1---2name: detecting-process-hollowing-technique3description: Detect process hollowing (T1055.012) by analyzing memory-mapped sections, hollowed process indicators, and parent-child process anomalies in EDR telemetry.4domain: cybersecurity5subdomain: threat-hunting6tags: [threat-hunting, mitre-attack, process-hollowing, process-injection, edr, t1055, proactive-detection]7version: "1.0"8author: mahipal9license: MIT10metadata:11 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/njones17/detecting-process-hollowing-technique12---1314# Detecting Process Hollowing Technique1516## When to Use1718- When investigating suspected fileless malware or in-memory threats19- After EDR alerts on process injection or suspicious memory operations20- When hunting for defense evasion techniques in a compromised environment21- When threat intel reports indicate process hollowing in active campaigns22- During purple team exercises validating T1055.012 detection coverage2324## Prerequisites2526- EDR with memory protection monitoring (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)27- Sysmon with Event IDs 1 (Process Create), 8 (CreateRemoteThread), 25 (ProcessTampering)28- Windows ETW providers for process hollowing (Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process)29- Memory forensics capabilities (Volatility, WinDbg)30- Process integrity monitoring tools3132## Workflow33341. **Understand Hollowing Mechanics**: Process hollowing involves creating a legitimate process in suspended state, unmapping its memory, writing malicious code, then resuming execution.352. **Monitor Suspended Process Creation**: Hunt for processes created with CREATE_SUSPENDED flag followed by memory writes and thread resumption.363. **Detect Memory Section Anomalies**: Identify processes where the in-memory image differs from the on-disk binary (image mismatch).374. **Analyze Parent-Child Process Trees**: Flag processes whose behavior does not match their binary name (e.g., svchost.exe making unusual network connections).385. **Check Process Integrity**: Compare process memory sections against the legitimate binary on disk.396. **Correlate with Network Activity**: Hollowed processes often establish C2 connections - correlate suspicious process behavior with network logs.407. **Document and Contain**: Report findings, isolate affected endpoints, and update detection rules.4142## Key Concepts4344| Concept | Description |45|---------|-------------|46| T1055.012 | Process Injection: Process Hollowing |47| T1055 | Process Injection (parent technique) |48| T1055.001 | DLL Injection |49| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |50| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call |51| CREATE_SUSPENDED | Windows flag to create a process in suspended state |52| NtUnmapViewOfSection | API to unmap process memory sections |53| WriteProcessMemory | API to write into another process's memory |54| ResumeThread | API to resume a suspended thread |55| Image Mismatch | Process memory content differs from on-disk binary |56| Process Doppelganging | Related technique using NTFS transactions (T1055.013) |5758## Tools & Systems5960| Tool | Purpose |61|------|---------|62| CrowdStrike Falcon | Memory protection and hollowing detection |63| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | ProcessTampering alerts |64| Sysmon v13+ | Event ID 25 ProcessTampering detection |65| Volatility | Memory forensics - malfind plugin |66| pe-sieve | Process memory scanner for hollowed processes |67| Hollows Hunter | Automated hollowed process detection |68| Process Hacker | Live process memory inspection |69| API Monitor | Monitor NtUnmapViewOfSection calls |7071## Common Scenarios72731. **Svchost.exe Hollowing**: Malware creates svchost.exe suspended, hollows it, injects backdoor code - process appears legitimate but behaves maliciously.742. **Explorer.exe Hollowing**: Attacker hollows explorer.exe to inherit its network permissions and trusted process context.753. **Rundll32 Hollowing**: Malicious loader creates rundll32.exe, replaces its memory with implant code for C2 beaconing.764. **Multi-Stage Hollowing**: Loader uses process hollowing as first stage, then performs additional injection into services.7778## Output Format7980```81Hunt ID: TH-HOLLOW-[DATE]-[SEQ]82Technique: T1055.01283Hollowed Process: [Process name and PID]84Original Binary: [Expected on-disk path]85Parent Process: [Parent name and PID]86Memory Mismatch: [Yes/No]87Suspicious APIs: [NtUnmapViewOfSection, WriteProcessMemory, etc.]88Network Activity: [C2 connections if any]89Host: [Hostname]90User: [Account context]91Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]92```