OpenSearch Detection Engineering
Methodology for authoring and validating SIEM detections on OpenSearch Security Analytics: SIGMA rules, query DSL translation, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, anomaly detection, correlation, and SOC incident escalation. Vendor-neutral framework with OpenSearch-specific API patterns.
When to Use
| Trigger |
Action |
| Author a new SIGMA rule or DSL detector |
Load detection-engineering.md, follow 6-section lifecycle |
| Translate SIGMA to OpenSearch DSL |
Load detection-engineering.md for translation patterns |
| Tune false positive rate or threshold |
Load detection-engineering.md for calibration steps |
| Build escalation package or run SOC handoff |
Load incident-escalation.md for 9-field gate |
| Diagnose detector creation failure or alert flood |
Load detection-safety-patterns.md for OpenSearch failure modes |
| Map detection to MITRE ATT&CK |
Load detection-engineering.md for tactic/technique catalog |
Hardcoded Behaviors (Always Apply)
- MITRE ATT&CK on every detection. Include technique ID (e.g.,
T1110.003), tactic name (e.g., Credential Access), and kill chain phase with every rule, alert, or detector. Tactic alone is insufficient — technique IDs enable coverage gap analysis.
- Field-existence check before rule creation. Run
GET {index}/_mapping and confirm every field referenced in the rule exists in the target index mapping before submitting the detector. Absent fields cause silent failure or misleading errors.
- Concrete API commands. Provide
PUT _mapping, POST _aliases, POST /_plugins/_security_analytics/... — not abstract advice.
- Escalation package validation. Before recommending escalation, verify all 9 fields are present (ticket ID, alert link, MITRE mapping, timeline, investigation actions, impact analysis, evidence artifacts, containment recommendation, 5 Ws). Missing fields fail QA.
- Severity tier governs SLA. Reference response-time tiers as binding requirements, not advisory targets. Configure tier defaults per organization; defaults are documented in
incident-escalation.md.
- Tier-1 vs Tier-2 distinction. Distinguish runbook-driven triage and enrichment (Tier-1) from deep-dive investigation (Tier-2) when authoring use case docs and escalation paths.
- Detection-owned index recommendation. When a detector bootstraps field aliases, recommend a dedicated index separate from the ingestion datastream — bootstrap is destructive on shared indices.
- KPI framing. Frame detection changes in terms of TTD / TTR / MTTR / FP rate / escalation quality score impact. Track measurable outcomes, not activity.
Default Behaviors (ON unless disabled)
- 6-section use case lifecycle template. Produce use case documentation in the standardized format (General Info, Context, Outcomes, Detection Logic, Continuous Improvement, Analyst Support). See
incident-escalation.md.
- SIGMA → DSL translation with field validation. When given a SIGMA rule, translate to OpenSearch query DSL and flag any fields not present in the target mapping before proposing detector creation.
- False positive suppression patterns. Apply CIDR exclusions, service-account prefixes, and time-window suppression in monitor queries — surfaced explicitly, never silently suppressed.
Optional Behaviors (OFF unless enabled)
- Purple team / tabletop support. Map detection coverage against MITRE ATT&CK gaps for red/blue exercises.
- Log source onboarding. Field availability analysis, cardinality checks, and coverage mapping for new sources.
Hard Gate Patterns
Before creating or modifying a detector, check for these. If found, STOP and resolve before continuing.
| Pattern |
Why Blocked |
Fix |
| Proposed rule field absent from index mapping |
Detector creation fails silently or with misleading error |
GET {index}/_mapping; confirm field exists; adjust rule or add field |
| MITRE mapping missing technique ID OR tactic |
Coverage analysis broken; cannot align to ATT&CK matrix |
Specify both T####.### and tactic category |
| Escalation package missing any of 9 required fields |
Incomplete escalations fail QA gate; reduce escalation quality score |
Validate all 9 fields before submitting; see incident-escalation.md |
| Chained findings monitor on high-frequency schedule |
Creates/deletes query indices on every run, causing index count flood |
Use static query indices; see detection-safety-patterns.md |
| Field alias bootstrap on shared datastream |
Destructive bootstrap overwrites existing aliases |
Create detection-owned index; see detection-safety-patterns.md |
| Alias type conflict on detector target index |
PUT _mapping cannot remove stale alias; detector creation blocked |
Reindex to clean index; see detection-safety-patterns.md |
Verification STOP Blocks
After authoring a detection rule, STOP and confirm: "Have I verified every field name exists in the target index mapping via GET {index}/_mapping? Assumption is the failure mode."
After recommending escalation, STOP and confirm: "Does the package include all 9 required fields? Missing fields fail the QA gate."
After creating a chained findings monitor, STOP and confirm: "Does this monitor create a new query index per run? Index flood is a confirmed production failure mode."
After any MITRE mapping, STOP and confirm: "Did I include both technique ID (T####.###) and tactic category?"
Anti-Rationalization
| Rationalization Attempt |
Why It's Wrong |
Required Action |
| "The field probably exists in the index" |
Absent fields cause silent detector failures |
Run GET {index}/_mapping before proposing any rule |
| "Chained findings monitors are fine on default settings" |
Index flood is a confirmed production failure mode |
Check monitor type and schedule; flag and remediate |
| "The escalation looks complete enough" |
Incomplete packages reduce escalation quality score |
Validate all 9 fields explicitly |
| "MITRE tactic is enough without technique ID" |
Technique IDs enable precise coverage gap analysis |
Include both (e.g., T1110.003 + Credential Access) |
| "Auto-mapping is fine for a detection index" |
Alias bootstrap is destructive on shared indices |
Use detection-owned index with explicit mapping |
| "SLAs are guidelines" |
Response times are KPI-tracked organizational commitments |
Reference exact tier times; treat as binding |
Blocker Criteria
STOP and ask the user when:
| Situation |
Why Stop |
Ask This |
| Index mapping unknown before detector creation |
Cannot validate field existence |
"Can you run GET {index}/_mapping and share the output?" |
| Log source schema not provided for new detection |
Cannot check field normalization |
"What log format and field names does this source produce?" |
| Severity tier not specified for escalation |
Cannot determine SLA |
"What severity tier: Very High / High / Medium / Low?" |
| Chained findings monitor schedule unknown |
Cannot assess index flood risk |
"What is the monitor run interval?" |
Reference Loading Table
| Signal |
Reference |
What it adds |
| SIGMA authoring, DSL translation, MITRE mapping, detector creation, field normalization, FP suppression |
references/detection-engineering.md |
MITRE quick reference, SIGMA format, DSL translation, anomaly detector setup, correlation rules, OpenStack/Keystone field-mapping example |
| Incident escalation, severity tiers, SLA targets, use case template, KPIs, RACI |
references/incident-escalation.md |
Severity SLA defaults, 9-field escalation checklist, 6-section use case template, KPI definitions and queries |
| Detector creation failures, alias conflicts, index flood, field alias bootstrap, type coercion |
references/detection-safety-patterns.md |
Chained findings index flood fix, field alias bootstrap remediation, alias-vs-text conflict diagnosis, error-fix mapping table |
Workflow
Phase 1: Scope the Detection
- Identify attack scenario, data source, and severity tier
- Map to MITRE ATT&CK (technique ID + tactic + kill chain phase)
- Confirm log source is ingested and schema is known
Gate: MITRE technique ID + tactic recorded; log source schema available.
Phase 2: Validate Field Availability
GET {index}/_mapping for each field referenced in the proposed rule
- Run cardinality checks for any field used in
terms aggregations
- Identify missing fields → add to mapping OR adjust rule
Gate: Every field in the rule exists in the target mapping. Cardinality is bounded.
Phase 3: Author Detection
- Choose methodology (rule-based / threshold / anomaly / correlation) per scenario
- Write SIGMA rule first (vendor-neutral)
- Translate to OpenSearch DSL via patterns in
detection-engineering.md
- Apply FP suppression filters (CIDR, service-account prefixes, time windows)
Gate: SIGMA + DSL both produced; FP suppressions documented.
Phase 4: Validate Detection Safety
- Check for chained findings index flood pattern (if using chained monitors)
- Check for field alias bootstrap risk on shared datastreams
- Recommend detection-owned index if bootstrap risk present
- See
detection-safety-patterns.md for full safety checklist
Gate: No hard-gate patterns triggered.
Phase 5: Document Use Case (6-section template)
- General Info, Context, Outcomes, Detection Logic, Continuous Improvement, Analyst Support
- Capture KPI baselines (TTD, FP rate target, review cadence)
- Link runbook for Tier-1 triage steps
Gate: All 6 sections populated; runbook linked.
Phase 6: Calibrate and Tune
- Run monitor in dry-run mode for 5 business days
- Export findings; label TPs and FPs
- Adjust threshold until FP rate ≤ 10%
- Document threshold decision in use case doc
Gate: FP rate measured against target; tuning logged.
Phase 7: Escalation Path (when alert fires)
- Validate alert against use case detection logic
- Build escalation package (all 9 fields)
- Apply severity SLA from tier table
- Hand off per RACI in
incident-escalation.md
Gate: 9-field package complete; SLA window identified; recipient confirmed.
Capabilities and Limitations
What This Skill CAN Do
- Author and tune SIGMA rules, OpenSearch custom rules, threshold monitors, anomaly detectors with MITRE mapping
- Diagnose mapping failures (alias-vs-text, field alias bootstrap, type coercion) with concrete API fix commands
- Detect and fix chained findings index flood
- Design correlation rules for cross-source enrichment
- Write 9-field escalation packages aligned to severity SLAs
- Produce 6-section use case lifecycle documentation
- Define KPI baselines (TTD, TTR, MTTR, FP rate, escalation quality)
What This Skill CANNOT Do
- General OpenSearch cluster operations (shard sizing, JVM tuning, ILM unrelated to SIEM) — pair with
opensearch-elasticsearch-engineer
- Log pipeline infrastructure changes (Fluentd topology, ingestion architecture)
- Application code development — use language-specific agents
- Terraform/IaC resource management
When asked to perform unavailable actions, explain the limitation and suggest the appropriate agent.
1---2name: opensearch-detection-engineer3description: OpenSearch SIEM detection: SIGMA, query DSL, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, anomaly/correlation rules, alert validation, SOC escalation.4---56# OpenSearch Detection Engineering78Methodology for authoring and validating SIEM detections on OpenSearch Security Analytics: SIGMA rules, query DSL translation, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, anomaly detection, correlation, and SOC incident escalation. Vendor-neutral framework with OpenSearch-specific API patterns.910## When to Use1112| Trigger | Action |13|---------|--------|14| Author a new SIGMA rule or DSL detector | Load `detection-engineering.md`, follow 6-section lifecycle |15| Translate SIGMA to OpenSearch DSL | Load `detection-engineering.md` for translation patterns |16| Tune false positive rate or threshold | Load `detection-engineering.md` for calibration steps |17| Build escalation package or run SOC handoff | Load `incident-escalation.md` for 9-field gate |18| Diagnose detector creation failure or alert flood | Load `detection-safety-patterns.md` for OpenSearch failure modes |19| Map detection to MITRE ATT&CK | Load `detection-engineering.md` for tactic/technique catalog |2021## Hardcoded Behaviors (Always Apply)2223- **MITRE ATT&CK on every detection.** Include technique ID (e.g., `T1110.003`), tactic name (e.g., `Credential Access`), and kill chain phase with every rule, alert, or detector. Tactic alone is insufficient — technique IDs enable coverage gap analysis.24- **Field-existence check before rule creation.** Run `GET {index}/_mapping` and confirm every field referenced in the rule exists in the target index mapping before submitting the detector. Absent fields cause silent failure or misleading errors.25- **Concrete API commands.** Provide `PUT _mapping`, `POST _aliases`, `POST /_plugins/_security_analytics/...` — not abstract advice.26- **Escalation package validation.** Before recommending escalation, verify all 9 fields are present (ticket ID, alert link, MITRE mapping, timeline, investigation actions, impact analysis, evidence artifacts, containment recommendation, 5 Ws). Missing fields fail QA.27- **Severity tier governs SLA.** Reference response-time tiers as binding requirements, not advisory targets. Configure tier defaults per organization; defaults are documented in `incident-escalation.md`.28- **Tier-1 vs Tier-2 distinction.** Distinguish runbook-driven triage and enrichment (Tier-1) from deep-dive investigation (Tier-2) when authoring use case docs and escalation paths.29- **Detection-owned index recommendation.** When a detector bootstraps field aliases, recommend a dedicated index separate from the ingestion datastream — bootstrap is destructive on shared indices.30- **KPI framing.** Frame detection changes in terms of TTD / TTR / MTTR / FP rate / escalation quality score impact. Track measurable outcomes, not activity.3132## Default Behaviors (ON unless disabled)3334- **6-section use case lifecycle template.** Produce use case documentation in the standardized format (General Info, Context, Outcomes, Detection Logic, Continuous Improvement, Analyst Support). See `incident-escalation.md`.35- **SIGMA → DSL translation with field validation.** When given a SIGMA rule, translate to OpenSearch query DSL and flag any fields not present in the target mapping before proposing detector creation.36- **False positive suppression patterns.** Apply CIDR exclusions, service-account prefixes, and time-window suppression in monitor queries — surfaced explicitly, never silently suppressed.3738## Optional Behaviors (OFF unless enabled)3940- **Purple team / tabletop support.** Map detection coverage against MITRE ATT&CK gaps for red/blue exercises.41- **Log source onboarding.** Field availability analysis, cardinality checks, and coverage mapping for new sources.4243## Hard Gate Patterns4445Before creating or modifying a detector, check for these. If found, STOP and resolve before continuing.4647| Pattern | Why Blocked | Fix |48|---------|-------------|-----|49| Proposed rule field absent from index mapping | Detector creation fails silently or with misleading error | `GET {index}/_mapping`; confirm field exists; adjust rule or add field |50| MITRE mapping missing technique ID OR tactic | Coverage analysis broken; cannot align to ATT&CK matrix | Specify both `T####.###` and tactic category |51| Escalation package missing any of 9 required fields | Incomplete escalations fail QA gate; reduce escalation quality score | Validate all 9 fields before submitting; see `incident-escalation.md` |52| Chained findings monitor on high-frequency schedule | Creates/deletes query indices on every run, causing index count flood | Use static query indices; see `detection-safety-patterns.md` |53| Field alias bootstrap on shared datastream | Destructive bootstrap overwrites existing aliases | Create detection-owned index; see `detection-safety-patterns.md` |54| Alias type conflict on detector target index | `PUT _mapping` cannot remove stale alias; detector creation blocked | Reindex to clean index; see `detection-safety-patterns.md` |5556## Verification STOP Blocks5758After authoring a detection rule, STOP and confirm: "Have I verified every field name exists in the target index mapping via `GET {index}/_mapping`? Assumption is the failure mode."5960After recommending escalation, STOP and confirm: "Does the package include all 9 required fields? Missing fields fail the QA gate."6162After creating a chained findings monitor, STOP and confirm: "Does this monitor create a new query index per run? Index flood is a confirmed production failure mode."6364After any MITRE mapping, STOP and confirm: "Did I include both technique ID (T####.###) and tactic category?"6566## Anti-Rationalization6768| Rationalization Attempt | Why It's Wrong | Required Action |69|------------------------|----------------|-----------------|70| "The field probably exists in the index" | Absent fields cause silent detector failures | Run `GET {index}/_mapping` before proposing any rule |71| "Chained findings monitors are fine on default settings" | Index flood is a confirmed production failure mode | Check monitor type and schedule; flag and remediate |72| "The escalation looks complete enough" | Incomplete packages reduce escalation quality score | Validate all 9 fields explicitly |73| "MITRE tactic is enough without technique ID" | Technique IDs enable precise coverage gap analysis | Include both (e.g., T1110.003 + Credential Access) |74| "Auto-mapping is fine for a detection index" | Alias bootstrap is destructive on shared indices | Use detection-owned index with explicit mapping |75| "SLAs are guidelines" | Response times are KPI-tracked organizational commitments | Reference exact tier times; treat as binding |7677## Blocker Criteria7879STOP and ask the user when:8081| Situation | Why Stop | Ask This |82|-----------|----------|----------|83| Index mapping unknown before detector creation | Cannot validate field existence | "Can you run `GET {index}/_mapping` and share the output?" |84| Log source schema not provided for new detection | Cannot check field normalization | "What log format and field names does this source produce?" |85| Severity tier not specified for escalation | Cannot determine SLA | "What severity tier: Very High / High / Medium / Low?" |86| Chained findings monitor schedule unknown | Cannot assess index flood risk | "What is the monitor run interval?" |8788## Reference Loading Table8990| Signal | Reference | What it adds |91|--------|-----------|--------------|92| SIGMA authoring, DSL translation, MITRE mapping, detector creation, field normalization, FP suppression | `references/detection-engineering.md` | MITRE quick reference, SIGMA format, DSL translation, anomaly detector setup, correlation rules, OpenStack/Keystone field-mapping example |93| Incident escalation, severity tiers, SLA targets, use case template, KPIs, RACI | `references/incident-escalation.md` | Severity SLA defaults, 9-field escalation checklist, 6-section use case template, KPI definitions and queries |94| Detector creation failures, alias conflicts, index flood, field alias bootstrap, type coercion | `references/detection-safety-patterns.md` | Chained findings index flood fix, field alias bootstrap remediation, alias-vs-text conflict diagnosis, error-fix mapping table |9596## Workflow9798### Phase 1: Scope the Detection991001. Identify attack scenario, data source, and severity tier1012. Map to MITRE ATT&CK (technique ID + tactic + kill chain phase)1023. Confirm log source is ingested and schema is known103104**Gate:** MITRE technique ID + tactic recorded; log source schema available.105106### Phase 2: Validate Field Availability1071081. `GET {index}/_mapping` for each field referenced in the proposed rule1092. Run cardinality checks for any field used in `terms` aggregations1103. Identify missing fields → add to mapping OR adjust rule111112**Gate:** Every field in the rule exists in the target mapping. Cardinality is bounded.113114### Phase 3: Author Detection1151161. Choose methodology (rule-based / threshold / anomaly / correlation) per scenario1172. Write SIGMA rule first (vendor-neutral)1183. Translate to OpenSearch DSL via patterns in `detection-engineering.md`1194. Apply FP suppression filters (CIDR, service-account prefixes, time windows)120121**Gate:** SIGMA + DSL both produced; FP suppressions documented.122123### Phase 4: Validate Detection Safety1241251. Check for chained findings index flood pattern (if using chained monitors)1262. Check for field alias bootstrap risk on shared datastreams1273. Recommend detection-owned index if bootstrap risk present1284. See `detection-safety-patterns.md` for full safety checklist129130**Gate:** No hard-gate patterns triggered.131132### Phase 5: Document Use Case (6-section template)1331341. General Info, Context, Outcomes, Detection Logic, Continuous Improvement, Analyst Support1352. Capture KPI baselines (TTD, FP rate target, review cadence)1363. Link runbook for Tier-1 triage steps137138**Gate:** All 6 sections populated; runbook linked.139140### Phase 6: Calibrate and Tune1411421. Run monitor in dry-run mode for 5 business days1432. Export findings; label TPs and FPs1443. Adjust threshold until FP rate ≤ 10%1454. Document threshold decision in use case doc146147**Gate:** FP rate measured against target; tuning logged.148149### Phase 7: Escalation Path (when alert fires)1501511. Validate alert against use case detection logic1522. Build escalation package (all 9 fields)1533. Apply severity SLA from tier table1544. Hand off per RACI in `incident-escalation.md`155156**Gate:** 9-field package complete; SLA window identified; recipient confirmed.157158## Capabilities and Limitations159160### What This Skill CAN Do161- Author and tune SIGMA rules, OpenSearch custom rules, threshold monitors, anomaly detectors with MITRE mapping162- Diagnose mapping failures (alias-vs-text, field alias bootstrap, type coercion) with concrete API fix commands163- Detect and fix chained findings index flood164- Design correlation rules for cross-source enrichment165- Write 9-field escalation packages aligned to severity SLAs166- Produce 6-section use case lifecycle documentation167- Define KPI baselines (TTD, TTR, MTTR, FP rate, escalation quality)168169### What This Skill CANNOT Do170- General OpenSearch cluster operations (shard sizing, JVM tuning, ILM unrelated to SIEM) — pair with `opensearch-elasticsearch-engineer`171- Log pipeline infrastructure changes (Fluentd topology, ingestion architecture)172- Application code development — use language-specific agents173- Terraform/IaC resource management174175When asked to perform unavailable actions, explain the limitation and suggest the appropriate agent.