Nft Protocol Security

Injectable Skill: NFT Protocol Security

Protocol Type Trigger: nft (detected when ERC721/ERC1155 with marketplace, minting, staking, or collateral logic found) Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth-token-flow, depth-edge-case Language: EVM only (Solana/Move NFT models use different mechanisms without callbacks or enumeration) Finding prefix: [NFT-N]

Orchestrator Decomposition Guide

When decomposing this skill into depth agent investigation questions, map sections to domains:

• Sections 1, 2: depth-token-flow (callback flows, approval/transfer paths)
• Section 3: depth-edge-case (enumeration invariants, boundary states)
• Section 4: depth-state-trace (ownership state consistency, metadata integrity)

When This Skill Activates

Recon detects NFT protocol patterns: ERC721/ERC1155 with state-modifying logic beyond simple transfer (marketplace listing, staking, collateral, minting with conditions, royalty enforcement, batch operations).

Pure ERC721/ERC1155 token implementations without protocol logic do NOT trigger this skill.

1. Callback Reentrancy Surface

For each function that triggers NFT callbacks:

1a. Safe Transfer Callback Inventory

Enumerate all code paths that invoke _safeMint, _safeTransfer, safeTransferFrom, or onERC1155Received/onERC1155BatchReceived:

For each entry:

• Is all critical state updated BEFORE the callback? (checks-effects-interactions)
• Can the callback recipient re-enter the calling contract?
• Can the callback recipient REVERT selectively to reject unwanted outcomes and retry until a desired outcome occurs?
• Pattern: _safeMint(to, tokenId) → onERC721Received callback → recipient reverts if assigned token has undesirable properties → retry until desired properties assigned.

1b. Batch Callback Completeness

For contracts implementing ERC1155:

• Is onERC1155Received implemented for single transfers?
• Is onERC1155BatchReceived implemented for batch transfers?
• If batch callback is MISSING: safeBatchTransferFrom will revert, blocking batch settlement/distribution.
• Do both callbacks return the correct selector?

Tag: [TRACE:_safeMint → onERC721Received callback → state_before={list} → reentrant_path={YES/NO}]

2. Approval and Transfer Path Analysis

2a. Approval Scope

For each approval mechanism:

• approve(address, tokenId): per-token approval. Is approval cleared on transfer?
• setApprovalForAll(address, bool): blanket approval. Can an approved operator transfer ANY token?
• Is there a mechanism to revoke approvals? Can approval persist across ownership changes?

2b. Transfer Authorization

For each transfer function:

• Who can transfer? (owner, approved, operator)
• Is authorization checked for ALL transfer code paths? (direct, marketplace, staking, collateral seizure)
• Pattern: protocol custody contract has setApprovalForAll from users → contract can transfer any user's NFTs → compromise of contract = compromise of all approved NFTs.

2c. Royalty Bypass

If royalties are enforced:

• Can transfers occur through paths that bypass royalty checks? (direct transferFrom vs marketplace executeSale)
• Are royalties enforced at the token level (ERC2981) or marketplace level?
• If marketplace-level only: direct transfer bypasses royalties.

Tag: [TRACE:transfer_path={function} → auth_check={method} → royalty_enforced={YES/NO}]

3. Enumeration and Index Integrity

For contracts using ERC721Enumerable or custom enumeration:

3a. Index Structure Consistency

• What data structures track token ownership enumeration? (_ownedTokens, _allTokens, index mappings)
• For every state-changing operation (mint, burn, transfer): are ALL index structures updated atomically?
• Pattern: override _beforeTokenTransfer (OZ v4) or _update (OZ v5) without calling super → index structures become stale.

3b. Burn and Transfer Edge Cases

• After burn: does tokenOfOwnerByIndex still return correct values? Is totalSupply decremented?
• After transfer: does old owner's index shrink and new owner's index grow?
• At boundary: single-token owner burns their only token → empty enumeration handles correctly?

3c. Batch Operation Atomicity

For batch mint/burn/transfer:

• Are indices updated for EACH token in the batch, or only once at the end?
• Can a partial failure in a batch leave indices in an inconsistent state?
• Gas cost at maximum batch size: does it exceed block gas limit?

Tag: [BOUNDARY:burn_last_token → _ownedTokens[owner].length={0} → tokenOfOwnerByIndex={result}]

4. Metadata and State Consistency

4a. Token URI Integrity

If tokenURI or uri returns dynamic content:

• For ERC1155: does uri(uint256 id) return a template with literal {id} placeholder per spec? Or a fully resolved URL? (clients expect to substitute the zero-padded hex ID client-side)
• Can metadata be changed after mint? By whom? Does change emit event?
• Is metadata stored on-chain or off-chain? If off-chain: what happens if the URI host is unreachable?

4b. Token Property Assignment

If tokens have properties assigned at mint time (rarity, type, attributes):

• Is the assignment deterministic or random?
• If random: is the randomness source manipulable? (block.timestamp, block.prevrandao, weak PRNG)
• Can the minter influence which properties are assigned? (selective minting via callback revert)
• Cross-reference FLASH_LOAN_INTERACTION if properties affect economic value.

4c. Ownership State During Custody

When tokens are deposited into protocol custody (staking, collateral, escrow):

• Does ownerOf(tokenId) return the protocol address or the depositor?
• Are user rights (claim, withdraw, liquidate) tracked correctly in protocol state?
• If the protocol is compromised: can deposited NFTs be recovered?

Tag: [TRACE:mint → property_assignment={method} → randomness_source={source} → manipulable={YES/NO}]

Key Questions (must answer all)

1. For each _safeMint/_safeTransfer: is critical state updated BEFORE the callback?
2. For ERC1155: are BOTH single and batch callbacks implemented with correct selectors?
3. For enumerable tokens: do burn/transfer operations update ALL index structures?
4. For metadata: does uri() follow the spec for the token standard used?
5. For custody protocols: is depositor ownership tracked independently from ownerOf?

Common False Positives

• Non-reentrant safe transfers: _safeMint within nonReentrant modifier → callback reentrancy blocked
• Standard OZ implementation: Inherits ERC721Enumerable or ERC1155 without overriding internal hooks → indices maintained by parent
• Immutable metadata: Token URI set at mint and never changeable → no metadata manipulation
• Trusted recipients only: Safe transfers only to protocol-controlled addresses (not user-supplied) → callback revert/reentrancy not user-exploitable

Step Execution Checklist (MANDATORY)