SRC Bug Bounty Hunting
Overview
Security Response Centers (SRCs, 安全应急响应中心) run scoped, rules-based
bug bounty programs with payout tables, explicit out-of-scope lists, and
strict compliance red lines. Hunting them productively is a staged campaign —
intake, recon, enumeration, hunt, report — where the highest-value failures
are scope violations and evidence gaps, not missed vulnerabilities.
This skill encodes that campaign structure plus China-specific asset
fingerprinting (OA/中间件 identification, ICP-style asset mapping) and the
compliance discipline SRC programs enforce. It complements general
bug-hunting skills with the scope/payout discipline and time-boxed
prioritization that SRC platforms demand.
Source: cherry-picked and translated from zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill
(skills/pentest-tools/src-hunter, MIT license). Reference payload
libraries are not bundled; this skill is the standalone workflow.
When to Use
Trigger phrases:
- "hunt on this SRC program"
- "SRC bounty campaign"
- "scope-in/scope-out for a Chinese SRC"
- "time-boxed vulnerability hunt"
- "report a finding to an SRC"
- "China asset fingerprinting for bounty"
Use this skill when:
- You are working a scoped SRC/bug bounty target with published rules and
payout tables.
- You need a repeatable, evidence-disciplined campaign rather than ad hoc
probing.
- Out-of-scope boundaries and compliance red lines must be respected.
Prerequisites
- Scope authorization for every asset tested (see red lines below).
- A recon toolset: subdomain enumeration, HTTP probing, directory/parameter
fuzzing, and a vulnerability scanner for confirmation.
- The program's rules page: scope, out-of-scope, payout table, reporting
format.
Workflow
Phase 1: Intake
- Record the scoped target list, the out-of-scope list, the rules, and the
payout table in a campaign notes file.
- Note submission format and any "do not test" conditions (production
hours, rate limits, WAF behavior).
- Define the campaign time box and the target classes in scope.
Phase 2: Recon
- Subdomain discovery: passive (certificate transparency, DNS) then active
(brute force) enumeration; validate resolvable, live hosts.
- Perimeter mapping: CDN/WAF identification (knowledge-pass these — see red
lines), origin discovery, cloud asset inventory.
- File-browser and API discovery: exposed directories, JS bundle endpoints,
API documentation endpoints, and versioned API surfaces.
- China-specific fingerprinting: OA (office automation) systems,
中间件 (middleware: Weblogic, Tomcat, Nacos, Spring, etc.) version
identification — these are frequent SRC fast wins.
Phase 3: Enumeration
- Directory probing: dictionary + wordlist against live hosts; log status
code, size, and tech stack.
- Parameter dimension: enumerate parameters on interesting endpoints
(including hidden/undocumented params), record param types.
- Functional audit: walk each in-scope feature (auth, upload, search,
export, password reset) and note trust boundaries.
- Aim-tagging: tag each finding candidate with the vulnerability class it
most plausibly maps to — this drives Phase 4 priority.
Phase 4: Hunt
Prioritize by payout × exploitability using the standard class table:
| Priority |
Classes |
| High |
XSS (stored/reflected), RCE, SSRF, IDOR/BOLA, SQLi |
| Medium |
CSRF on sensitive actions, Path Traversal, File Upload, SSTI, XXE |
| Low |
Race conditions, HTTP Smuggling, OAuth/JWT/SAML misconfig, GraphQL abuse, Mobile API issues, LLM prompt-level flaws, DoS (scope-checked) |
For each candidate:
- Confirm the class with a minimal proof (no destructive payloads).
- Capture evidence: request/response pair, time, affected asset, impact
chain.
- Rule out false positives before moving on; a confirmed finding beats ten
unconfirmed leads.
Phase 5: Report
- Evidence discipline: every claim maps to a reproducible request/response
or trace — no screenshots of "trust me".
- Classification: state severity, vulnerability class, and business impact
(which data/function is affected).
- Relation to known issues: search the program's public duplicates before
submitting.
- Timeline: submission date, expected triage SLA, follow-up cadence.
Compliance Red Lines
- No production-damaging actions: no data destruction, no account takeover
beyond the minimal proof, no load-generating tests without authorization.
- No privacy exfiltration: never download or exfiltrate real user data;
use placeholders and minimal samples.
- No DoS: no volume/amplification testing.
- Authorization scope only: never test out-of-scope or third-party assets
reachable from an in-scope host.
- CDN/WAF knowledge-pass: identify them in recon and route around rather
than attacking the protection layer itself.
- Contact the SRC before testing anything unusual (origin discovery,
production-adjacent assets, third-party integrations).
Hands-On Example
Quick reachability probe of in-scope assets before active fingerprinting
(Phase 2 — Recon). With Python's httpx, installed via pip install httpx:
import httpx
for url in ["https://example.com"]:
r = httpx.get(url, timeout=10, headers={"User-Agent": "probe"})
print(url, r.status_code, len(r.content), r.headers.get("server"))
# https://example.com 200 559 cloudflare
Output above verified live (example.com 200, 559 bytes). A 200 from a
CDN-backed asset is a probe result, not a finding: log it, fingerprint the
origin — Kali's apt install nuclei installs nuclei 3.8+ — and only assets
that survive scope + compliance red-line checks get active testing.
Verification
Run this self-check before claiming completion:
When NOT to Use
- Unscoped testing or assets without authorization — stop and get scope.
- Pure infrastructure/networking programs (no web surface) — use network
pentest workflows.
- A program-agnostic hunt with no SRC rules or payout table —
bug-hunting
is the generic AI-orchestrated workflow.
- Long-running 24/7 scanning across many targets —
continuous-hunter;
SRC hunting is time-boxed by design.
- Long-horizon APT-style engagement — SRC hunting is time-boxed by design.
Anti-Rationalization Table
| Rationalization |
Reality |
| "It's in-scope-adjacent, so it's probably fine." |
Adjacent is out-of-scope. Test only listed assets; document the scope check per asset. |
| "I'll grab a real user record to prove impact." |
Privacy exfiltration is a red line and a program-ban offense. Use placeholders. |
| "One more payload pass on this low-priority class." |
Time-box discipline beats volume: spend the next pass on the payout-weighted table. |
| "The screenshot proves it." |
A screenshot without a request/response pair is not reproducible evidence; SRC triage will reject it. |
| "The WAF blocks me, so I'll attack the WAF." |
Knowledge-pass the protection layer; route around it or report the bypass properly. |
1---2name: src-hunter3description: Use when structured SRC bug bounty hunting for security response centers: intake scoped targets and payout rules, recon subdomains and perimeters, enumerate attack surface, hunt prioritized vulnerability classes with time-boxed discipline, and report with evidence discipline. Use when hunting on SRC platforms, running time-boxed bounty campaigns, or applying China-specific asset fingerprinting.4license: Apache-2.05---678# SRC Bug Bounty Hunting910## Overview1112Security Response Centers (SRCs, 安全应急响应中心) run scoped, rules-based13bug bounty programs with payout tables, explicit out-of-scope lists, and14strict compliance red lines. Hunting them productively is a staged campaign —15intake, recon, enumeration, hunt, report — where the highest-value failures16are scope violations and evidence gaps, not missed vulnerabilities.1718This skill encodes that campaign structure plus China-specific asset19fingerprinting (OA/中间件 identification, ICP-style asset mapping) and the20compliance discipline SRC programs enforce. It complements general21bug-hunting skills with the scope/payout discipline and time-boxed22prioritization that SRC platforms demand.2324Source: cherry-picked and translated from `zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill`25(`skills/pentest-tools/src-hunter`, MIT license). Reference payload26libraries are not bundled; this skill is the standalone workflow.2728## When to Use2930**Trigger phrases:**31- "hunt on this SRC program"32- "SRC bounty campaign"33- "scope-in/scope-out for a Chinese SRC"34- "time-boxed vulnerability hunt"35- "report a finding to an SRC"36- "China asset fingerprinting for bounty"3738Use this skill when:3940- You are working a scoped SRC/bug bounty target with published rules and41 payout tables.42- You need a repeatable, evidence-disciplined campaign rather than ad hoc43 probing.44- Out-of-scope boundaries and compliance red lines must be respected.4546## Prerequisites4748- Scope authorization for every asset tested (see red lines below).49- A recon toolset: subdomain enumeration, HTTP probing, directory/parameter50 fuzzing, and a vulnerability scanner for confirmation.51- The program's rules page: scope, out-of-scope, payout table, reporting52 format.5354## Workflow5556### Phase 1: Intake5758- Record the scoped target list, the out-of-scope list, the rules, and the59 payout table in a campaign notes file.60- Note submission format and any "do not test" conditions (production61 hours, rate limits, WAF behavior).62- Define the campaign time box and the target classes in scope.6364### Phase 2: Recon6566- Subdomain discovery: passive (certificate transparency, DNS) then active67 (brute force) enumeration; validate resolvable, live hosts.68- Perimeter mapping: CDN/WAF identification (knowledge-pass these — see red69 lines), origin discovery, cloud asset inventory.70- File-browser and API discovery: exposed directories, JS bundle endpoints,71 API documentation endpoints, and versioned API surfaces.72- China-specific fingerprinting: OA (office automation) systems,73 中间件 (middleware: Weblogic, Tomcat, Nacos, Spring, etc.) version74 identification — these are frequent SRC fast wins.7576### Phase 3: Enumeration7778- Directory probing: dictionary + wordlist against live hosts; log status79 code, size, and tech stack.80- Parameter dimension: enumerate parameters on interesting endpoints81 (including hidden/undocumented params), record param types.82- Functional audit: walk each in-scope feature (auth, upload, search,83 export, password reset) and note trust boundaries.84- Aim-tagging: tag each finding candidate with the vulnerability class it85 most plausibly maps to — this drives Phase 4 priority.8687### Phase 4: Hunt8889Prioritize by payout × exploitability using the standard class table:9091| Priority | Classes |92|---|---|93| High | XSS (stored/reflected), RCE, SSRF, IDOR/BOLA, SQLi |94| Medium | CSRF on sensitive actions, Path Traversal, File Upload, SSTI, XXE |95| Low | Race conditions, HTTP Smuggling, OAuth/JWT/SAML misconfig, GraphQL abuse, Mobile API issues, LLM prompt-level flaws, DoS (scope-checked) |9697For each candidate:9899- Confirm the class with a minimal proof (no destructive payloads).100- Capture evidence: request/response pair, time, affected asset, impact101 chain.102- Rule out false positives before moving on; a confirmed finding beats ten103 unconfirmed leads.104105### Phase 5: Report106107- Evidence discipline: every claim maps to a reproducible request/response108 or trace — no screenshots of "trust me".109- Classification: state severity, vulnerability class, and business impact110 (which data/function is affected).111- Relation to known issues: search the program's public duplicates before112 submitting.113- Timeline: submission date, expected triage SLA, follow-up cadence.114115## Compliance Red Lines116117- No production-damaging actions: no data destruction, no account takeover118 beyond the minimal proof, no load-generating tests without authorization.119- No privacy exfiltration: never download or exfiltrate real user data;120 use placeholders and minimal samples.121- No DoS: no volume/amplification testing.122- Authorization scope only: never test out-of-scope or third-party assets123 reachable from an in-scope host.124- CDN/WAF knowledge-pass: identify them in recon and route around rather125 than attacking the protection layer itself.126- Contact the SRC before testing anything unusual (origin discovery,127 production-adjacent assets, third-party integrations).128129## Hands-On Example130131Quick reachability probe of in-scope assets before active fingerprinting132(Phase 2 — Recon). With Python's httpx, installed via `pip install httpx`:133134```python135import httpx136for url in ["https://example.com"]:137 r = httpx.get(url, timeout=10, headers={"User-Agent": "probe"})138 print(url, r.status_code, len(r.content), r.headers.get("server"))139# https://example.com 200 559 cloudflare140```141142Output above verified live (example.com 200, 559 bytes). A 200 from a143CDN-backed asset is a probe result, not a finding: log it, fingerprint the144origin — Kali's `apt install nuclei` installs nuclei 3.8+ — and only assets145that survive scope + compliance red-line checks get active testing.146147## Verification148149Run this self-check before claiming completion:150151- [ ] Campaign notes contain scope, out-of-scope, rules, and payout table.152- [ ] Recon artifacts (subdomain list, live hosts, CDN/WAF map) exist and153 are reproducible.154- [ ] Every finding has a request/response evidence pair and an affected155 asset.156- [ ] Priority ordering followed payout × exploitability, not convenience.157- [ ] No red line was crossed; scope checks are documented per tested asset.158- [ ] Report includes classification, business impact, and duplicate check.159160## When NOT to Use161162- Unscoped testing or assets without authorization — stop and get scope.163- Pure infrastructure/networking programs (no web surface) — use network164 pentest workflows.165- A program-agnostic hunt with no SRC rules or payout table — `bug-hunting`166 is the generic AI-orchestrated workflow.167- Long-running 24/7 scanning across many targets — `continuous-hunter`;168 SRC hunting is time-boxed by design.169- Long-horizon APT-style engagement — SRC hunting is time-boxed by design.170171## Anti-Rationalization Table172173| Rationalization | Reality |174|---|---|175| "It's in-scope-adjacent, so it's probably fine." | Adjacent is out-of-scope. Test only listed assets; document the scope check per asset. |176| "I'll grab a real user record to prove impact." | Privacy exfiltration is a red line and a program-ban offense. Use placeholders. |177| "One more payload pass on this low-priority class." | Time-box discipline beats volume: spend the next pass on the payout-weighted table. |178| "The screenshot proves it." | A screenshot without a request/response pair is not reproducible evidence; SRC triage will reject it. |179| "The WAF blocks me, so I'll attack the WAF." | Knowledge-pass the protection layer; route around it or report the bypass properly. |