Securability Engineering Review

SSEM Evaluation (Scoring and Reporting)

Analyze code for securable engineering qualities and produce a structured SSEM scorecard. This file is authoritative for the rubric, weights, severity classification, and report shape. The play at plays/securability-engineering-review.md is the step-by-step runbook; consult it for when to do each step, not for what the rubric says.

Aligned with FIASSE v1.0.4. Per-attribute measurement guidance in data/fiasse/SA.*.md (Appendix A).

When to Invoke

Trigger this skill when the user asks to:

• Assess, audit, score, rate, or evaluate the securability of code
• Produce an SSEM scorecard or SSEM evaluation report
• Review a merge request / pull request through a securable engineering lens
• Establish a security posture baseline for a project
• Identify engineering quality issues that affect security (not vulnerability-centric)
• Answer "where would I start hardening this codebase?"
• Check FIASSE/SSEM compliance

Adjacent phrasings: "rate this code for security", "is this audit-ready?", "what's the security health of X?", "how securable is this?", "do a sec-engineering review", "give me a posture report".

Scoring Framework

Each attribute is scored 0-10. Pillar scores are simple averages of their attribute scores. The overall SSEM score is the simple average of the three pillar scores.

Pillars and Attributes (FIASSE v1.0.4 — 10 attributes, equal weights)

Pillar score = average of its attribute scores. Overall SSEM score = (Maintainability + Trustworthiness + Reliability) / 3.

Equal weighting reflects FIASSE v1.0.4's stance that no SSEM attribute is intrinsically more important than another — context-specific severity is captured in findings, not in the rubric.

Scoring Rubric (Anchor Points)

Interpolation between anchors is allowed when justified by evidence. Stay consistent with the rubric language.

Attribute Inventory (the 10 scored items)

Every report MUST produce a numeric 0-10 score for each of these:

Maintainability

1. Analyzability (FIASSE v1.0.4 S3.2.1.1) — clarity, complexity, naming, structure
2. Modifiability (FIASSE v1.0.4 S3.2.1.2) — coupling, cohesion, separation of concerns
3. Testability (FIASSE v1.0.4 S3.2.1.3) — coverage, mockability, independence
4. Observability (FIASSE v1.0.4 S3.2.1.4) — log coverage, instrumentation, failure-path visibility

Trustworthiness 5. Confidentiality (FIASSE v1.0.4 S3.2.2.1) — sensitive-data handling, least privilege, encryption 6. Accountability (FIASSE v1.0.4 S3.2.2.2) — audit trails, action traceability 7. Authenticity (FIASSE v1.0.4 S3.2.2.3) — identity verification, token integrity, non-repudiation

Reliability 8. Availability (FIASSE v1.0.4 S3.2.3.1) — resource limits, timeouts, graceful degradation 9. Integrity (FIASSE v1.0.4 S3.2.3.2) — input handling, parameterized queries, derived state 10. Resilience (FIASSE v1.0.4 S3.2.3.3) — error handling, recovery, defensive coding

Grading Scale

Severity Classification (for individual findings)

Severity is an engineering-impact judgment, not a CVSS or CWE score. FIASSE does not borrow assurance-tool severity scales. Classify each finding by its effect on SSEM scores and on the system's ability to remain securable.

Required Inputs

If the repository or input is incomplete, ask for these before scoring:

• Project name and short description
• Programming language(s) and framework(s)
• Architecture overview (one paragraph is enough)
• Repository URL or codebase access (or pasted code)
• Any existing documentation, test posture, or prior assessments worth incorporating

If essential context is missing, score conservatively and state the limitation explicitly. Do not invent coverage, architecture, or operational controls.

Triage and Sampling Strategy (for codebases > a few thousand LoC)

Full read-through is impossible at scale. Sample deliberately and declare what was sampled. The report's credibility rests on the sampling discipline, not on claimed totality.

Inspection priority order:

1. Trust boundaries — every entry point: HTTP handlers, queue consumers, RPC servers, file ingestors, CLI flag parsers. Boundaries are where Integrity, Authenticity, and Confidentiality scores are won or lost.
2. Security-sensitive modules — auth, authz, crypto, session, secrets handling, audit logging, error/logging glue.
3. Data-access layer — query construction, ORM usage, file-path joining, deserialization.
4. Architectural seams — public interfaces, dependency-injection wiring, configuration loaders, feature-flag plumbing.
5. Cross-cutting infrastructure — health endpoints, metrics, tracing, scheduled jobs.
6. Spot-sample of business logic — pick 2–3 representative modules; do not exhaustively grade what you didn't read.

For each sampled area, mark the report with the file paths actually inspected. For un-sampled areas, score conservatively (cap at 6) and call out the gap in the assessment line. Do not extrapolate from sampled to un-sampled with confidence.

For very large repos, scope the review to a single service / package / module and say so in the scope statement. A focused scorecard is worth more than a vague one covering everything.

Procedure

The full step-by-step runbook lives in plays/securability-engineering-review.md. The high-level shape:

1. Scope and context — language, framework, system type, data sensitivity, exposure, lifecycle, team context.
2. Inspect the code, not the docs — open files; trace flows; sample tests. Anchors are about what is there, not what is claimed.
3. Score each pillar — Maintainability (4 attributes), Trustworthiness (3), Reliability (3). Cite specific file paths or patterns, not generalities.
4. Compute scores — attribute → pillar (simple average) → overall (simple average). Show the math.
5. Assemble the report — three-part structure below, exactly.

Output Format

The report must contain exactly these three parts in order. Do not skip parts even on small reviews.

Part 1: SSEM Score Summary

A compact summary block. The exact ASCII shape can flex (Markdown tables are also acceptable when the review is short), but it must include:

• Project name and date
• Overall SSEM score, grade, and a one-line status assessment
• Pillar summary (Maintainability / Trustworthiness / Reliability) — each with score, grade, and a one-line key finding
• Maintainability breakdown table — 4 attributes (Analyzability, Modifiability, Testability, Observability), each with weight (25%), score, and short assessment
• Trustworthiness breakdown table — 3 attributes (Confidentiality, Accountability, Authenticity), each with weight (33.3%), score, and assessment
• Reliability breakdown table — 3 attributes (Availability, Integrity, Resilience), each with weight (33.3%), score, and assessment
• Top 3 strengths with concrete evidence (file path, pattern name, or short quote)
• Top 3 improvement opportunities with concrete recommendations

Part 2: Detailed Findings

Per pillar, write:

• Pillar name, score, grade
• Strengths: bullets with specific evidence (file:line, pattern, observation)
• Weaknesses: bullets with concrete examples or locations and an impact note
• Recommendations: numbered list using this shape:

  1. **[Title]** (Severity: CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW/INFO)
     - Issue:    [Specific problem]
     - Impact:   [Effect on the pillar score and on the system]
     - Solution: [Actionable steps]
     - Expected Improvement: +[X.X] points
  

For per-finding format, use templates/finding.md. For full-report scaffold, use templates/report.md.

Part 3: Appendix A — Evaluation Checklist (50 items)

The official checklist:

• Maintainability (20 items): Analyzability (5), Modifiability (5), Testability (5), Observability (5)
• Trustworthiness (15 items): Confidentiality (5), Accountability (5), Authenticity (5)
• Reliability (15 items): Availability (5), Integrity (5), Resilience (5)

Mark each [x] (passing) or [ ] (failing) with a brief inline note when failing.

End with a checklist summary:

• Maintainability: N/20 passing (NN%)
• Trustworthiness: N/15 passing (NN%)
• Reliability: N/15 passing (NN%)
• Overall: N/50 passing (NN%)

Worked Example (Mini)

Snippet under review (Python, ~12 lines):

@app.post("/notes/{note_id}")
def update_note(note_id, body):
    sql = f"UPDATE notes SET body = '{body}' WHERE id = {note_id}"
    db.execute(sql)
    print("note updated " + note_id)
    return {"ok": True}

Analyzability — 4/10 (weak). Single-purpose handler but unsafe string formatting; no input typing; no early returns; conflates parsing, persistence, and response shaping. Evidence: f"UPDATE notes SET body = '{body}' WHERE id = {note_id}".

Observability — 2/10 (minimal). print(...) is not structured output. No correlation ID, no actor, no outcome field. Failure paths are silent. Evidence: print("note updated " + note_id).

Integrity — 2/10 (minimal). SQL injection via string interpolation; no parameterized queries; no ownership check (any caller can update any note ID — Derived Integrity violation per FIASSE v1.0.4 S4.4.1.2). Evidence: same line as above; no current_user derivation.

Accountability — 3/10 (weak). print is not an audit log; missing actor, action verb, target ID type-tagged, and outcome. Evidence: print("note updated " + note_id).

Recommendation (HIGH) — Replace the f-string with a parameterized query that scopes by owner, and emit a structured note.update log with {actor, note_id, outcome}. Expected improvement: Integrity +5, Accountability +3, Observability +4, Analyzability +2.

This is the level of specificity the report should hit at scale — every score paired with a code-anchored observation, every weakness with a remediation that names the change.

Pattern Tag Reference

When you find one of these patterns, tag the finding with the FIASSE/SSEM principle it violates. Specific named tagging is what makes a report actionable — saying "the code mishandles auth" is weak; saying "this is a Derived Integrity violation (FIASSE v1.0.4 S4.4.1.2) — the server's authorization decision rests on a client-asserted JWT claim" is strong.

You don't need this whole table inline in every report. But when one of these patterns is present, the finding should name the principle by tag — not just describe the symptom.

Anti-Patterns (Things That Make a Report Useless)

• Fabricated evidence: don't cite line numbers or function names you didn't actually read. If something is unverified, mark the score as conservative and call out the gap explicitly.
• All-7s scoring: if every attribute lands at the same number, you haven't actually evaluated. Some attributes will be stronger than others; the report should reflect that.
• Vulnerability-centric drift: this is not a CWE pentest report. SSEM scores engineering attributes (analyzability, modifiability, etc.). A finding's value is in the engineering improvement, not the exploit recipe.
• Generic recommendations: "improve error handling" is not actionable. "Replace bare except: at app/handlers.py:42 with except (ValidationError, NotFound) as e:" is.
• Score without code access: if you can't see the code, say so and refuse to score that pillar — don't extrapolate.
• Missing the math: pillar scores must show how they were derived from attribute scores. Don't leave the reader guessing.
• Claiming totality on a sample: if you sampled 5 of 50 modules, do not score as if you read all 50. Mark sampled paths and cap un-sampled scores at 6.

Required Evaluation Criteria

Always:

• Be specific. Reference observable code or architecture evidence by file path or function name.
• Apply equal weights (1/3 per pillar; 1/4 within Maintainability; 1/3 within Trustworthiness and Reliability).
• Keep recommendations actionable — the reader should be able to open a PR from your text.
• Consider project size, domain, architecture, and intended use when scoring against rubric anchors.
• If evidence is insufficient, score conservatively and state the limitation in the assessment line for that attribute.

Invocation Behavior

When invoked:

1. Ask for missing project information if context is incomplete.
2. Apply the triage strategy if the codebase is large; otherwise inspect comprehensively.
3. Score against the rubric using the procedure above.
4. Produce the three-part report exactly as specified.
5. Use repository evidence over assumptions; declare gaps where evidence is missing.

FIASSE & OWASP References

• FIASSE Framework v1.0.4
• FIASSE v1.0.4 SA.* — Appendix A (per-attribute measurement guidance) in data/fiasse/SA.*.md
• ISO/IEC 25010:2011 — Software quality models
• RFC 4949 — Internet Security Glossary
• OWASP Code Review Guide
• OWASP ASVS v5.0 — data/asvs/
• Step-by-step runbook: plays/securability-engineering-review.md
• Finding format: templates/finding.md
• Report scaffold: templates/report.md