Collecting Indicators of Compromise
When to Use
- During active incident response to identify and block adversary infrastructure
- Post-incident to document all observed adversary artifacts for future detection
- When sharing threat intelligence with ISACs, sector partners, or law enforcement
- When building detection rules in SIEM, EDR, or network security tools
- When enriching IOCs with threat intelligence context for risk scoring
Do not use for behavioral TTP analysis without accompanying technical indicators; use MITRE ATT&CK mapping for behavioral characterization.
Prerequisites
- Access to incident evidence sources: SIEM logs, EDR telemetry, memory dumps, disk images, network captures
- Threat intelligence platform (MISP, OpenCTI, ThreatConnect) for IOC management and sharing
- IOC enrichment tools: VirusTotal, OTX (AlienVault Open Threat Exchange), Shodan, DomainTools
- STIX 2.1 knowledge for structured IOC representation
- Sharing agreements with relevant ISACs (FS-ISAC, H-ISAC, IT-ISAC) or sector partners
Workflow
Step 1: Identify IOC Categories
Collect indicators across all categories from incident evidence:
Network Indicators:
- IP addresses (C2 servers, staging servers, exfiltration destinations)
- Domain names (C2 domains, phishing domains, DGA domains)
- URLs (malware download, C2 check-in, exfiltration endpoints)
- JA3/JA3S hashes (TLS client/server fingerprints)
- User-Agent strings (custom or unusual HTTP headers)
- DNS query patterns (tunneling signatures, DGA patterns)
Host Indicators:
- File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 of malware, tools, scripts)
- File paths (known malware installation directories)
- Registry keys (persistence mechanisms, configuration storage)
- Scheduled tasks and service names (persistence)
- Mutex/event names (malware instance synchronization)
- Named pipes (C2 communication channels, e.g., Cobalt Strike)
Email Indicators:
- Sender addresses and domains (spoofed or attacker-controlled)
- Subject lines and body content patterns
- Attachment names and hashes
- Embedded URLs
- Email header anomalies (SPF/DKIM/DMARC failures)
Step 2: Extract IOCs from Evidence Sources
Systematically extract indicators from each evidence source:
From SIEM/Log Analysis:
# Extract unique destination IPs from firewall logs
index=firewall action=blocked
| stats count by dest_ip
| where count > 100
# Extract domains from DNS query logs
index=dns query=*evil* OR query=*c2*
| stats count by query
From Memory Forensics:
# Extract network connections
vol -f memory.raw windows.netscan | grep ESTABLISHED
# Extract strings from suspicious process memory
vol -f memory.raw windows.memmap --pid 3847 --dump
strings -n 8 pid.3847.dmp | grep -E "(http|https)://"
From Malware Analysis:
Sandbox Report IOC Extraction:
- Dropped files: 3 (hashes extracted)
- DNS queries: update.evil[.]com, cdn.malware[.]net
- HTTP connections: POST to https://185.220.101[.]42/gate.php
- Registry modified: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svcupdate
- Mutex created: Global\MTX_0x1234ABCD
- Named pipe: \\.\pipe\MSSE-1234-server
Step 3: Enrich IOCs with Context
Add threat intelligence context to each indicator:
IOC Enrichment Report:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
IP: 185.220.101.42
VirusTotal: 12/89 vendors flag as malicious
Shodan: Open ports: 443, 8443, 80
Geolocation: Netherlands, AS208476
First Seen: 2025-10-01
Threat Intel: Associated with Qakbot C2 infrastructure
Confidence: High
TLP: AMBER
Domain: update.evil[.]com
Registration: 2025-10-28 (recently registered)
Registrar: Namecheap
WHOIS Privacy: Yes
VirusTotal: 8/89 vendors flag as malicious
DNS History: Resolved to 185.220.101.42, 91.215.85.17
Confidence: High
TLP: AMBER
Step 4: Score and Prioritize IOCs
Assign confidence and risk scores to each indicator:
| Score |
Confidence Level |
Criteria |
| 90-100 |
Confirmed Malicious |
Multiple TI sources confirm, observed in active attack |
| 70-89 |
Highly Suspicious |
Single TI source confirms, behavioral analysis supports |
| 50-69 |
Suspicious |
Limited TI data, contextually suspicious |
| 30-49 |
Unconfirmed |
No TI matches, but anomalous in environment |
| 0-29 |
Likely Benign |
False positive indicators or legitimate infrastructure |
Step 5: Distribute IOCs for Detection and Blocking
Push IOCs to defensive systems for immediate protection:
- Firewall/IPS: Block C2 IPs and domains
- DNS: Sinkhole malicious domains
- EDR: Add file hashes to blocklist, create custom IOC watchlists
- Email Gateway: Block sender domains, attachment hashes, malicious URLs
- SIEM: Create correlation searches for IOC matches
- Web Proxy: Block URLs and domains in web filtering policy
Step 6: Share IOCs with Partners
Package IOCs in STIX 2.1 format for sharing:
{
"type": "indicator",
"spec_version": "2.1",
"id": "indicator--a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
"created": "2025-11-15T18:00:00Z",
"modified": "2025-11-15T18:00:00Z",
"name": "Qakbot C2 Server IP",
"indicator_types": ["malicious-activity"],
"pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '185.220.101.42']",
"pattern_type": "stix",
"valid_from": "2025-11-15T14:23:00Z",
"confidence": 95,
"labels": ["c2", "qakbot"],
"object_marking_refs": ["marking-definition--f88d31f6-486f-44da-b317-01333bde0b82"]
}
Submit to MISP, ISAC portals, and TAXII servers per sharing agreements.
Key Concepts
| Term |
Definition |
| IOC (Indicator of Compromise) |
Technical artifact observed during a security incident that indicates adversary presence (hash, IP, domain, etc.) |
| TLP (Traffic Light Protocol) |
Standard for classifying the sharing restrictions of threat intelligence: WHITE, GREEN, AMBER, AMBER+STRICT, RED |
| STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) |
Standard language for representing cyber threat intelligence in a structured, machine-readable format |
| TAXII (Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information) |
Transport protocol for sharing STIX-formatted threat intelligence between organizations |
| Confidence Score |
Numerical rating (0-100) indicating the analyst's certainty that an indicator is truly malicious |
| IOC Lifecycle |
Process of creating, validating, distributing, and eventually retiring indicators as they lose relevance |
| Defanging |
Practice of modifying malicious URLs and domains in reports to prevent accidental clicks (e.g., evil[.]com) |
Tools & Systems
- MISP: Open-source threat intelligence sharing platform for managing, storing, and distributing IOCs
- VirusTotal: Multi-engine malware scanning and threat intelligence platform for IOC enrichment
- OpenCTI: Open-source cyber threat intelligence platform supporting STIX 2.1 natively
- Yeti: Open-source platform for organizing observables, indicators, and TTPs
- CyberChef: GCHQ's data transformation tool useful for decoding, defanging, and formatting IOCs
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Post-Incident IOC Package for ISAC Sharing
Context: After responding to a Qakbot infection that led to Cobalt Strike deployment, the IR team must package all IOCs for sharing with the Financial Services ISAC (FS-ISAC).
Approach:
- Compile all network, host, and email indicators from the investigation
- Enrich each IOC with VirusTotal and MISP correlation data
- Assign confidence scores based on direct observation vs. secondary correlation
- Mark all IOCs with TLP:AMBER for partner sharing
- Export as STIX 2.1 bundle and submit to FS-ISAC TAXII feed
- Create a human-readable IOC summary report for email distribution
Pitfalls:
- Including internal IP addresses or hostnames in shared IOC packages (information leakage)
- Sharing IOCs at TLP:WHITE that should be restricted to TLP:AMBER
- Not defanging URLs and domains in human-readable reports
- Sharing IP addresses of legitimate CDNs or cloud providers as malicious IOCs
Output Format
INDICATOR OF COMPROMISE REPORT
================================
Incident: INC-2025-1547
Date: 2025-11-15
TLP: AMBER
Sharing: FS-ISAC, internal SOC
NETWORK INDICATORS
Type | Value | Confidence | Context
---------|--------------------------|------------|--------
IPv4 | 185.220.101[.]42 | 95 | Qakbot C2 server
IPv4 | 91.215.85[.]17 | 90 | Cobalt Strike C2
Domain | update.evil[.]com | 95 | Staging domain
URL | hxxps://185.220[.]101.42/gate.php | 95 | C2 check-in
JA3 | a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc7...| 80 | Qakbot TLS fingerprint
HOST INDICATORS
Type | Value | Confidence | Context
---------|--------------------------|------------|--------
SHA-256 | a1b2c3d4e5f6... | 100 | Qakbot dropper
SHA-256 | b2c3d4e5f6a7... | 100 | Cobalt Strike beacon
FilePath | C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\update.exe | 85 | Dropper location
RegKey | HKCU\...\Run\svcupdate | 90 | Persistence
Mutex | Global\MTX_0x1234ABCD | 95 | Qakbot instance lock
Task | WindowsUpdate | 90 | Scheduled task persistence
EMAIL INDICATORS
Type | Value | Confidence | Context
---------|--------------------------|------------|--------
Sender | billing@spoofed[.]com | 95 | Phishing sender
Subject | "Invoice-Nov2025" | 70 | Phishing subject line
Hash | c3d4e5f6a7b8... | 100 | Malicious .docm attachment
TOTAL: 14 indicators | HIGH confidence avg: 91
1---2name: collecting-indicators-of-compromise3description: >4 Systematically collects, categorizes, and distributes indicators of compromise (IOCs)5 during and after security incidents to enable detection, blocking, and threat intelligence6 sharing. Covers network, host, email, and behavioral indicators using STIX/TAXII7 formats and threat intelligence platforms. Activates for requests involving IOC collection,8 indicator extraction, threat indicator sharing, compromise indicators, STIX export,9 or IOC enrichment.10domain: cybersecurity11subdomain: incident-response12tags: [IOC-collection, threat-indicators, STIX-TAXII, MISP, threat-intelligence-sharing]13version: 1.0.014author: mahipal15license: MIT16metadata:17 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/njones17/collecting-indicators-of-compromise18---1920# Collecting Indicators of Compromise2122## When to Use2324- During active incident response to identify and block adversary infrastructure25- Post-incident to document all observed adversary artifacts for future detection26- When sharing threat intelligence with ISACs, sector partners, or law enforcement27- When building detection rules in SIEM, EDR, or network security tools28- When enriching IOCs with threat intelligence context for risk scoring2930**Do not use** for behavioral TTP analysis without accompanying technical indicators; use MITRE ATT&CK mapping for behavioral characterization.3132## Prerequisites3334- Access to incident evidence sources: SIEM logs, EDR telemetry, memory dumps, disk images, network captures35- Threat intelligence platform (MISP, OpenCTI, ThreatConnect) for IOC management and sharing36- IOC enrichment tools: VirusTotal, OTX (AlienVault Open Threat Exchange), Shodan, DomainTools37- STIX 2.1 knowledge for structured IOC representation38- Sharing agreements with relevant ISACs (FS-ISAC, H-ISAC, IT-ISAC) or sector partners3940## Workflow4142### Step 1: Identify IOC Categories4344Collect indicators across all categories from incident evidence:4546**Network Indicators:**47- IP addresses (C2 servers, staging servers, exfiltration destinations)48- Domain names (C2 domains, phishing domains, DGA domains)49- URLs (malware download, C2 check-in, exfiltration endpoints)50- JA3/JA3S hashes (TLS client/server fingerprints)51- User-Agent strings (custom or unusual HTTP headers)52- DNS query patterns (tunneling signatures, DGA patterns)5354**Host Indicators:**55- File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 of malware, tools, scripts)56- File paths (known malware installation directories)57- Registry keys (persistence mechanisms, configuration storage)58- Scheduled tasks and service names (persistence)59- Mutex/event names (malware instance synchronization)60- Named pipes (C2 communication channels, e.g., Cobalt Strike)6162**Email Indicators:**63- Sender addresses and domains (spoofed or attacker-controlled)64- Subject lines and body content patterns65- Attachment names and hashes66- Embedded URLs67- Email header anomalies (SPF/DKIM/DMARC failures)6869### Step 2: Extract IOCs from Evidence Sources7071Systematically extract indicators from each evidence source:7273**From SIEM/Log Analysis:**74```75# Extract unique destination IPs from firewall logs76index=firewall action=blocked77| stats count by dest_ip78| where count > 1007980# Extract domains from DNS query logs81index=dns query=*evil* OR query=*c2*82| stats count by query83```8485**From Memory Forensics:**86```bash87# Extract network connections88vol -f memory.raw windows.netscan | grep ESTABLISHED8990# Extract strings from suspicious process memory91vol -f memory.raw windows.memmap --pid 3847 --dump92strings -n 8 pid.3847.dmp | grep -E "(http|https)://"93```9495**From Malware Analysis:**96```97Sandbox Report IOC Extraction:98- Dropped files: 3 (hashes extracted)99- DNS queries: update.evil[.]com, cdn.malware[.]net100- HTTP connections: POST to https://185.220.101[.]42/gate.php101- Registry modified: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svcupdate102- Mutex created: Global\MTX_0x1234ABCD103- Named pipe: \\.\pipe\MSSE-1234-server104```105106### Step 3: Enrich IOCs with Context107108Add threat intelligence context to each indicator:109110```111IOC Enrichment Report:112━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━113IP: 185.220.101.42114 VirusTotal: 12/89 vendors flag as malicious115 Shodan: Open ports: 443, 8443, 80116 Geolocation: Netherlands, AS208476117 First Seen: 2025-10-01118 Threat Intel: Associated with Qakbot C2 infrastructure119 Confidence: High120 TLP: AMBER121122Domain: update.evil[.]com123 Registration: 2025-10-28 (recently registered)124 Registrar: Namecheap125 WHOIS Privacy: Yes126 VirusTotal: 8/89 vendors flag as malicious127 DNS History: Resolved to 185.220.101.42, 91.215.85.17128 Confidence: High129 TLP: AMBER130```131132### Step 4: Score and Prioritize IOCs133134Assign confidence and risk scores to each indicator:135136| Score | Confidence Level | Criteria |137|-------|-----------------|----------|138| 90-100 | Confirmed Malicious | Multiple TI sources confirm, observed in active attack |139| 70-89 | Highly Suspicious | Single TI source confirms, behavioral analysis supports |140| 50-69 | Suspicious | Limited TI data, contextually suspicious |141| 30-49 | Unconfirmed | No TI matches, but anomalous in environment |142| 0-29 | Likely Benign | False positive indicators or legitimate infrastructure |143144### Step 5: Distribute IOCs for Detection and Blocking145146Push IOCs to defensive systems for immediate protection:147148- **Firewall/IPS**: Block C2 IPs and domains149- **DNS**: Sinkhole malicious domains150- **EDR**: Add file hashes to blocklist, create custom IOC watchlists151- **Email Gateway**: Block sender domains, attachment hashes, malicious URLs152- **SIEM**: Create correlation searches for IOC matches153- **Web Proxy**: Block URLs and domains in web filtering policy154155### Step 6: Share IOCs with Partners156157Package IOCs in STIX 2.1 format for sharing:158159```json160{161 "type": "indicator",162 "spec_version": "2.1",163 "id": "indicator--a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",164 "created": "2025-11-15T18:00:00Z",165 "modified": "2025-11-15T18:00:00Z",166 "name": "Qakbot C2 Server IP",167 "indicator_types": ["malicious-activity"],168 "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '185.220.101.42']",169 "pattern_type": "stix",170 "valid_from": "2025-11-15T14:23:00Z",171 "confidence": 95,172 "labels": ["c2", "qakbot"],173 "object_marking_refs": ["marking-definition--f88d31f6-486f-44da-b317-01333bde0b82"]174}175```176177Submit to MISP, ISAC portals, and TAXII servers per sharing agreements.178179## Key Concepts180181| Term | Definition |182|------|------------|183| **IOC (Indicator of Compromise)** | Technical artifact observed during a security incident that indicates adversary presence (hash, IP, domain, etc.) |184| **TLP (Traffic Light Protocol)** | Standard for classifying the sharing restrictions of threat intelligence: WHITE, GREEN, AMBER, AMBER+STRICT, RED |185| **STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression)** | Standard language for representing cyber threat intelligence in a structured, machine-readable format |186| **TAXII (Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information)** | Transport protocol for sharing STIX-formatted threat intelligence between organizations |187| **Confidence Score** | Numerical rating (0-100) indicating the analyst's certainty that an indicator is truly malicious |188| **IOC Lifecycle** | Process of creating, validating, distributing, and eventually retiring indicators as they lose relevance |189| **Defanging** | Practice of modifying malicious URLs and domains in reports to prevent accidental clicks (e.g., evil[.]com) |190191## Tools & Systems192193- **MISP**: Open-source threat intelligence sharing platform for managing, storing, and distributing IOCs194- **VirusTotal**: Multi-engine malware scanning and threat intelligence platform for IOC enrichment195- **OpenCTI**: Open-source cyber threat intelligence platform supporting STIX 2.1 natively196- **Yeti**: Open-source platform for organizing observables, indicators, and TTPs197- **CyberChef**: GCHQ's data transformation tool useful for decoding, defanging, and formatting IOCs198199## Common Scenarios200201### Scenario: Post-Incident IOC Package for ISAC Sharing202203**Context**: After responding to a Qakbot infection that led to Cobalt Strike deployment, the IR team must package all IOCs for sharing with the Financial Services ISAC (FS-ISAC).204205**Approach**:2061. Compile all network, host, and email indicators from the investigation2072. Enrich each IOC with VirusTotal and MISP correlation data2083. Assign confidence scores based on direct observation vs. secondary correlation2094. Mark all IOCs with TLP:AMBER for partner sharing2105. Export as STIX 2.1 bundle and submit to FS-ISAC TAXII feed2116. Create a human-readable IOC summary report for email distribution212213**Pitfalls**:214- Including internal IP addresses or hostnames in shared IOC packages (information leakage)215- Sharing IOCs at TLP:WHITE that should be restricted to TLP:AMBER216- Not defanging URLs and domains in human-readable reports217- Sharing IP addresses of legitimate CDNs or cloud providers as malicious IOCs218219## Output Format220221```222INDICATOR OF COMPROMISE REPORT223================================224Incident: INC-2025-1547225Date: 2025-11-15226TLP: AMBER227Sharing: FS-ISAC, internal SOC228229NETWORK INDICATORS230Type | Value | Confidence | Context231---------|--------------------------|------------|--------232IPv4 | 185.220.101[.]42 | 95 | Qakbot C2 server233IPv4 | 91.215.85[.]17 | 90 | Cobalt Strike C2234Domain | update.evil[.]com | 95 | Staging domain235URL | hxxps://185.220[.]101.42/gate.php | 95 | C2 check-in236JA3 | a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc7...| 80 | Qakbot TLS fingerprint237238HOST INDICATORS239Type | Value | Confidence | Context240---------|--------------------------|------------|--------241SHA-256 | a1b2c3d4e5f6... | 100 | Qakbot dropper242SHA-256 | b2c3d4e5f6a7... | 100 | Cobalt Strike beacon243FilePath | C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\update.exe | 85 | Dropper location244RegKey | HKCU\...\Run\svcupdate | 90 | Persistence245Mutex | Global\MTX_0x1234ABCD | 95 | Qakbot instance lock246Task | WindowsUpdate | 90 | Scheduled task persistence247248EMAIL INDICATORS249Type | Value | Confidence | Context250---------|--------------------------|------------|--------251Sender | billing@spoofed[.]com | 95 | Phishing sender252Subject | "Invoice-Nov2025" | 70 | Phishing subject line253Hash | c3d4e5f6a7b8... | 100 | Malicious .docm attachment254255TOTAL: 14 indicators | HIGH confidence avg: 91256```