Authorization Model

AUTHORIZATION_MODEL Skill (DAML)

Trigger Pattern: Always required for DAML audits Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth-state-trace, depth-external Finding prefix: [DML-AM-N] Rules referenced: R4, R6, R12, R13

DAML's authorization model has no msg.sender. Authority flows through the transaction tree: the required authorizers of every node MUST be a subset of the parties who authorized the submission. A create requires the new contract's signatory parties; an exercise/fetch requires the choice's controller parties; an archive requires the signatories. Signatory authority propagates exactly ONE hop into a choice's consequences. The most common critical bug class is a choice whose controller is derived from a choice argument (privilege injection), or a choice that performs a privileged action with only one authorizer where joint authorization is required.

1. Choice-Authority Inventory

For EVERY choice in each template, record who must authorize it and what it does:

Critical patterns to flag:

• A choice that moves value, changes ownership, or updates config but lists only ONE controller where the action affects multiple parties (single-where-joint → [ELEVATE:MISSING_COAUTH]).
• A controller expression that reads a field of the choice argument rather than a template signatory/fixed party (privilege injection → [ELEVATE:PARAM_CONTROLLER], ALWAYS flag).

DAML note: controller p makes p the required authorizer AND an automatic observer. A controller derived from arg.someParty lets the caller name themselves as the authorizer — there is no msg.sender to constrain it.

2. Controller-Source Trace (privilege injection)

For each choice whose controller is NOT a fixed template signatory, trace where the controlling party comes from:

Attack: If controller resolves from a value the caller supplies (choice argument, or a field of a contract the caller created), the caller authorizes their own privileged action. Compare against the intended authority from the AUTHORIZATION MATRIX in attack_surface.md.

ARG-DERIVED controller is ALWAYS a finding candidate — it must be proven safe (the arg is itself constrained by a prior signatory check) before it is dismissed.

3. In-Body Validation Enumeration

A correct controller does NOT replace in-body checks. Enumerate the validation each choice performs against its controller:

Check for:

• A choice that lets ANY party be the controller but then acts on this.owner without asserting owner == controllingParty (missing owner == party).
• A choice that updates a per-party balance/position but does not bind the controller to the affected party.
• Reliance on the controller alone where the choice consequences touch parties the controller should not be able to affect.

4. Guard / Whitelist / Flag Bypass

Enumerate every conditional that gates a privileged path:

Patterns:

• A flag (paused, frozen, active) read from a contract the caller can re-create with a forged value.
• A whitelist membership test against a list supplied as a choice argument rather than a signed template field.
• A guard short-circuited by an alternative choice on the same template that reaches the same consequence without the guard.

5. Fetch-Based Auth Bypass

A fetch/fetchByKey returns a contract that the choice may branch on for an authorization decision. If the fetched contract is not bound to a trusted signatory, the caller can forge it.

Attack: A choice fetches a Config/Role/Approval contract and grants access based on a field, but the caller can create that contract themselves (they are a signatory of it). The auth decision rests on attacker-controlled state. Verify the fetched contract's signatories include the party whose authority the decision relies on ([ELEVATE:FETCH_AUTH]).

Finding Template

**ID**: [DML-AM-N]
**Severity**: [Critical if value/ownership, High if config/co-auth, Medium if view-privileged]
**Step Execution**: ✓1,2,3,4,5 | ✗(reasons) | ?(uncertain)
**Rules Applied**: [R4:✓/✗, R6:✓/✗, R12:✓/✗, R13:✓/✗]
**Location**: {Module}.daml:LineN (template X, choice Y)
**Title**: {Choice} controller derived from argument / missing co-authorization allows unauthorized {action}
**Description**: [Specific authority gap with the controller expr, what the tx tree requires, and why the caller can satisfy it alone]
**Impact**: [What the unauthorized party achieves: takes a contract, moves value, becomes admin, bypasses a guard]
**PoC steer**: `submit attacker (exerciseCmd cid Choice with ...)` SUCCEEDS + harm assertion; a passing `submitMustFail` instead proves SAFETY (refutes).

Step Execution Checklist (MANDATORY)