Detecting Golden Ticket Attacks In Kerberos Logs
Overview
Cybersecurity skill for detecting golden ticket attacks in kerberos logs. Follows industry best practices and security standards.
When to Use
Trigger phrases:
"detecting golden ticket attacks in kerberos logs"
"Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory by analyzing Kerberos TGT anoma"
When KRBTGT account hash may have been compromised via DCSync or NTDS.dit extraction
When hunting for forged Kerberos tickets used for persistent domain access
After incident response reveals credential theft at the domain level
When investigating impossible logon patterns (users logging in from multiple locations simultaneously)
During post-breach assessment to determine if Golden Tickets are in use
When NOT to Use
- When you lack proper authorization for testing
- For production systems without change management
- When the task requires legal or compliance expertise beyond technical scope
Prerequisites
- Windows Security Event IDs 4768, 4769, 4771 on domain controllers
- Kerberos policy configuration knowledge (max ticket lifetime, encryption types)
- Domain controller audit policy enabling Kerberos Service Ticket Operations
- SIEM with ability to correlate Kerberos events across multiple DCs
Workflow
# Example: IOC detection
import re
IOC_PATTERNS = {
"ip": r"\b(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}\b",
"domain": r"\b[a-z0-9-]+\.[a-z]{2,}\b",
"hash_md5": r"\b[a-f0-9]{32}\b",
"hash_sha256": r"\b[a-f0-9]{64}\b",
}
def extract_iocs(text: str) -> dict:
return {k: re.findall(v, text) for k, v in IOC_PATTERNS.items()}
- Define Detection Scope — Identify the specific golden ticket attacks in kerberos logs techniques or indicators to hunt. Map to MITRE ATT&CK tactics/techniques where applicable.
- Collect Baseline Data — Gather historical logs and establish normal behavior patterns for golden ticket attacks in kerberos logs.
- Build Detection Queries — Write detection rules, Sigma rules, or SIEM queries targeting golden ticket attacks in kerberos logs indicators.
- Execute Hunts — Run queries against the collected data, starting with broad filters and narrowing down.
- Triage Results — Investigate alerts, filter false positives, and validate findings against known-good behavior.
- Document Findings — Record confirmed detections, IOCs, and affected systems. Update detection rules based on findings.
Tools
- SIEM Platform — Central log aggregation and query execution
- Sigma Rules — Vendor-agnostic detection rule format
- MITRE ATT&CK Navigator — Technique mapping and coverage analysis
Process
- Reconnaissance — Gather target information, identify attack surface, enumerate services
- Analysis/Exploitation — Execute the technique, analyze results, document findings
- Reporting — Document IOCs, write findings, provide remediation recommendations
Verification
Anti-Rationalization Table
| Rationalization |
Reality |
| "We are too small to be targeted" |
Automated attacks target everyone. Size does not matter. |
| "Security slows us down" |
A breach slows you down 100x more. Build security in from the start. |
| "We will fix it after launch" |
Vulnerabilities in production are exploited within hours. Fix before deploy. |
1---2name: detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs3description: Use when detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory by analyzing Kerberos TGT anomalies including mismatched encryption types, impossible ticket lifetimes, non-existent accounts, and forged PAC signatures in domain controller event logs. Use when detecting golden ticket attacks in active directory by analyzing kerberos.4license: Apache-2.05---67# Detecting Golden Ticket Attacks In Kerberos Logs89## Overview1011Cybersecurity skill for detecting golden ticket attacks in kerberos logs. Follows industry best practices and security standards.1213## When to Use14**Trigger phrases:**15- "detecting golden ticket attacks in kerberos logs"16- "Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory by analyzing Kerberos TGT anoma"171819- When KRBTGT account hash may have been compromised via DCSync or NTDS.dit extraction20- When hunting for forged Kerberos tickets used for persistent domain access21- After incident response reveals credential theft at the domain level22- When investigating impossible logon patterns (users logging in from multiple locations simultaneously)23- During post-breach assessment to determine if Golden Tickets are in use242526## When NOT to Use2728- When you lack proper authorization for testing29- For production systems without change management30- When the task requires legal or compliance expertise beyond technical scope313233## Prerequisites3435- Windows Security Event IDs 4768, 4769, 4771 on domain controllers36- Kerberos policy configuration knowledge (max ticket lifetime, encryption types)37- Domain controller audit policy enabling Kerberos Service Ticket Operations38- SIEM with ability to correlate Kerberos events across multiple DCs3940## Workflow4142```python43# Example: IOC detection44import re4546IOC_PATTERNS = {47 "ip": r"\b(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}\b",48 "domain": r"\b[a-z0-9-]+\.[a-z]{2,}\b",49 "hash_md5": r"\b[a-f0-9]{32}\b",50 "hash_sha256": r"\b[a-f0-9]{64}\b",51}5253def extract_iocs(text: str) -> dict:54 return {k: re.findall(v, text) for k, v in IOC_PATTERNS.items()}55```56571. **Define Detection Scope** — Identify the specific golden ticket attacks in kerberos logs techniques or indicators to hunt. Map to MITRE ATT&CK tactics/techniques where applicable.582. **Collect Baseline Data** — Gather historical logs and establish normal behavior patterns for golden ticket attacks in kerberos logs.593. **Build Detection Queries** — Write detection rules, Sigma rules, or SIEM queries targeting golden ticket attacks in kerberos logs indicators.604. **Execute Hunts** — Run queries against the collected data, starting with broad filters and narrowing down.615. **Triage Results** — Investigate alerts, filter false positives, and validate findings against known-good behavior.626. **Document Findings** — Record confirmed detections, IOCs, and affected systems. Update detection rules based on findings.6364## Tools6566- **SIEM Platform** — Central log aggregation and query execution67- **Sigma Rules** — Vendor-agnostic detection rule format68- **MITRE ATT&CK Navigator** — Technique mapping and coverage analysis697071## Process72731. **Reconnaissance** — Gather target information, identify attack surface, enumerate services741. **Analysis/Exploitation** — Execute the technique, analyze results, document findings751. **Reporting** — Document IOCs, write findings, provide remediation recommendations7677## Verification7879- [ ] All golden ticket attacks in kerberos logs procedures executed completely and documented80- [ ] Findings validated against multiple data sources81- [ ] False positives identified and filtered82- [ ] Results documented with evidence and timestamps83- [ ] Recommendations provided with risk-based prioritization8485## Anti-Rationalization Table8687| Rationalization | Reality |88|---|---|89| "We are too small to be targeted" | Automated attacks target everyone. Size does not matter. |90| "Security slows us down" | A breach slows you down 100x more. Build security in from the start. |91| "We will fix it after launch" | Vulnerabilities in production are exploited within hours. Fix before deploy. |