Fork Ancestry

FORK_ANCESTRY Skill (Sui)

Trigger Pattern: Always (run during recon TASK 0, not breadth) Inject Into: Recon agent only (meta_buffer.md enrichment) Finding prefix: [FA-N] Purpose: Detect known parent Sui packages and inherit their historical vulnerability patterns.

1. Detect Fork Indicators

Grep the codebase for known parent Sui package signatures:

Also check:

• Move.toml dependencies for parent package addresses or names (e.g., cetus_clmm = "0x...", deepbook = { addr = "0x..." })
• Import paths in Move source: use cetus_clmm::, use deepbook::, use suilend::, etc.
• Struct names and function signatures matching known parent interfaces
• Published package addresses in dependency declarations (known mainnet addresses of parent protocols)

Git-based detection (complements code-pattern matching — catches forks that renamed all identifiers). Skip if REPO_SHAPE: squashed_import in build_status.md — single-commit repos have no meaningful git metadata.

• Parse .gitmodules for submodule URLs pointing to known parent repos
• Check git remote -v for origin URLs matching known Sui parent organizations (MystenLabs, cetus-technology, scallop-io, navi-protocol, suilend, deepbook, turbos-finance)
• If a git-URL match is found but NO code-pattern match exists, flag as GIT_ONLY_FORK

Output: List of detected parents with confidence level:

• HIGH: 3+ unique patterns matched, OR parent package in Move.toml dependencies
• MEDIUM: 2 patterns matched
• LOW: 1 pattern matched (may be coincidental naming)
• GIT_ONLY: git URL match but no code patterns — fork likely renamed identifiers

2. Query Known Parent Issues

For each detected parent (confidence MEDIUM or HIGH):

2a. Solodit Search (two queries, run in parallel)

// Query 1: Known high-quality issues
search_solodit_live(
  keywords="{parent_name} sui move",
  impact=["HIGH", "CRITICAL"],
  language="Move",
  quality_score=3,
  sort_by="Quality",
  max_results=15
)
// Query 2: Fork-specific divergence issues
search_solodit_live(
  keywords="{parent_name} fork modified sui object",
  impact=["HIGH", "MEDIUM"],
  language="Move",
  sort_by="Rarity",
  max_results=10
)

2b. Tavily Search

tavily_search(query="{parent_name} sui move vulnerability exploit audit finding 2024 2025 2026")

2c. Known Issue Catalog

Compile results into:

Applicability criteria:

• YES: Fork retains the vulnerable code path unchanged
• NO: Fork modified the vulnerable code path (document what changed)
• CHECK: Cannot determine without deeper analysis (flag for breadth agent)

2d. Hardcoded Known-Issue Floor (Web Search Fallback)

If Solodit AND Tavily BOTH fail, use this minimum catalog -- check EACH applicable parent.

This floor is keyed on the parent's TYPE (generic mechanism), NOT on any specific protocol name — brand-keyed rows are prohibited (a floor row naming a specific protocol is the confirmed benchmark-contamination vector; see the HARD no-overfit rule). Classify the detected parent (from Section 1) into a type below and check the generic known-issue class; use at most one illustrative brand only in prose, never as the row key.

3. Divergence Analysis

For each detected parent:

3a. Identify What Changed

Compare fork vs parent in security-critical paths:

Sui-specific divergence focus areas (ordered by criticality):

Object Ownership Model Changes (HIGHEST PRIORITY)

• Did the fork change any object from OWNED to SHARED or vice versa? Ownership model changes fundamentally alter the access control surface.
• Did the fork add or remove store ability from objects? Adding store = anyone can transfer; removing store = module-controlled transfer only.
• Did the fork change shared object access control patterns (different capability checks, different admin verification)?
• Critical: Shared object without proper access control = anyone can mutate protocol state.

Capability and Admin Pattern Changes

• Did the fork change which capabilities gate admin operations (different Cap objects, different verification logic)?
• Did the fork add store to capability objects that the parent kept module-restricted? This allows capability transfer, potentially weakening admin control.
• Did the fork introduce new admin functions without corresponding capability checks?
• Critical: Capability objects with store can be transferred to arbitrary addresses, including contracts that auto-execute.

Balance and Coin Handling Changes

• Did the fork modify how Balance<T> or Coin<T> objects are split, joined, or transferred?
• Are there new code paths where Balance could be created (via balance::zero() then never destroyed) or destroyed (via unmatched balance::destroy_zero())?
• Did the fork add support for additional coin types without updating all code paths?
• Critical: Balance accounting mismatches between protocol state and actual Coin holdings.

Dynamic Field Schema Changes

• Did the fork change dynamic field key types or naming conventions?
• Are there new dynamic field additions without corresponding removal logic?
• Did the fork change which objects have dynamic fields attached?

Other Divergence Areas

• Modified mathematical formulas (fee calculations, exchange rates, reward distribution)
• Parameter semantic verification: When the parent has a mathematical specification, verify that each core parameter carries the same mathematical meaning in the fork — not just the same name and numeric range. Forks may store a raw value where the parent stores a derived form (e.g., raw coefficient vs. coefficient scaled by a function of pool dimensions). Compare the fork's formula usage against the parent's specification to confirm the encoding convention matches.
• Changed access control (added/removed capabilities, modified authority checks)
• Removed safety checks (assertions removed, constraints removed)
• Changed struct layouts (fields reordered, types changed, new fields added)
• Added/removed public functions (new attack surface or missing safety functions)
• Changed event emissions (may affect off-chain monitoring and indexers)

3b. New Attack Surface from Divergence

For each modification:

• Does the change introduce a NEW vulnerability not in the parent?
• Does the change REMOVE a parent fix/mitigation?
• Does the change create an INCONSISTENCY with parent's invariants?
• Does the change break assumptions that other unchanged code relies on? (e.g., parent assumes PoolConfig is always shared; fork sometimes wraps it inside another object)

4. Output to meta_buffer.md

Append to {SCRATCHPAD}/meta_buffer.md:

## Fork Ancestry Analysis

### Detected Parents
| Parent | Confidence | Patterns Found | Move.toml Dependency? |
|--------|-----------|---------------|----------------------|

### Inherited Vulnerabilities to Verify
| # | Parent Issue | Severity | Location in Fork | Status |
|---|-------------|----------|------------------|--------|
| 1 | {issue} | {severity} | {fork location: module::function} | CHECK / VERIFIED_SAFE / VULNERABLE |

### Fork Divergences (Security-Critical)
| # | Component | Change Type | Change Description | New Risk? |
|---|-----------|------------|-------------------|-----------|
| 1 | {component} | OWNERSHIP_MODEL / CAPABILITY / BALANCE / DYNAMIC_FIELD / OTHER | {what changed} | YES/NO/CHECK |

### Questions for Breadth Agents
1. {derived from inherited vulnerabilities}
2. {derived from divergence analysis}
3. {derived from ownership model changes}

Step Execution Checklist (MANDATORY)

Cross-Reference Markers

After Step 1: If Move.toml shows specific parent package address dependencies, verify the addresses match known mainnet deployments (not test/devnet).

After Step 3a (Ownership Model): Feed changed ownership models to OBJECT_OWNERSHIP skill for targeted re-analysis of affected objects.

After Step 3a (Capability): Feed new/changed capabilities to SEMI_TRUSTED_ROLES skill for admin privilege analysis.

After Step 3a (Balance): Feed changed balance handling to TOKEN_FLOW_TRACING skill for flow analysis.