Bulk Triage Regressions

Bulk Triage Regressions

Input

bulk-triage-regressions <view> [--components comp1 comp2 ...] [--auto-triage]

Example: bulk-triage-regressions 5.0-main --components Installer Unknown

Description

This skill implements the Component Readiness triage duty workflow: it fetches all untriaged regressions for a set of components in a view (e.g., 5.0-main, components Installer and Unknown), analyzes them as a batch, clusters them into root-cause buckets, and then triages each bucket to a single JIRA bug (existing or new).

This differs from /ci:analyze-regression (which analyzes a single regression in depth). Triage duty requires a holistic view, because:

1. Many regressions, few root causes. One product bug commonly opens 5–30 regressions across variants (different platforms, arches, featuresets, upgrade modes) and across "wrapper" tests (install should succeed: overall, : cluster bootstrap, : cluster creation, verify the cluster readiness and stability, mass-failure tests, etc.). Analyzing regressions one-by-one wastes effort and risks filing duplicate bugs. Cluster first, deep-dive once per cluster.

2. Component attribution is often wrong. Regressions in Installer and Unknown are catch-all attributions. A failed installation or bootstrap is frequently caused by a specific component — e.g., a monitoring operator failing to go available blocks cluster creation, an etcd slowness issue breaks bootstrap, an MCO bug degrades nodes during install. The Sippy component label tells you which test failed, not whose bug it is. The real owner must be determined from artifacts (cluster operator status, log bundle, operator logs), and the JIRA bug must be filed against the actual owning component, not Installer.

Use this skill when doing triage duty for a view, or whenever a user asks to "look at all untriaged regressions from " rather than a single regression ID.

Implementation

Script invocation rules: Run Python skill scripts directly and analyze their JSON output with your own reasoning (pass --format json where the script offers the flag; scripts without it, such as list_regressions.py, emit JSON by default). Do not pipe script output through inline Python one-liners. Do not suppress stderr: if a script exits non-zero or returns invalid/empty JSON, stop and surface the error — an authentication or API failure must never be mistaken for an empty inventory ("nothing to triage").

Authentication: Read steps (listing, fetching details, test runs, GCS artifacts) require no auth — Phases 1–3 and a read-only report must work without any credentials. Two Sippy hosts exist and the split matters: https://sippy.dptools.openshift.org is public and read-only (regressions, test details, and the full symptom/label catalog — see the list-symptoms skill), while everything on https://sippy-auth.dptools.openshift.org requires a DPCR Bearer token, including the reevaluate probe, which has no public equivalent (the route returns 404 on the public host). The only Phase 3 step that needs a token is therefore the active symptom probe. When it is unavailable (no token, or a 401/403), treat the result as an unknown — never as "no symptoms matched", the same error as reading a failed listing script as an empty inventory, and work down this fallback: (1) passive label_summary / job_labels from fetch-regression-details; (2) list the catalog from the public API with the list-symptoms skill and grep each plausible symptom's match_string against its file_pattern in the GCS artifacts you are already fetching — this reproduces the probe locally for the handful of symptoms related to the bucket's stage and platform; (3) only then the full evidence ladder, recording that the active probe was unavailable so the next shift knows the catalog was checked by hand. Write credentials are validated only when writes are going to happen: with --auto-triage, validate both up front (so an expired token surfaces before hours of analysis); otherwise validate at the start of Phase 4, before the first write. Sippy writes (creating/updating triage records) require a Bearer token from the DPCR cluster (api.cr.j7t7.p1.openshiftapps.com:6443) — see the oc-auth skill and the token-extraction snippet in /ci:analyze-regression; check with an authenticated GET against https://sippy-auth.dptools.openshift.org/api/component_readiness/triages (200 vs 401/403).

JIRA writes (filing bugs, set-release-blocker, add-jira-triage-link) additionally require the JIRA_USERNAME and JIRA_API_TOKEN environment variables (API token from https://id.atlassian.com/manage-profile/security/api-tokens); verify with an authenticated GET against https://redhat.atlassian.net/rest/api/3/myself (Basic auth, 200 vs 401/403). If a required write credential is missing or invalid, pause before Phase 4 and ask the user to fix it — the analysis and report so far remain valid and must still be presented.

Phase 1: Collect the full batch

1. Load CI context: Read the files in plugins/ci/references/ (jobs.md, tests.md, sippy-apis.md) for conventions on tests, jobs, and Sippy APIs.

2. Parse arguments:

   • view: required, e.g. 5.0-main
   • --components: component filter list, e.g. Installer Unknown. Matching is case-insensitive and hierarchy-aware: a filter matches the full component name or any /-separated segment of it, so Installer also covers Installer / openshift-installer, and Networking covers Networking / ovn-kubernetes, Networking / router, and every other Networking / * component. If omitted, ask the user which components the duty covers.
   • --auto-triage: if present, triage buckets without per-bucket confirmation when confidence is high (see Phase 4). Default is to present findings and confirm before writing.

3. List regressions with the list-regressions skill:

   python3 plugins/teams/skills/list-regressions/list_regressions.py \
     --view <view> --components <components...>
   

   Keep only open, untriaged regressions (empty triages array), but note recently-triaged ones — they are prime candidates for absorbing untriaged siblings.

   Closed regressions are out of scope — even when untriaged. A regression whose closed field is set has already resolved itself; do not inventory it, cluster it, deep-dive it, or recommend retroactive triage for it. The duty batch consists solely of open untriaged regressions. Closed regressions may be consulted as evidence (e.g., a closed sibling that shares a root cause with an open bucket, or a closed sibling whose existing triage/JIRA an open bucket should reuse — see Pitfalls), but they must never appear as bucket members, action items, or "leftovers" in the report. The only exception is the explicit closed-set audit mode (--audit-closed, see below), which the user must request by name — it is never part of a normal duty run.

4. Build a batch inventory table: For every open untriaged regression record: regression ID, test name, component/capability, variants (Platform/Arch/Network/Topology/FeatureSet/Upgrade), opened date, failure/run counts. Present this table to the user up front so the scope of the duty run is visible. Do not include closed regressions in the inventory.

5. Stale-triage sweep (mandatory) — a 100% triaged board can still hide live defects. For every open, already-triaged regression, compare its last_failure against the state of its triage's JIRA: a regression whose bug is Closed/Verified/resolved but which has failed after the resolution date is an alarm, not a statistic. Its fresh failure window is either a failed fix or — more often — a different cause hiding behind the old triage record. For each such regression, verify the recent runs' signature (armed Sippy symptoms are a cheap first oracle: dry-run reevaluate the newest runs — label hits map windows to known causes instantly; unlabeled recent runs mean a new, uninvestigated cause) and add the correct triage(s) for the new window rather than trusting the stale one. (Case 4 in case-notes.md: three "triaged" regressions pointing at a Closed bug while failing daily from two new causes.)

6. Long-lived wrapper regressions are cause timelines, not single buckets. A wrapper regression that stays open for weeks accumulates causes, each window separately verified and separately triaged. When a previously-analyzed regression shows new last_failure dates, re-verify the new window from scratch — never assume the existing triage covers it. (Case 13: one record carried four causes.)

Phase 2: Cluster into candidate buckets (cheap signals first)

Before any deep log analysis, group regressions using signals already in hand:

• Same test, different variants — almost always one bucket.
• Same variant fingerprint, different tests — e.g., install should succeed: overall + : cluster creation + verify the cluster readiness and stability all failing on azure/amd64/techpreview starting the same day is one bucket. Wrapper tests fail together.
• Same opened date — regressions opened the same day across components often share one payload-level cause.
• Shared job runs — fetch details for each regression (fetch-regression-details skill) and compare job_runs prowjob_run_ids. Regressions observed in the same failed runs are strong candidates for one bucket — but this is a clustering signal, not proof: the same run can contain independent defects or be a mass failure, so Phase 3 validation is still required. Also run the fetch-related-triages skill per regression; same_last_failure and similarly_named_test matches feed the clustering, and triaged_matches with confidence ≥5 immediately suggest an existing triage/bug for the whole bucket.
• Symptom labels — fetch-regression-details returns label_summary (per job) and job_labels (per run). A label shared by most failed runs of several regressions is a strong bucket signal, and labels are precise (human-written matchers over artifacts). An empty label list means nothing was detected — not that nothing is wrong, and often just that the runs were never swept: Phase 3 opens with an active dry-run reevaluation that closes this gap.
• Mass-failure marker: high test_failures counts in job_runs mean the regression is likely collateral of a bigger event, not an independent issue.

Output of this phase: a draft bucket list, each bucket with member regression IDs, the shared fingerprint (test/variant/date/job-run overlap), and any candidate existing triage or JIRA bug.

Treat buckets as hypotheses — Phase 3 must confirm or split them. Do not merge buckets merely because both are "install failures"; installs fail at different stages for unrelated reasons.

Phase 3: Deep-dive each bucket (confirm root cause and real owner)

For each bucket, pick 2–5 representative failed job runs (spread across jobs/variants; include the newest) and analyze. 2–5 runs are sufficient only when they yield a consistent result (same error signature / failure stage across all of them). If the sample is mixed or unclear — different errors, different stages, or an inconclusive owner — extend the sample to 10–20 runs before concluding; a small ambiguous sample must never be the basis for splitting/merging a bucket or attributing an owner.

Cross-cutting analysis principles — most specific rules below (and most Pitfalls) are instances of these three; when a situation matches none of the specific rules, fall back to the principle:

• Messenger vs. owner. The component that reports a failure is presumed the messenger until artifacts prove it is the producer. This covers: the installer for install failures, wrapper tests for whatever blocked them, a test whose setup failed on another component's error (Case 9 in case-notes.md), a crash-looper whose error names a missing upstream dependency, and any component that names a bad value someone else computed (Case 12). Ask "who produced the condition this error describes?" and walk upstream until the answer is "this component itself".
• Population claims require population evidence. Any claim quantifying over runs — "resolved", "stopped", "all runs show X", "only variant Y" — must enumerate the population it quantifies over: all of the regression's job_runs by date (never a 3–4 run sample; Case 1), only runs from the regression's own job_runs list (never a broad job-filter query; Case 10), and source-code gating for any "X-only" scope claim.
• Consult known-cause catalogs before deriving from scratch. Cheap indices exist for almost every question and must be queried before artifact dives or new-bug filings: the armed symptom catalog (dry-run reevaluate), existing triage records, the owning component's recent JIRA bugs regardless of keywords, the owning repo's merge history at onset/cessation boundaries, and closed/dropped sibling regressions. (Case 3: one dry-run call resolved a board that cost a parallel run 264 shell commands.)

Symptom-catalog oracle first (cheap, decisive — run before any artifact dive or subagent dispatch). The passive label_summary from Phase 2 only shows labels already applied by past sweeps; recent runs are typically unswept and show nothing. Actively probe the catalog instead: POST https://sippy-auth.dptools.openshift.org/api/jobs/runs/reevaluate with {"prow_job_build_ids": [...], "dry_run": true} (DPCR Bearer token) for 3–5 representative runs per bucket, spread across platforms. Reevaluation scans the runs' GCS artifacts server-side against every armed symptom matcher and returns symptoms_matched per run — one call can attribute an entire bucket to a known incident in seconds (Case 3 in case-notes.md). Matched symptoms are a hypothesis with a named cause — still verify per the steps below (the label names the incident; confirm the causal chain to the bucket's specific test) — but they dictate where to look first and usually collapse the deep-dive to a single confirmatory artifact read. No matches means the cause is not yet cataloged — proceed with the full evidence ladder.

No token? The catalog is still public — degrade, never skip. A 401/403 from the probe is an unknown, never "no symptoms matched": use the credential-free fallback in the Authentication section above, and say in the report which rung was used.

Deep-dive at least one CI sample per bucket — always, even at high confidence. A Sippy triaged_matches confidence of 10 or a same-day triaged sibling is a hypothesis, not a verdict: Sippy matches on test names and shared job runs, which produces conf=10 for the same test name across unrelated platforms and root causes (see Pitfalls). Before accepting any disposition — including "extend existing triage" — read the actual failure evidence for at least one representative run of the bucket (failure output at minimum; installer logs / artifacts for install wrappers) and confirm it matches the target triage's root cause. You have deeper analysis capabilities than Sippy's heuristics — use your own judgement on the raw evidence, and if it contradicts the Sippy categorization, trust the evidence and re-bucket.

1. Failure outputs: fetch-test-runs skill with the bucket's test IDs and job run IDs — check whether error messages are consistent within the bucket. >90% same error is strong evidence of a single cause, not confirmation: wrapper tests and mass failures print identical error text for unrelated defects (e.g., "nodes not ready" covers disk, memory, and network deaths alike). Confirm with items 2–3 below before treating the bucket as one cause; inconsistent errors ⇒ split the bucket.

2. Job run context: fetch-job-run-summary skill per representative run — is the regressed test isolated, part of a consistent co-failure set, or one of hundreds of random failures? For Unknown-component and mass-failure regressions this is where the real component reveals itself: read the names of the co-failing tests.

3. Install/bootstrap failures — mandatory artifact dig: For any bucket whose tests include install should succeed (any stage) or bootstrap/cluster-readiness wrappers, invoke the prow-job-analysis skill per representative run. Do not stop at Sippy's generic "install failed" wrapper. From the GCS artifacts determine:

   • Failure stage: infrastructure provisioning / bootstrap / cluster creation (operators rolling out) / stability window.
   • The blocking condition: for cluster-creation failures, read clusteroperators.json (or the installer log's "Cluster operator X is not available" lines) and the failing operator's pod logs from the log bundle. For bootstrap failures, read the bootstrap log bundle (etcd, bootkube, release-image pulls).
   • Bootstrap-era logs are full of normal transients — validate every causal theory against the gathered end-state. During any bootstrap, operator logs contain scary-looking messages that resolve on their own ("the server could not find the requested resource (post routes.route.openshift.io)" before openshift-apiserver is up, static pods "0 nodes at revision 0" early on). Quoting one of these as the root cause is only valid if the final cluster state agrees. The end-state oracle for bootstrap-stage failures is clusteroperators.json, not pod existence: check etcd's StaticPodsAvailable/revision status and openshift-apiserver's APIServicesAvailable directly — a bootstrap-timed-out run whose gather still shows etcd Available=False: 0 nodes are active; 3 nodes are at revision 0 was blocked by etcd no matter what else looks broken. Do not infer "etcd/apiserver were fine" from workload pods running: during bootstrap the bootstrap-node etcd/apiserver serve the control plane, so pods run happily while cluster etcd never deploys. A crash-looping container's *_previous.log is primary evidence for that container's failure — but before assigning ownership, check whether its error names a missing upstream dependency: such a component is a victim, not an owner.
   • "Operators were not stable" — count condition transitions before classifying. "Healthy at gather time" does NOT imply a harmless transient. Grep the install log for the operator's condition lines and look at LastTransitionTime/DurationSinceTransition: hundreds of transitions with DurationSinceTransition=1s across the stability window means the operator is flapping continuously (a sync-loop product bug that will never pass the stability check — permafail), whereas a single long Progressing=True window that eventually clears is a slow rollout (flaky race against the timeout). These two have opposite classifications and dispositions. (Case 1: a ~1 Hz flap, 1600+ transitions in 30 minutes, mislabeled "self-resolved slow rollout" from a 3-run sample.)
   • Race/ordering theories require timestamp proof — from artifacts, not from the error string. Any "X was not ready when Y ran" mechanism must be proven with timestamps the artifacts already contain (creationTimestamps, Established/Available conditions, phase logs, first/last occurrence of the error). If X was ready before the errors began, that refutes this ordering theory — but not every timing theory: readiness at the source does not mean visibility at the consumer, so the next candidates are cache/informer warmup, an in-progress rollout, or a stale client. Name which one the artifacts support rather than dropping the timing angle entirely. Also measure the failure window's duration: it is part of the mechanism claim and belongs in the bug.
   • Bad-value failures: trace the value to its producer — the error-emitter is usually just the messenger. When a component rejects or fails writing a value (a mapping, an ID range, a path, a quota number), walk the data flow upstream until you reach whoever computed it, however many hops away: the component that names the bad value in its error is the victim's messenger. The producer is then the prime suspect, not the automatic owner — before filing, confirm the value was already wrong as produced: check that no intermediate hop transformed a valid value into an invalid one, and that the value does not violate a documented input contract the consumer was itself obliged to enforce. Whichever hop first turned a valid value into an invalid one owns the bug; name the hops you cleared. (Case 12 in case-notes.md: a GID-mapping error filed against CRI-O when the producer was kubelet's ID allocator two hops upstream — pinns and CRI-O were verified pass-throughs.)
   • Decode suspicious constants before writing "malformed" or "overflow". A weird-looking number is a mechanism clue, not evidence of corruption: check whether it is semantically meaningful — 2^32 − size, a type maximum, a page/alignment boundary, an epoch. Do the arithmetic; never pattern-match "big hex-ish number ⇒ overflow bug". (Case 12: 4294901760 + 65536 = 2^32 — an allocator boundary, handing you the whole mechanism.)
   • The claimed mechanism must predict the observed frequency. A deterministic-bug theory cannot explain n=1 across many runs exercising the same path — a low rate demands a stochastic or boundary mechanism, and the expected probability should be stated in the bug. A mechanism/frequency mismatch means the theory is wrong; resolve it before filing, and mark any remaining mechanism prose as an explicit unverified hypothesis ("unverified: possibly …"), never as "suggesting X bug in component Y". (Case 12: the filed theory predicted every-pod failure; the real mechanism predicted ~1/65535 per pod — matching n=1.)
   • Differential recovery check — when the same error hits many objects but only some stay broken, explain the asymmetry before finalizing. Survivors show the failure was not uniformly permanent; before concluding the trigger was transient, rule out the alternatives (survivors had different exposure, a retry path, or different state). Either way the lasting failure lives in whatever failed to recover, and that component owns the bug. Pattern: transient trigger vs. persistent damage — ask which candidate defect explains the permanence of the failure, and lead with that one.
   • Read the owning repo's source before claiming a missing safeguard. A claim that "component X lacks ordering/gating/protection Y" is only valid after locating (or proving absent) that safeguard in the repo — the same rule as reading a test's skip/gates before describing its scope, applied to product code.
   • The real owner: the component whose operator/pods are actually failing. Examples from past duty: "cluster creation failed" ⇒ monitoring operator degraded ⇒ Monitoring bug; "bootstrap failed" ⇒ etcdserver: request timed out on Azure ⇒ etcd bug; nodes degraded during install ⇒ MCO bug; quota/DNS/cloud-API errors ⇒ ci-infra, not a product bug at all.
   • Stability-window failures — "operator X not available" is a symptom, not a root cause. For cluster-readiness/stability wrappers that fail on a ClusterVersion or ClusterOperator condition, two extra steps are mandatory before assigning an owner:

     1. Recover the underlying condition message when the junit output is vague. Outputs like clusterversion not available: False (empty reason) carry no cause. Run this literal check against the e2e step's build-log.txt (and, if present, the monitor-intervals JSON under the step's artifacts/junit/):

        curl -s <gcs-url-of-e2e-step>/build-log.txt | grep -oE '(Failing|Available|Degraded)=(True|False)[:,][^"\\]{0,160}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head
        

        The condition messages recovered this way (e.g., a controller error string) name the real culprit. This step is complete only when the report quotes the recovered message for every vague-output run. Never attribute such a run from its co-failing tests: co-failures on techpreview jobs are usually unrelated background noise, and correlation with them has produced wrong owners in past duty runs.

     2. Ask why the operator went unavailable, not just which operator. If everything is healthy at gather time, the wrapper caught a transient flap: read the operator's own pod log around the transition timestamps and find the trigger. Distinguish (a) the operator genuinely failing (⇒ product bug for that operator) from (b) a routine reconciliation/rollout triggered by a cluster mutation (config/secret change, node roll) — a rollout of a single-replica deployment flaps Available by design. A rollout-flap disposition must name the mutator, not stop at "the operator detected a configuration change": quote the operator-log line identifying which object changed (grep the operator pod log for object changed / secret and config names and read the surrounding lines), then identify who wrote it — audit logs (verb update/patch on that object: user + userAgent) or the job's test-harness step logs (search them for the object name or the value being set). If a test step caused the mutation mid-run, the bucket is test owned by that suite, not a product bug against the flapping operator; filing "spurious rollouts" against the operator without naming the mutator is an incomplete deep-dive. (Case 2 in case-notes.md: an image-registry flap drafted as a product bug until the operator log showed the harness had replaced the pull secret mid-run.)

4. Test-interference buckets — read the offending test's source before describing its scope. When the root cause is another test's or tool's behavior (a test creates pods/namespaces that break an invariant check, leaks resources, reboots nodes, etc.), do not infer why the failure is confined to certain variants from the regression's variant labels — correlation with a variant (techpreview, platform, upgrade mode) is not evidence of how the offending code is gated. Instead:

   • Locate the offending code (gh search code in openshift/origin or the relevant repo for the test name, namespace prefix, or error string) and read its skip/gate conditions (skipIf..., e2eskipper.Skipf, feature-gate checks, platform checks, suite membership).
   • State the actual gating in the report (e.g., "gated on baremetal platform via skipIfNotBaremetal"), and if that gating is broader than the regressed variants, say so — the regression's variant slice then reflects job-scheduling or sample-size effects, not the blast radius, and other variants are also at risk.
   • Check the file's merge history (gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/commits?path=...) — a merge date matching the regression onset both confirms the attribution and identifies the owning team.
   • Never write "X-only" (techpreview-only, platform-only, arch-only) about a test or tool in the report or a bug unless the source code gating has been read and confirms it.

5. Onset and suspect PRs (when the bucket has a crisp start date): follow the "Determine Regression Start Date" and "Identify Suspect PRs in Payload" procedures from /ci:analyze-regression (first failing run → payload tag via fetch-prowjob-json → fetch-new-prs-in-payload → up to 5 candidate PRs vetted with gh). A LIKELY PR both strengthens the bucket and tells you the owning component/repo.

6. Cross-check globally: fetch-test-report skill (with --no-collapse) for the bucket's main test — confirms whether the issue is variant-specific or global, and surfaces open_bugs that may already cover the bucket.

7. Check Slack context (optional — only when Slack access is available): The TRT/release-oversight team discusses ongoing payload and CI issues in #forum-ocp-release-oversight (https://redhat.enterprise.slack.com/archives/C01CQA76KMX). Search/read the last 14 days of messages there for the bucket's signature (test name, error message, operator, platform, payload tag) — known payload-wide events, infra outages, and in-flight fixes are usually discussed there before triages/bugs exist, and a thread often names the owning team or an existing OCPBUGS ticket. If the agent has no Slack access (no Slack tooling/credentials), omit this step entirely — do not block or ask for access.

Mechanism self-review (mandatory before finalizing any bucket). Every rule above is an instance of one behavior: challenge your own conclusion before filing it. After drafting a bucket's root cause, run this adversarial pass on the mechanism claim itself:

1. Enumerate the load-bearing assumptions in the claim — every "because", "not yet", "race", "missing", "computes wrong", "X-only". For each, cite a specific, checkable evidence locator: an artifact path plus the quoted line, a source-code location, a job-run ID, a structured API/JSON field, a condition's LastTransitionTime, or the query that returned the result. A line number is one acceptable form, not a requirement — much of the evidence here (run metadata, API fields, object IDs, timestamps) has no stable line to cite, and inventing one is worse than quoting the field. What matters is that the next reader can go to the same place and see the same thing. An assumption with no such locator is downgraded in the filed text to an explicit unverified hypothesis ("unverified: possibly …") — never stated as fact.
2. Check the theory's predictions against everything observed, not just the failing line: does it predict the observed frequency (deterministic theory vs. n=1), the measured window duration, the recovery asymmetry (who healed vs. who stayed broken), and the variant/platform spread? Any mismatch means the theory is wrong or incomplete — resolve it before filing.
3. Argue the strongest alternative. Spend one honest paragraph on the best competing mechanism (warmup instead of ordering, upstream producer instead of the error-emitter, boundary condition instead of corruption, unrecovered state instead of the transient trigger) and state the artifact evidence that discriminates between them. If nothing discriminates, the confidence is not HIGH.

A bucket whose mechanism claim fails any of these checks is not finalizable — keep digging or downgrade honestly.

After deep-dive, finalize buckets. Depth is mandatory, not optional: no bucket may be finalized at LOW or MEDIUM confidence, and the duty run must not end with open "action items" like "needs artifact deep-dive" or "spot-check installer logs first". When one regression's failed runs split into multiple distinct failure signatures, every signature must be root-caused independently — each may get its own triage record (a regression can carry several), and no run may be left labeled "ambiguous"/"unclear" in a bucket claimed at HIGH confidence: an unexplained run either gets dug into until it joins a signature, or the bucket's confidence is honestly downgraded and the digging continues. Never bundle an unexplained sub-pattern into another pattern's triage "pragmatically" or "since the regression is open anyway" — triage covers only the runs whose root cause it actually explains; attaching unexplained runs to it hides them from the next duty shift and mis-scopes the bug. If a sub-pattern remains unexplained, the whole bucket is not finalizable — keep digging. If confidence is not HIGH after the steps above, keep digging until it is — escalate through the evidence ladder yourself: raw failure outputs → job-run summaries → GCS artifacts (prow-job-artifact-search, install/test-failure analysis skills) → audit logs (grep for the failing object/namespace to identify the creating user and userAgent — this reliably resolves "who created this pod/namespace" questions) → junit timing correlation (what else ran in the same window) → suspect-PR vetting. Triage taking longer is acceptable; leaving an unexplained bucket is not. The only permitted low-confidence outcome is when the evidence is genuinely exhausted (artifacts expired, logs missing), and then the report must say exactly what was checked and what was missing.

Additional finalization rules (each has caused a wrong disposition in a real duty run):

• "Resolved"/"stopped"/"no recurrence" claims require the full run list, not a sample. Before classifying a signature as resolved or transient, enumerate all of the regression's job_runs by date and confirm the newest runs' signature. A signature absent from a 3–4 run sample of a 20-run regression is not evidence it stopped. And when a sub-test starts "passing" recently, verify recent runs actually reach that stage: a bootstrap failure cannot "self-resolve" while newer runs of the same job die earlier at infrastructure provisioning — the earlier failure masks the later stage, it does not fix it.
• "Leave untriaged" is not a permitted disposition for a bucket with an identified root cause and owner. If the deep-dive named the mechanism and the responsible component/suite, the bucket gets a triage (to an existing or new issue) — "collateral of noisy runs" is only a valid leftover justification when the failure has no independent mechanism (pure co-occurrence). A failure that is deterministically produced by another test's behavior has an independent mechanism and must be triaged as test.
• Extend, don't duplicate. When an existing triage record already covers the bucket's bug, extend that triage with the new regression IDs (--triage-id); do not create a second triage record pointing at the same JIRA.
• Subagent outputs must be verified, not trusted. If bucket deep-dives are delegated (subagents, parallel tasks), the orchestrator must check each returned bucket against this section's requirements before accepting it — in particular that the mandatory quotes are present (recovered condition messages for vague wrappers, mutator identification for rollout flaps, transition counts for stability failures, *_previous.log reads for crash-looping containers). A missing mandatory quote means the sub-analysis is incomplete and must be redone, regardless of how confident its prose sounds. Batch size is never a reason to skip mandatory steps.
• Never end your turn to "wait" for dispatched subagents — the session ends the moment you stop. There is no background execution across turns: an assistant message that ends with a status narration ("waiting for X analysis to complete") and no tool call terminates the run, and in CI the harness will tear the process down at that point. Collect every subagent's result within the turn that needs it, and treat the duty report as a hard checkpoint: if the run were killed right after your current message, the report file must already exist on disk — write intermediate versions early and update them, rather than deferring all writing to a final step that may never come. (Case 5 in case-notes.md: $12 of analysis, no report.)

Each bucket must have:

• Member regression IDs (re-check the untriaged list — new siblings may have opened during analysis)
• Root cause summary (one paragraph) and failure classification (permafail / flaky / resolved / recent)
• Owning component (may differ from the Sippy component — state both)
• Triage type: product / test / ci-infra / product-infra
• Disposition: existing triage to extend / existing JIRA to create a triage for / new JIRA needed / no action (resolved or pure infra noise — say so explicitly and leave untriaged only with justification)

Phase 4: Search for existing bugs, then triage each bucket

For each bucket, before filing anything new:

1. Check triaged_matches from fetch-related-triages (confidence ≥5 with an open JIRA is the default target) — but never act on a match, even conf=10, without the Phase 3 per-bucket CI-sample verification confirming the root cause actually matches.

2. Check open_bugs from the test report.

3. Search Jira for the root-cause signature (error message, operator name, component-regression label) in OCPBUGS against the owning component — the right bug may exist under Monitoring/etcd/MCO even though the regression sits under Installer.

4. Component-scoped JIRA listing (mandatory — keyword search is not enough). Owning teams describe defects in developer vocabulary that shares no keywords with the CI-side symptom. After determining the owning component, list its recent bugs regardless of keywords and read the summaries:

   project = OCPBUGS AND component = "<owning component>" AND created >= -21d ORDER BY created DESC
   

   A bug whose creation date falls inside the bucket's failure window, on the owning component, is a duplicate candidate even with zero keyword overlap — open it and compare mechanisms.

5. Owning-repo merge-history check (mandatory when onset or cessation is dated). Query the owning repo for PRs merged around the bucket's onset and cessation dates:

   gh pr list --repo <org>/<repo> --state merged --search "merged:<window>" --json number,title,mergedAt
   

   A merge at the cessation boundary is likely the fix — its OCPBUGS-* title prefix names the existing bug: triage to that bug instead of filing a new one. A merge at the onset boundary is a suspect trigger. The phrase "resolved by unidentified payload change" is banned from reports and bugs unless this check was run and came back empty. For currently-live breakage, also scan the owning repo's newest merges for revert PRs: a fresh Revert "..." title citing a TRT/OCPBUGS key hands you the trigger PR, the tracking ticket, and the expected recovery time in one query.

Then act (this is where --auto-triage applies; without it, confirm each bucket with the user):

• Extend existing triage: triage-regression skill with --triage-id (additive merge is automatic; pass only the new IDs).
• New triage to existing bug: triage-regression skill with --url, --type, and a one-sentence --description (<120 chars).
• New bug: file with /jira:create bug (the create skill from the jira plugin) against the owning component, label component-regression, description per the bug-filing template in /ci:analyze-regression ("Prepare Bug Filing Recommendations" section: full test names in {code} blocks, test IDs, regression IDs, variants, error signature, Sippy test-details UI links for every member regression, suspect PRs). Every JIRA issue or comment created by this workflow must end with an AI-attribution footer as a separate, visually marked block — not a sentence buried in the text: place it after a divider, as its own paragraph or note panel, e.g. a rule followed by a panel (type note) in ADF containing "AI-generated content: This bug was filed by AI as part of Component Readiness triage duty. Please verify before acting on it." Release blocker is conditional on the triage type and impact, not automatic: mark the bug a release blocker (set-release-blocker skill) only for product bugs whose failures block or materially degrade blocking/informing payload jobs; test bugs (races, invariant-scan interference) and ci-infra issues (cloud capacity, registry outages) are not release blockers — state the blocker decision and its one-line justification in the report. Then create the triage record.
• Suggested fixes carry a higher evidentiary bar than attribution — and triage duty never opens fix PRs. A "suggested fix" in a filed bug is optional; when included it requires (a) the mechanism timeline-proven per Phase 3 (timestamps, window duration, alternatives refuted), and

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