Review Security

Review Security

Security audit for common vulnerabilities and unsafe patterns.

Usage

/review-security              # Review context-related code
/review-security --staged     # Review staged changes
/review-security --unpushed   # Review files changed across all unpushed commits
/review-security --changed    # Review unstaged changes
/review-security --all        # Full codebase audit (parallel agents)

Scope

--unpushed derives its range from git rev-list HEAD --not --remotes (oldest unpushed commit's parent → HEAD). If nothing is unpushed, or there is no remote/upstream (or the range walks back to the root commit) so it can't be determined reliably, stop and ask the user to pick another scope.

Do NOT skip checks:

• "This code is internal only" -- Internal code gets compromised too
• "This is just a prototype" -- Prototypes become production code
• "I already checked for the obvious issues" -- The non-obvious ones are the dangerous ones

Gotchas

• Dependency audit commands (pip-audit, safety check, bundle audit, govulncheck) must be installed separately. If missing, they silently produce no output rather than erroring.
• --staged, --unpushed, and --changed review the full file content, not just the diff. Pre-existing vulnerabilities in the file are flagged even if the staged/unstaged/unpushed change is unrelated.

Workflow

1. Determine scope based on flags (see Scope table above)

2. Review each file against the Security Checklist below, prioritizing categories in this order:

   1. Injection (OWASP 2021 A03) — highest exploitation likelihood
   2. Sensitive Data Exposure (OWASP 2021 A02) — hardcoded secrets are easy wins
   3. Broken Authentication (OWASP 2021 A07) — auth bugs have outsized impact
   4. Security Misconfiguration (OWASP 2021 A05) — config issues are common in PRs
   5. Dependency Vulnerabilities — run audit commands last (they take time)

3. Parallelize if scope has >5 files: spawn one sub-agent per checklist category, each scanning all files. Merge results and deduplicate.

   Dispatch workers that return findings without editing files. Disable delegation tools where supported; read-only access alone does not prevent delegation. Any coordinating role needs explicit subtasks, a descendant limit, and a stopping condition in its brief.

4. Check dependencies using the ecosystem-specific commands in the Dependency Vulnerabilities section

5. Classify severity for each finding:

   • Critical: Exploitable vulnerability with direct user/data impact (e.g., SQL injection on a public endpoint, hardcoded production secret)
   • High: Vulnerability requiring specific conditions to exploit but with serious impact (e.g., XSS in admin panel, missing rate limiting on login)
   • Medium: Security weakness that increases attack surface (e.g., overly permissive CORS, debug mode flag)
   • Suggestion: Defense-in-depth improvement (e.g., adding CSP headers, tightening cookie flags)

6. Report findings grouped by severity using the Output Format below

Security Checklist

References below use OWASP Top 10 2021 category numbers (A01–A10).

For code examples, grep patterns, false-positive rules, and dependency audit commands, see references/security-checklist.md.

Injection (OWASP A03)

• No string concatenation in SQL queries (use parameterized queries)
• No unsanitized user input passed to shell commands
• No direct HTML insertion from user content (use textContent or a sanitizer)

Broken Authentication (OWASP A07)

• Passwords hashed with bcrypt/argon2 (not MD5/SHA1)
• Rate limiting on login endpoints
• Session tokens are secure (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite)
• No credentials in URLs or logs
• Account lockout after failed attempts

Sensitive Data Exposure (OWASP A02)

• No hardcoded secrets, API keys, or passwords in source code (use environment variables)
• No sensitive fields (passwords, tokens) written to logs
• Grep source files for secret patterns — see references/security-checklist.md for patterns and false-positive filtering rules

Security Misconfiguration (OWASP A05)

• Debug mode disabled in production
• No default/test credentials
• Error messages don't expose internals
• CORS properly configured (not * for sensitive APIs)
• Security headers set (CSP, X-Frame-Options, etc.)

Dependency Vulnerabilities

Run ecosystem-specific audit commands — see references/security-checklist.md for commands by ecosystem.

Report any Critical or High severity vulnerabilities.

Output Format

## Security Review: {scope}

### Critical (fix immediately)
- {file}:{line} - {vulnerability type}: {description}
  **Fix:** {remediation}

### High Priority
- {file}:{line} - {issue}
  **Fix:** {remediation}

### Medium Priority
- {file} - {issue}

### Dependency Vulnerabilities
| Package | Severity | CVE | Fix Version |
|---------|----------|-----|-------------|
| {pkg} | Critical | CVE-XXXX-XXXX | {version} |

### Suggestions
- {improvement}

Examples

Staged changes introduce SQL injection:

/review-security --staged

Reviews staged files and catches a login handler using string concatenation to build a SQL query with user input. Reports it as Critical with a fix showing parameterized queries.

Pre-release audit finds hardcoded secret:

/review-security --all

Parallel agents scan the full codebase by security category. Finds a hardcoded API key in a config file and a JWT secret committed as a string literal, along with an overly permissive CORS policy allowing all origins.

Troubleshooting

False positive on an intentional security pattern

Solution: If the flagged code is deliberate (e.g., a test fixture with hardcoded credentials, or a localhost-only CORS wildcard), add a comment like // SECURITY: intentional - <reason> so future audits can skip it with context.

Obfuscated or generated code blocks the audit

Solution: Exclude generated files (e.g., *.min.js, dist/, generated/) from the scope and audit only the source inputs. For vendored code, check the upstream project's security advisories rather than scanning the minified output.

Notes

• Focus on exploitable vulnerabilities, not theoretical risks
• Always provide remediation guidance
• For --all, use parallel agents per category for speed
• Check both source code and configuration files
• Dependency checks require package manager files (package.json, requirements.txt, etc.)