Analyzing Linux Kernel Rootkits
Overview
Linux kernel rootkits operate at ring 0, modifying kernel data structures to hide processes, files, network connections, and kernel modules from userspace tools. Detection requires either memory forensics (analyzing physical memory dumps with Volatility3) or cross-view analysis (comparing /proc, /sys, and kernel data structures for inconsistencies). This skill covers using Volatility3 Linux plugins to detect syscall table hooks, hidden kernel modules, and modified function pointers, supplemented by live system scanning with rkhunter and chkrootkit.
When to Use
Trigger phrases:
"analyzing linux kernel rootkits"
"Detect kernel-level rootkits in Linux memory dumps using Volatility3 linux plugi"
When investigating security incidents that require analyzing linux kernel rootkits
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Volatility3 installed (pip install volatility3)
- Linux memory dump (acquired via LiME, AVML, or /proc/kcore)
- Volatility3 Linux symbol table (ISF) matching the target kernel version
- rkhunter and chkrootkit for live system scanning
- Reference known-good kernel image for comparison
Steps
- Scope the task — define objectives, boundaries, and success criteria
- Gather information — collect all necessary data and context before proceeding
- Execute the core workflow — follow the domain-specific steps methodically
- Validate results — verify outputs against expected outcomes or baselines
- Document findings — record results, anomalies, and recommendations
Step 1: Acquire Memory Dump
Capture Linux physical memory using LiME kernel module or AVML for cloud instances.
Step 2: Analyze with Volatility3
Run linux.check_syscall, linux.lsmod, linux.hidden_modules, and linux.check_idt plugins to detect rootkit artifacts.
Step 3: Cross-View Analysis
Compare module lists from /proc/modules, lsmod, and /sys/module to identify modules hidden from one view but present in another.
Step 4: Live System Scanning
Run rkhunter and chkrootkit to detect known rootkit signatures, suspicious files, and modified system binaries.
Expected Output
JSON report containing detected syscall hooks, hidden kernel modules, modified IDT entries, suspicious /proc discrepancies, and rkhunter findings.
Example Output
$ sudo python3 rootkit_analyzer.py --memory /evidence/linux-mem.lime --profile Ubuntu2204
Linux Kernel Rootkit Analysis Report
=====================================
Memory Image: /evidence/linux-mem.lime
Kernel Version: 5.15.0-91-generic (Ubuntu 22.04 LTS)
Analysis Time: 2024-01-18 09:15:32 UTC
[+] Scanning syscall table for hooks...
Syscall Table Base: 0xffffffff82200300
Total syscalls checked: 449
HOOKED SYSCALLS DETECTED:
┌─────────┬──────────────────┬──────────────────────┬──────────────────────┐
│ NR │ Syscall │ Expected Address │ Current Address │
├─────────┼──────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────┤
│ 0 │ sys_read │ 0xffffffff8139a0e0 │ 0xffffffffc0a12000 │
│ 2 │ sys_open │ 0xffffffff8139b340 │ 0xffffffffc0a12180 │
│ 78 │ sys_getdents64 │ 0xffffffff813f5210 │ 0xffffffffc0a12300 │
│ 62 │ sys_kill │ 0xffffffff8110c4a0 │ 0xffffffffc0a12480 │
└─────────┴──────────────────┴──────────────────────┴──────────────────────┘
WARNING: 4 syscall hooks detected - rootkit behavior confirmed
[+] Checking for hidden kernel modules...
Loaded modules (lsmod): 147
Modules in kobject list: 149
HIDDEN MODULES:
- "netfilter_helper" at 0xffffffffc0a10000 (size: 12288)
- "kworker_sched" at 0xffffffffc0a14000 (size: 8192)
[+] Scanning /proc for discrepancies...
Processes in task_struct list: 234
Processes visible in /proc: 231
HIDDEN PROCESSES:
- PID 31337 cmd: "[kworker/0:3]" (disguised as kernel thread)
- PID 31442 cmd: "rsyslogd" (fake, real rsyslogd is PID 892)
- PID 31500 cmd: "" (unnamed process)
[+] Checking IDT entries...
IDT entries scanned: 256
Modified entries: 0 (clean)
[+] Running rkhunter scan...
Checking for known rootkits: 68 variants checked
Diamorphine rootkit: WARNING - signatures match
System binary checks:
/usr/bin/ps: MODIFIED (SHA-256 mismatch)
/usr/bin/netstat: MODIFIED (SHA-256 mismatch)
/usr/bin/ls: MODIFIED (SHA-256 mismatch)
/usr/sbin/ss: OK
[+] Network analysis...
Hidden connections (not in /proc/net/tcp):
ESTABLISHED 0.0.0.0:0 -> 198.51.100.47:4443 (PID 31337)
ESTABLISHED 0.0.0.0:0 -> 198.51.100.47:8080 (PID 31442)
Summary:
Rootkit Type: Loadable Kernel Module (LKM)
Probable Family: Diamorphine variant
Syscall Hooks: 4 (read, open, getdents64, kill)
Hidden Modules: 2
Hidden Processes: 3
Hidden Connections: 2 (C2: 198.51.100.47)
Modified Binaries: 3 (/usr/bin/ps, netstat, ls)
Risk Level: CRITICAL
When NOT to Use
- You need to perform the attack, not analyze it (use performing-* skills)
- Task is about detection, not analysis (use detecting-* skills)
- You need to implement controls (use implementing-* skills)
- Task is about threat hunting, not post-incident analysis (use hunting-* skills)
- You don't have access to the artifacts/logs to analyze
- Task requires real-time monitoring (use SOC tools)
Red Flags
- Performing actions without explicit written authorization from the asset owner
- Testing against production systems without a defined scope and rules of engagement
- Failing to use write-blockers when acquiring forensic evidence
- Not verifying hash integrity before and after imaging
- Modifying original evidence during analysis
Process
- Scope — Define research questions, identify data sources, set time boundaries
- Gather — Collect data from primary sources, APIs, and public records
- Synthesize — Analyze findings, identify patterns, produce actionable report
Verification
- All steps executed successfully against a test environment before production use
- Output documented with screenshots or logs demonstrating expected behavior
- Hash values computed and verified match between source and image
- Chain of custody log complete with timestamps and examiner names
- Analysis tools and versions documented for reproducibility
Anti-Rationalization Table
| Rationalization |
Reality |
| "We are too small to be targeted" |
Automated attacks target everyone. Size does not matter. |
| "Security slows us down" |
A breach slows you down 100x more. Build security in from the start. |
| "We will fix it after launch" |
Vulnerabilities in production are exploited within hours. Fix before deploy. |
1---2name: analyzing-linux-kernel-rootkits3description: Use when detect kernel-level rootkits in Linux memory dumps using Volatility34 linux plugins (check_syscall, lsmod, hidden_modules), rkhunter system scanning,5 and /proc vs /sys discrepancy analysis to identify hooked syscalls, hidden kernel6 modules, and tampered system structures. Use when detecting kernel-level rootkits7 in linux memory dumps using volatility3 linux.8domain: cybersecurity9subdomain: digital-forensics10tags:11- rootkit12- linux13- kernel14- volatility315- memory-forensics16- malware-analysis17- rkhunter18- forensics19version: '1.0'20author: oyi7721license: Apache-2.022nist_csf:23- RS.AN-0124- RS.AN-0325- DE.AE-0226- RS.MA-0127category: cybersecurity28metadata:29 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/oyi77/analyzing-linux-kernel-rootkits30---313233# Analyzing Linux Kernel Rootkits3435## Overview3637Linux kernel rootkits operate at ring 0, modifying kernel data structures to hide processes, files, network connections, and kernel modules from userspace tools. Detection requires either memory forensics (analyzing physical memory dumps with Volatility3) or cross-view analysis (comparing /proc, /sys, and kernel data structures for inconsistencies). This skill covers using Volatility3 Linux plugins to detect syscall table hooks, hidden kernel modules, and modified function pointers, supplemented by live system scanning with rkhunter and chkrootkit.383940## When to Use41**Trigger phrases:**42- "analyzing linux kernel rootkits"43- "Detect kernel-level rootkits in Linux memory dumps using Volatility3 linux plugi"444546- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing linux kernel rootkits47- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain48- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type49- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques5051## Prerequisites5253- Volatility3 installed (pip install volatility3)54- Linux memory dump (acquired via LiME, AVML, or /proc/kcore)55- Volatility3 Linux symbol table (ISF) matching the target kernel version56- rkhunter and chkrootkit for live system scanning57- Reference known-good kernel image for comparison5859## Steps60611. **Scope the task** — define objectives, boundaries, and success criteria622. **Gather information** — collect all necessary data and context before proceeding633. **Execute the core workflow** — follow the domain-specific steps methodically644. **Validate results** — verify outputs against expected outcomes or baselines655. **Document findings** — record results, anomalies, and recommendations66### Step 1: Acquire Memory Dump67Capture Linux physical memory using LiME kernel module or AVML for cloud instances.6869### Step 2: Analyze with Volatility370Run linux.check_syscall, linux.lsmod, linux.hidden_modules, and linux.check_idt plugins to detect rootkit artifacts.7172### Step 3: Cross-View Analysis73Compare module lists from /proc/modules, lsmod, and /sys/module to identify modules hidden from one view but present in another.7475### Step 4: Live System Scanning76Run rkhunter and chkrootkit to detect known rootkit signatures, suspicious files, and modified system binaries.7778## Expected Output7980JSON report containing detected syscall hooks, hidden kernel modules, modified IDT entries, suspicious /proc discrepancies, and rkhunter findings.8182## Example Output8384```text85$ sudo python3 rootkit_analyzer.py --memory /evidence/linux-mem.lime --profile Ubuntu22048687Linux Kernel Rootkit Analysis Report88=====================================89Memory Image: /evidence/linux-mem.lime90Kernel Version: 5.15.0-91-generic (Ubuntu 22.04 LTS)91Analysis Time: 2024-01-18 09:15:32 UTC9293[+] Scanning syscall table for hooks...94 Syscall Table Base: 0xffffffff8220030095 Total syscalls checked: 4499697 HOOKED SYSCALLS DETECTED:98 ┌─────────┬──────────────────┬──────────────────────┬──────────────────────┐99 │ NR │ Syscall │ Expected Address │ Current Address │100 ├─────────┼──────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────┤101 │ 0 │ sys_read │ 0xffffffff8139a0e0 │ 0xffffffffc0a12000 │102 │ 2 │ sys_open │ 0xffffffff8139b340 │ 0xffffffffc0a12180 │103 │ 78 │ sys_getdents64 │ 0xffffffff813f5210 │ 0xffffffffc0a12300 │104 │ 62 │ sys_kill │ 0xffffffff8110c4a0 │ 0xffffffffc0a12480 │105 └─────────┴──────────────────┴──────────────────────┴──────────────────────┘106 WARNING: 4 syscall hooks detected - rootkit behavior confirmed107108[+] Checking for hidden kernel modules...109 Loaded modules (lsmod): 147110 Modules in kobject list: 149111 HIDDEN MODULES:112 - "netfilter_helper" at 0xffffffffc0a10000 (size: 12288)113 - "kworker_sched" at 0xffffffffc0a14000 (size: 8192)114115[+] Scanning /proc for discrepancies...116 Processes in task_struct list: 234117 Processes visible in /proc: 231118 HIDDEN PROCESSES:119 - PID 31337 cmd: "[kworker/0:3]" (disguised as kernel thread)120 - PID 31442 cmd: "rsyslogd" (fake, real rsyslogd is PID 892)121 - PID 31500 cmd: "" (unnamed process)122123[+] Checking IDT entries...124 IDT entries scanned: 256125 Modified entries: 0 (clean)126127[+] Running rkhunter scan...128 Checking for known rootkits: 68 variants checked129 Diamorphine rootkit: WARNING - signatures match130 System binary checks:131 /usr/bin/ps: MODIFIED (SHA-256 mismatch)132 /usr/bin/netstat: MODIFIED (SHA-256 mismatch)133 /usr/bin/ls: MODIFIED (SHA-256 mismatch)134 /usr/sbin/ss: OK135136[+] Network analysis...137 Hidden connections (not in /proc/net/tcp):138 ESTABLISHED 0.0.0.0:0 -> 198.51.100.47:4443 (PID 31337)139 ESTABLISHED 0.0.0.0:0 -> 198.51.100.47:8080 (PID 31442)140141Summary:142 Rootkit Type: Loadable Kernel Module (LKM)143 Probable Family: Diamorphine variant144 Syscall Hooks: 4 (read, open, getdents64, kill)145 Hidden Modules: 2146 Hidden Processes: 3147 Hidden Connections: 2 (C2: 198.51.100.47)148 Modified Binaries: 3 (/usr/bin/ps, netstat, ls)149 Risk Level: CRITICAL150```151## When NOT to Use152153- You need to perform the attack, not analyze it (use performing-* skills)154- Task is about detection, not analysis (use detecting-* skills)155- You need to implement controls (use implementing-* skills)156- Task is about threat hunting, not post-incident analysis (use hunting-* skills)157- You don't have access to the artifacts/logs to analyze158- Task requires real-time monitoring (use SOC tools)159160161## Red Flags162163- Performing actions without explicit written authorization from the asset owner164- Testing against production systems without a defined scope and rules of engagement165- Failing to use write-blockers when acquiring forensic evidence166- Not verifying hash integrity before and after imaging167- Modifying original evidence during analysis168169## Process1701711. **Scope** — Define research questions, identify data sources, set time boundaries1721. **Gather** — Collect data from primary sources, APIs, and public records1731. **Synthesize** — Analyze findings, identify patterns, produce actionable report174175## Verification176177- All steps executed successfully against a test environment before production use178- Output documented with screenshots or logs demonstrating expected behavior179- Hash values computed and verified match between source and image180- Chain of custody log complete with timestamps and examiner names181- Analysis tools and versions documented for reproducibility182183## Anti-Rationalization Table184185| Rationalization | Reality |186|---|---|187| "We are too small to be targeted" | Automated attacks target everyone. Size does not matter. |188| "Security slows us down" | A breach slows you down 100x more. Build security in from the start. |189| "We will fix it after launch" | Vulnerabilities in production are exploited within hours. Fix before deploy. |