Game Theory Orchestrator — The Strategist
Formalize strategic problems, route them to the right analytical framework, and synthesize actionable insights. The core capability is bridging informal situations to formal game structures — taking "my competitor is undercutting me" and producing a rigorous Bertrand competition analysis with equilibrium predictions.
Phases
Phase 1 — Understand the Strategic Situation
Before any analysis, gather the essential elements of the strategic interaction:
- Players — Who are the decision-makers? (individuals, firms, governments, algorithms, biological populations)
- Actions/Strategies — What can each player do? Are strategy sets finite or continuous?
- Timing — Do players move simultaneously or sequentially? Is there repetition?
- Information — What does each player know? Is there private information? Can players observe past moves?
- Payoffs — What are players optimizing? (profit, utility, fitness, votes, welfare)
- Commitments — Can players make binding agreements? Are there enforceable contracts?
If the user describes a situation informally ("how should I price against a competitor?"), extract these elements through targeted questions. If the user presents a formal game, validate the specification.
Phase 2 — Classify and Route
Determine which game-theoretic framework applies. A problem may span multiple subdomains — pick the primary and note supporting analyses.
Read references/domain-taxonomy.md for the full subfield map.
Subdomain routing summary:
| Subdomain |
Activates When |
Primary Concern |
| Strategic Foundations |
Standard games with known players, strategies, payoffs |
Equilibrium analysis, strategic prediction |
| Mechanism Design |
Designing rules, auctions, markets, or incentive systems |
Incentive compatibility, efficiency, revenue |
| Evolutionary Dynamics |
Large populations, adaptation, no central designer |
Stability, invasion, long-run dynamics |
| Information Economics |
Strategic communication, persuasion, signaling |
Information revelation, belief manipulation |
| Computational Strategy |
Algorithmic constraints, AI agents, behavioral limits |
Computational tractability, bounded rationality |
Classification decision tree:
- Is the question about analyzing an existing game, or designing rules/mechanisms?
- Designing → Mechanism Design
- Analyzing → continue
- Are players rational agents making deliberate choices, or a population evolving over time?
- Population/evolutionary → Evolutionary Dynamics
- Rational agents → continue
- Is the central issue what players know or how information flows?
- Information is the core issue → Information Economics
- Information is a feature but not the focus → continue
- Are there computational constraints or behavioral biases that matter?
- Yes → Computational Strategy
- No → Strategic Foundations
Phase 3 — Formalize
Before delegating, establish the analytical frame:
Game representation — choose the appropriate form:
- Normal (strategic) form — for simultaneous-move games with finite strategies
- Extensive form — for sequential games, games with information sets
- Characteristic function form — for cooperative/coalitional games
- Population game form — for evolutionary settings
Solution concept — select based on the game structure:
- Complete info, simultaneous → Nash Equilibrium
- Complete info, sequential → Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
- Incomplete info → Bayesian Nash Equilibrium / Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
- Cooperative setting → Core, Shapley Value, or bargaining solution
- Evolutionary setting → ESS, replicator dynamics
- Repeated game → Folk theorem analysis
Key assumptions — document what we're assuming and what would change the analysis:
- Rationality level (full, bounded, evolutionary)
- Common knowledge assumptions
- Commitment power
- Discount factors for repeated games
Analysis parameters — what the user actually needs:
- Equilibrium prediction ("what will happen?")
- Strategic recommendation ("what should I do?")
- Mechanism design ("what rules should I set?")
- Robustness check ("what if assumptions change?")
Phase 4 — Delegate
Route to the appropriate subdomain director, passing the formalization from Phase 3. Read references/delegation-rules.md for detailed routing logic, multi-subdomain sequencing, and escalation rules.
Available subdomain directors:
| Subdomain |
Director Path |
Status |
| Strategic Foundations |
skills/game-theory/strategic-foundations/SKILL.md |
Active |
| Mechanism Design |
skills/game-theory/mechanism-design/SKILL.md |
Active |
| Evolutionary Dynamics |
skills/game-theory/evolutionary-dynamics/SKILL.md |
Active |
| Information Economics |
skills/game-theory/information-economics/SKILL.md |
Active |
| Computational Strategy |
skills/game-theory/computational-strategy/SKILL.md |
Active |
For stub subdomains, handle the analysis directly using the orchestrator's knowledge and note which specialist would improve the analysis once built.
When launching an agent for analysis, always pass:
- The formalized game specification from Phase 3
- The specific question the user needs answered
- Relevant constraints or assumptions
For multi-subdomain problems, analyze sequentially — each analysis receives prior results to maintain coherence.
Phase 5 — Synthesize and Present
After analysis completes:
Plain-language interpretation — translate equilibrium results into actionable strategic insight. "The Nash equilibrium predicts both firms will price at marginal cost" becomes "in a price war with identical products, neither firm can sustainably charge above cost — you need to differentiate."
Sensitivity analysis — identify which assumptions matter most. What changes the equilibrium? What's robust?
Strategic recommendations — if the user asked "what should I do?", provide ranked options with game-theoretic justification.
Limitations — flag where the model simplifies reality. All games are models — be explicit about what's left out.
Cross-domain connections — note when the analysis connects to other domains:
- Worldbuilding: faction dynamics, political systems, economic structures
- Design: choice architecture, nudge theory, UX as mechanism design
- General: negotiation, competition, cooperation in any context
Knowledge Layer
Route through the subdomain director first. The director handles routing to specific knowledge skills, curriculum order, and conflict resolution.
Always route through the director:
| Subdomain |
Director |
Consult When |
| Strategic Foundations |
skills/game-theory/strategic-foundations/SKILL.md |
Equilibrium analysis, game classification, strategic prediction, bargaining, coalitions |
| Mechanism Design |
skills/game-theory/mechanism-design/SKILL.md |
Auction design, market rules, voting systems, incentive structures, matching |
| Evolutionary Dynamics |
skills/game-theory/evolutionary-dynamics/SKILL.md |
Population dynamics, evolutionary stability, adaptation, biological games |
| Information Economics |
skills/game-theory/information-economics/SKILL.md |
Signaling, screening, persuasion, information disclosure, belief updating |
| Computational Strategy |
skills/game-theory/computational-strategy/SKILL.md |
Algorithmic games, bounded rationality, AI/ML game theory, computational complexity |
Direct knowledge skill paths (prefer routing through the director):
| Knowledge Skill |
Path |
| Classical Games |
skills/game-theory/strategic-foundations/classical-games/SKILL.md |
| Cooperative Games |
skills/game-theory/strategic-foundations/cooperative-games/SKILL.md |
Failure Recovery
- If the user's situation doesn't cleanly map to a game, ask for clarification on players, strategies, and payoffs rather than forcing a fit
- If multiple equilibria exist (common), present all with intuitive selection criteria rather than picking one arbitrarily
- If a subdomain is still a stub, provide the best analysis possible from the orchestrator level and note what specialist depth would add
- If the user rejects an analysis, ask which assumption feels wrong rather than re-running the same model
Scope Boundaries
This orchestrator handles strategic analysis and game-theoretic reasoning. It does NOT:
- Execute actual negotiations or transactions on behalf of the user
- Provide legal advice on contracts or agreements (flag for legal counsel)
- Make ethical judgments about strategic behavior (present the analysis, let the user decide)
- Simulate games computationally (delegate to action skills like game-solver or evo-simulator)
1---2name: game-theory-orchestrator3description: Orchestrate game-theoretic analysis across strategic problems. Use when the user needs to analyze strategic interactions, find equilibria, design mechanisms or incentives, model evolutionary dynamics, evaluate information structures, or apply formal game theory to real-world scenarios in business, technology, politics, biology, or fiction.4---56# Game Theory Orchestrator — The Strategist78Formalize strategic problems, route them to the right analytical framework, and synthesize actionable insights. The core capability is **bridging informal situations to formal game structures** — taking "my competitor is undercutting me" and producing a rigorous Bertrand competition analysis with equilibrium predictions.910## Phases1112### Phase 1 — Understand the Strategic Situation1314Before any analysis, gather the essential elements of the strategic interaction:1516- **Players** — Who are the decision-makers? (individuals, firms, governments, algorithms, biological populations)17- **Actions/Strategies** — What can each player do? Are strategy sets finite or continuous?18- **Timing** — Do players move simultaneously or sequentially? Is there repetition?19- **Information** — What does each player know? Is there private information? Can players observe past moves?20- **Payoffs** — What are players optimizing? (profit, utility, fitness, votes, welfare)21- **Commitments** — Can players make binding agreements? Are there enforceable contracts?2223If the user describes a situation informally ("how should I price against a competitor?"), extract these elements through targeted questions. If the user presents a formal game, validate the specification.2425### Phase 2 — Classify and Route2627Determine which game-theoretic framework applies. A problem may span multiple subdomains — pick the primary and note supporting analyses.2829Read `references/domain-taxonomy.md` for the full subfield map.3031**Subdomain routing summary:**3233| Subdomain | Activates When | Primary Concern |34|-----------|---------------|-----------------|35| Strategic Foundations | Standard games with known players, strategies, payoffs | Equilibrium analysis, strategic prediction |36| Mechanism Design | Designing rules, auctions, markets, or incentive systems | Incentive compatibility, efficiency, revenue |37| Evolutionary Dynamics | Large populations, adaptation, no central designer | Stability, invasion, long-run dynamics |38| Information Economics | Strategic communication, persuasion, signaling | Information revelation, belief manipulation |39| Computational Strategy | Algorithmic constraints, AI agents, behavioral limits | Computational tractability, bounded rationality |4041**Classification decision tree:**42431. Is the question about **analyzing** an existing game, or **designing** rules/mechanisms?44 - Designing → Mechanism Design45 - Analyzing → continue462. Are players **rational agents** making deliberate choices, or a **population** evolving over time?47 - Population/evolutionary → Evolutionary Dynamics48 - Rational agents → continue493. Is the central issue **what players know** or **how information flows**?50 - Information is the core issue → Information Economics51 - Information is a feature but not the focus → continue524. Are there **computational constraints** or **behavioral biases** that matter?53 - Yes → Computational Strategy54 - No → Strategic Foundations5556### Phase 3 — Formalize5758Before delegating, establish the analytical frame:59601. **Game representation** — choose the appropriate form:61 - Normal (strategic) form — for simultaneous-move games with finite strategies62 - Extensive form — for sequential games, games with information sets63 - Characteristic function form — for cooperative/coalitional games64 - Population game form — for evolutionary settings65662. **Solution concept** — select based on the game structure:67 - Complete info, simultaneous → Nash Equilibrium68 - Complete info, sequential → Subgame Perfect Equilibrium69 - Incomplete info → Bayesian Nash Equilibrium / Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium70 - Cooperative setting → Core, Shapley Value, or bargaining solution71 - Evolutionary setting → ESS, replicator dynamics72 - Repeated game → Folk theorem analysis73743. **Key assumptions** — document what we're assuming and what would change the analysis:75 - Rationality level (full, bounded, evolutionary)76 - Common knowledge assumptions77 - Commitment power78 - Discount factors for repeated games79804. **Analysis parameters** — what the user actually needs:81 - Equilibrium prediction ("what will happen?")82 - Strategic recommendation ("what should I do?")83 - Mechanism design ("what rules should I set?")84 - Robustness check ("what if assumptions change?")8586### Phase 4 — Delegate8788Route to the appropriate subdomain director, passing the formalization from Phase 3. Read `references/delegation-rules.md` for detailed routing logic, multi-subdomain sequencing, and escalation rules.8990**Available subdomain directors:**9192| Subdomain | Director Path | Status |93|-----------|--------------|--------|94| Strategic Foundations | `skills/game-theory/strategic-foundations/SKILL.md` | Active |95| Mechanism Design | `skills/game-theory/mechanism-design/SKILL.md` | Active |96| Evolutionary Dynamics | `skills/game-theory/evolutionary-dynamics/SKILL.md` | Active |97| Information Economics | `skills/game-theory/information-economics/SKILL.md` | Active |98| Computational Strategy | `skills/game-theory/computational-strategy/SKILL.md` | Active |99100For stub subdomains, handle the analysis directly using the orchestrator's knowledge and note which specialist would improve the analysis once built.101102When launching an agent for analysis, always pass:103- The formalized game specification from Phase 3104- The specific question the user needs answered105- Relevant constraints or assumptions106107For multi-subdomain problems, analyze sequentially — each analysis receives prior results to maintain coherence.108109### Phase 5 — Synthesize and Present110111After analysis completes:1121131. **Plain-language interpretation** — translate equilibrium results into actionable strategic insight. "The Nash equilibrium predicts both firms will price at marginal cost" becomes "in a price war with identical products, neither firm can sustainably charge above cost — you need to differentiate."1141152. **Sensitivity analysis** — identify which assumptions matter most. What changes the equilibrium? What's robust?1161173. **Strategic recommendations** — if the user asked "what should I do?", provide ranked options with game-theoretic justification.1181194. **Limitations** — flag where the model simplifies reality. All games are models — be explicit about what's left out.1201215. **Cross-domain connections** — note when the analysis connects to other domains:122 - Worldbuilding: faction dynamics, political systems, economic structures123 - Design: choice architecture, nudge theory, UX as mechanism design124 - General: negotiation, competition, cooperation in any context125126## Knowledge Layer127128Route through the subdomain director first. The director handles routing to specific knowledge skills, curriculum order, and conflict resolution.129130**Always route through the director:**131132| Subdomain | Director | Consult When |133|-----------|----------|-------------|134| Strategic Foundations | `skills/game-theory/strategic-foundations/SKILL.md` | Equilibrium analysis, game classification, strategic prediction, bargaining, coalitions |135| Mechanism Design | `skills/game-theory/mechanism-design/SKILL.md` | Auction design, market rules, voting systems, incentive structures, matching |136| Evolutionary Dynamics | `skills/game-theory/evolutionary-dynamics/SKILL.md` | Population dynamics, evolutionary stability, adaptation, biological games |137| Information Economics | `skills/game-theory/information-economics/SKILL.md` | Signaling, screening, persuasion, information disclosure, belief updating |138| Computational Strategy | `skills/game-theory/computational-strategy/SKILL.md` | Algorithmic games, bounded rationality, AI/ML game theory, computational complexity |139140**Direct knowledge skill paths** (prefer routing through the director):141142| Knowledge Skill | Path |143|----------------|------|144| Classical Games | `skills/game-theory/strategic-foundations/classical-games/SKILL.md` |145| Cooperative Games | `skills/game-theory/strategic-foundations/cooperative-games/SKILL.md` |146147## Failure Recovery148149- If the user's situation doesn't cleanly map to a game, ask for clarification on players, strategies, and payoffs rather than forcing a fit150- If multiple equilibria exist (common), present all with intuitive selection criteria rather than picking one arbitrarily151- If a subdomain is still a stub, provide the best analysis possible from the orchestrator level and note what specialist depth would add152- If the user rejects an analysis, ask which assumption feels wrong rather than re-running the same model153154## Scope Boundaries155156This orchestrator handles **strategic analysis and game-theoretic reasoning**. It does NOT:157- Execute actual negotiations or transactions on behalf of the user158- Provide legal advice on contracts or agreements (flag for legal counsel)159- Make ethical judgments about strategic behavior (present the analysis, let the user decide)160- Simulate games computationally (delegate to action skills like game-solver or evo-simulator)