Performing Service Account Credential Rotation
Overview
Service accounts are non-human identities used by applications, daemons, CI/CD pipelines, and automated processes to authenticate to systems and APIs. These accounts often have elevated privileges and their credentials (passwords, API keys, certificates, tokens) are frequently long-lived and shared across teams, making them prime targets for attackers. Credential rotation is the systematic process of replacing these secrets on a scheduled basis, propagating new credentials to all dependent systems, and verifying service continuity after rotation.
When to Use
Trigger phrases:
"performing service account credential rotation"
"Automate credential rotation for service accounts across Active Directory, cloud"
When conducting security assessments that involve performing service account credential rotation
When following incident response procedures for related security events
When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
When validating security controls through hands-on testing
Prerequisites
- Inventory of all service accounts across AD, cloud, and applications
- Secrets management platform (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, or CyberArk)
- Service dependency mapping (which services use which credentials)
- Change management process for rotation windows
- Monitoring for service health post-rotation
Core Concepts
This section covers core concepts for performing service account credential rotation.
- Ensure all prerequisites are met before proceeding
- Follow the documented workflow steps in sequence
- Record results and any anomalies encountered during this phase
Service Account Types
| Type | Platform | Credential | Rotation Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| Active Directory Service Account | Windows/AD | Password | gMSA (automatic) or PAM-managed |
| AWS IAM User | AWS | Access Key/Secret Key | AWS Secrets Manager rotation Lambda |
| GCP Service Account | GCP | JSON key file | Key rotation via IAM API |
| Azure Service Principal | Azure | Client secret/certificate | Key Vault + rotation policy |
| Database Service Account | SQL/Oracle/Postgres | Password | Vault dynamic secrets |
| API Key | SaaS applications | API token | Application-specific API |
Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)
Windows gMSAs provide automatic password management by Active Directory:
- AD automatically rotates the password every 30 days
- Password is 240 bytes, cryptographically random
- Multiple servers can use the same gMSA simultaneously
- No administrator knows or manages the password
- Eliminates manual rotation for Windows services
Rotation Architecture
Secrets Manager / Vault
│
├── Rotation Trigger (schedule or on-demand)
│
├── Generate new credential
│
├── Update credential at source (AD, cloud IAM, database)
│
├── Update credential in all consumers:
│ ├── Application configuration
│ ├── CI/CD pipeline secrets
│ ├── Kubernetes secrets
│ └── Other dependent services
│
├── Verify service health
│ ├── Health check endpoints
│ ├── Authentication test
│ └── Functional smoke test
│
└── Revoke old credential (after grace period)
Workflow
- Inventory cloud assets — enumerate services, roles, and configurations in scope
- Assess configurations — check against security best practices and CIS benchmarks
- Test access controls — verify IAM policies, network ACLs, and security group rules
- Validate logging — ensure audit trails are enabled and properly retained
- Document and remediate — report findings with specific configuration changes needed
Step 1: Discover and Inventory Service Accounts
Enumerate all service accounts and their dependencies:
# Active Directory: Find all service accounts
Get-ADServiceAccount -Filter * -Properties *
Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} -Properties ServicePrincipalName,PasswordLastSet,LastLogonDate
# Find accounts with passwords older than 90 days
$threshold = (Get-Date).AddDays(-90)
Get-ADUser -Filter {PasswordLastSet -lt $threshold -and Enabled -eq $true} -Properties PasswordLastSet,ServicePrincipalName |
Where-Object {$_.ServicePrincipalName} |
Select-Object Name, PasswordLastSet, ServicePrincipalName
Step 2: Implement gMSA for Windows Services
# Create KDS Root Key (one-time, domain-wide)
Add-KdsRootKey -EffectiveImmediately
# Create the gMSA account
New-ADServiceAccount -Name "svc-webapp-gmsa" `
-DNSHostName "svc-webapp-gmsa.corp.example.com" `
-PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword "WebServerGroup" `
-KerberosEncryptionType AES128,AES256
# Install on target server
Install-ADServiceAccount -Identity "svc-webapp-gmsa"
# Test the account
Test-ADServiceAccount -Identity "svc-webapp-gmsa"
# Configure IIS Application Pool to use gMSA
# Set identity to: CORP\svc-webapp-gmsa$
Step 3: AWS Access Key Rotation with Secrets Manager
import boto3
import json
def rotate_iam_access_key(secret_arn, iam_username):
"""Rotate an IAM user's access key via Secrets Manager."""
iam = boto3.client("iam")
sm = boto3.client("secretsmanager")
# Create new access key
new_key = iam.create_access_key(UserName=iam_username)
new_access_key = new_key["AccessKey"]["AccessKeyId"]
new_secret_key = new_key["AccessKey"]["SecretAccessKey"]
# Store new credentials in Secrets Manager
sm.put_secret_value(
SecretId=secret_arn,
SecretString=json.dumps({
"accessKeyId": new_access_key,
"secretAccessKey": new_secret_key,
"username": iam_username,
})
)
# List old access keys and deactivate them
keys = iam.list_access_keys(UserName=iam_username)
for key in keys["AccessKeyMetadata"]:
if key["AccessKeyId"] != new_access_key and key["Status"] == "Active":
iam.update_access_key(
UserName=iam_username,
AccessKeyId=key["AccessKeyId"],
Status="Inactive"
)
return {"new_key_id": new_access_key, "old_keys_deactivated": True}
Step 4: Database Credential Rotation with Vault
import hvac
def configure_vault_database_rotation(vault_url, vault_token, db_config):
"""Configure HashiCorp Vault for automatic database credential rotation."""
client = hvac.Client(url=vault_url, token=vault_token)
# Enable database secrets engine
client.sys.enable_secrets_engine(
backend_type="database",
path="database"
)
# Configure database connection
client.secrets.database.configure(
name=db_config["name"],
plugin_name="postgresql-database-plugin",
connection_url=f"postgresql://{{{{username}}}}:{{{{password}}}}@"
f"{db_config['host']}:{db_config['port']}/{db_config['database']}",
allowed_roles=[db_config["role_name"]],
username=db_config["admin_user"],
password=db_config["admin_password"],
)
# Create a role for dynamic credentials
client.secrets.database.create_role(
name=db_config["role_name"],
db_name=db_config["name"],
creation_statements=[
"CREATE ROLE \"{{name}}\" WITH LOGIN PASSWORD '{{password}}' VALID UNTIL '{{expiration}}';",
f"GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO \"{{{{name}}}}\";"
],
default_ttl="1h",
max_ttl="24h",
)
return {"status": "configured", "role": db_config["role_name"]}
Step 5: Post-Rotation Verification
After every rotation, verify service continuity:
import requests
import time
def verify_service_health(service_endpoints, max_retries=3, delay=10):
"""Check that services are healthy after credential rotation."""
results = []
for endpoint in service_endpoints:
for attempt in range(max_retries):
try:
response = requests.get(
endpoint["health_url"],
timeout=10,
headers=endpoint.get("headers", {})
)
healthy = response.status_code == 200
results.append({
"service": endpoint["name"],
"status": "healthy" if healthy else f"unhealthy ({response.status_code})",
"attempt": attempt + 1,
})
if healthy:
break
except requests.RequestException as e:
results.append({
"service": endpoint["name"],
"status": f"error: {str(e)}",
"attempt": attempt + 1,
})
if attempt < max_retries - 1:
time.sleep(delay)
return results
Validation Checklist
- Complete inventory of service accounts with dependency mapping
- gMSA implemented for all eligible Windows service accounts
- Cloud access keys rotated via secrets manager (AWS, GCP, Azure)
- Database credentials managed via dynamic secrets (Vault) or rotation policy
- Rotation schedule defined (30-90 days depending on risk level)
- Post-rotation health checks automated
- Alerting configured for rotation failures
- Old credentials revoked after grace period
- Rotation events logged and auditable
- Rollback procedure documented and tested
When NOT to Use
- You don't have explicit written authorization to test
- Task is about defense/detection, not offense (use detection skills)
- You need to implement security controls (use implementing-* skills)
- Task requires compliance auditing (use auditing-* skills)
- You're investigating an incident (use incident response skills)
- Target is out of scope for your engagement
- Task is about vulnerability scanning only (use scanning tools)
Red Flags
- Performing actions without explicit written authorization from the asset owner
- Testing against production systems without a defined scope and rules of engagement
- Modifying cloud IAM policies or security groups without approval
- Exposing cloud credentials or secrets in logs or reports
- Running scans that generate excessive API calls and trigger billing alerts
Verification
- All steps executed successfully against a test environment before production use
- Output documented with screenshots or logs demonstrating expected behavior
- Cloud resource changes reverted or documented as intentional
- IAM policies reviewed for least-privilege compliance after testing
- No residual test resources left running (cost and security check)
References
- Google Cloud Service Account Key Rotation
- AWS Secrets Manager Rotation
- Microsoft gMSA Documentation
- HashiCorp Vault Database Secrets Engine
Process
- Analyze the task requirements
- Apply domain expertise
- Verify output quality
Anti-Rationalization Table
| Rationalization | Reality |
|---|---|
| "We are too small to be targeted" | Automated attacks target everyone. Size does not matter. |
| "Security slows us down" | A breach slows you down 100x more. Build security in from the start. |
| "We will fix it after launch" | Vulnerabilities in production are exploited within hours. Fix before deploy. |