Claude Settings Audit

Agent command policy audit

Contract

Inputs

• The repository root to audit (defaults to the current working directory).
• Optional: an existing policy file to merge into.

Procedure

1. Parse repository manifests to identify the tech stack. List the repository root and find manifest files to depth 2 (*.toml, *.json, *.lock, *.yaml, *.yml, Makefile, Dockerfile, *.tf). Classify by indicator files:
   • Python: pyproject.toml, setup.py, requirements.txt, Pipfile, poetry.lock, uv.lock
   • Node.js: package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml
   • Go: go.mod, go.sum; Rust: Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock; Ruby: Gemfile, Gemfile.lock
   • Java: pom.xml, build.gradle, build.gradle.kts
   • Build: Makefile, Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml; Infra: *.tf, kubernetes/, helm/
   • Monorepo: lerna.json, nx.json, turbo.json, pnpm-workspace.yaml Done when: the tech stack is classified from detected manifest files.
2. Read any existing policy files. Tolerate absence. Done when: existing policy is read or confirmed absent.
3. Synthesize a read-only command and domain allowlist specific to the detected stack. Build the baseline read-only commands, each as Bash(<cmd>:*): ls, pwd, find, file, stat, wc, head, tail, cat, tree, git status, git log, git diff, git show, git branch, git remote, git tag, git stash list, git rev-parse, gh pr view, gh pr list, gh pr checks, gh pr diff, gh issue view, gh issue list, gh run view, gh run list, gh run logs, gh repo view. Add stack-specific read-only commands only for tools actually detected by lock files or manifests. Done when: the stack-specific allowlist is built.
4. Filter the allowlist to strictly forbid state-modifying commands. Remove any command that can mutate state: no install, build, run, write, delete, or push. Remove unrestricted API wrappers (e.g. gh api without a read-only subcommand) that can issue mutating requests. Include only the package manager the project actually uses: if pnpm-lock.yaml is present, omit npm and yarn; if yarn.lock, omit npm and pnpm; if package-lock.json, omit yarn and pnpm. Where multiple lock files coexist, include commands for each detected manager. Done when: every remaining command is read-only, detected, and scoped.
5. Add WebFetch(domain:...) entries for detected frameworks: Django to docs.djangoproject.com; Flask to flask.palletsprojects.com; FastAPI to fastapi.tiangolo.com; React to react.dev; Next.js to nextjs.org; Vue to vuejs.org; Express to expressjs.com; Rails to guides.rubyonrails.org, api.rubyonrails.org; Go to pkg.go.dev; Rust to docs.rs, doc.rust-lang.org; Docker to docs.docker.com; Kubernetes to kubernetes.io; Terraform to registry.terraform.io. Done when: framework domain entries are added for detected frameworks.
6. Format the recommendation as a safe policy block. Use the :* suffix so a base command accepts any arguments. Never include absolute paths, user-specific paths, or project scripts that may have side effects. Done when: the policy block is formatted with only read-only, detected, scoped commands and domains.

Failure and recovery

• Missing manifests: report the stack as undetected for that category and emit only the baseline commands; do not guess frameworks.
• Unreadable existing policy: note the read failure and emit a fresh recommendation rather than merging.
• Ambiguous stack with conflicting lock files: apply the package-manager rule in step 4 and list each detected manager; never silently pick one.
• Invalid recommendation: if any emitted command can modify state, contains an absolute path, or names a tool not detected in the repository, re-run step 4 and re-emit.

Output

A chat report with three parts: a detected-stack summary table (languages, package manager, frameworks, services, build tools); the complete recommended command and domain allowlist with permissions.allow grouped by category and permissions.deny empty; and merge instructions when an existing policy file was found.