Auth Patterns

Authentication & Authorization Patterns

Intro

Authentication proves who a caller is; authorization decides what they can do. Use industry-standard protocols (OAuth2, OIDC, JWT) and proven patterns (session cookies, RBAC, ABAC) rather than inventing your own.

Overview

OAuth2 flow selection

Pick the flow based on the client's ability to keep secrets:

See references/oauth-flows.md for full flow diagrams and exchange parameters.

JWT essentials

• Always validate signature, exp, iss, and aud.
• Keep payloads small — JWTs ride on every request.
• Never store secrets in payloads; base64 is encoding, not encryption.
• Use short access-token expiry (5–15 min).
• Prefer RS256 or ES256 for public APIs over HS256.
• Rotate signing keys via a JWKS endpoint.

See references/jwt-reference.md for the structure, claims, and full validation checklist.

Session management

For server-rendered apps using session cookies:

• Generate cryptographically random session IDs (≥128 bits).
• Store session data server-side (Redis, database) — never inside the cookie body.
• Set HttpOnly, Secure, and SameSite=Lax (or Strict) on the cookie.
• Apply idle timeout (15–30 min) and absolute timeout (8–24 hours).
• Regenerate the session ID after login to prevent session fixation.

RBAC vs ABAC

RBAC assigns permissions to roles and roles to users. Simple and appropriate when access depends only on the user's job function.

ROLES = {
    "viewer": ["read:projects", "read:reports"],
    "editor": ["read:projects", "read:reports", "write:projects"],
    "admin":  ["read:projects", "read:reports", "write:projects",
               "manage:users", "manage:settings"],
}

def has_permission(user, permission):
    return any(permission in ROLES[role] for role in user.roles)

ABAC evaluates attributes of subject, resource, action, and context. Use it when access depends on ownership, department, time of day, or other context.

def can_access(subject, action, resource, context):
    if action == "edit" and resource.owner_id == subject.id:
        return True
    if "admin" in subject.roles and resource.department == subject.department:
        return True
    if action == "deploy" and not context.is_maintenance_window:
        return False
    return False

Token refresh

Access tokens should be short-lived. Refresh tokens trade themselves for new access tokens at the auth server:

Client                    Auth Server                 API
  |                           |                        |
  |--- Request (access token) ----------------------->|
  |<-- 401 Unauthorized -------------------------------|
  |--- Refresh token -------->|                        |
  |<-- New access + refresh --|                        |
  |--- Retry (new access token) --------------------->|
  |<-- 200 OK ----------------------------------------|

Refresh tokens must be stored securely (httpOnly cookie or secure device storage), single-use (rotated on every refresh), and revocable (server-side denylist or family tracking).

Gotchas

Agent-specific failure modes — provider-neutral pause-and-self-check items:

• JWT signature validation skipped or incomplete. Accepting a JWT without verifying the signature, or without validating exp (expiry), iss (issuer), and aud (audience) claims, means any JWT — including expired, foreign, or forged ones — will be accepted. Always validate all four: signature, expiry, issuer, and audience. Explicitly specify the allowed algorithm list so an attacker cannot switch to alg: none.
• Storing access tokens in localStorage. Tokens stored in localStorage are accessible to any JavaScript running on the page, including injected scripts via XSS. Keep access tokens in memory only; store refresh tokens in httpOnly cookies that JavaScript cannot read.
• Returning different error messages for "user not found" vs "wrong password." "User does not exist" vs "Incorrect password" allows an attacker to enumerate valid usernames by observing which error they receive. Always return the same generic message: "Invalid email or password." regardless of which check failed.
• Not regenerating the session ID after login. If a user has a session cookie before logging in (e.g., from a previous anonymous session) and the same session ID is reused after authentication, an attacker who captured the pre-login session cookie can now use it to access the authenticated session. Regenerate the session ID immediately after successful login.
• Using HS256 for tokens consumed by clients you don't control. HS256 uses a shared symmetric key — anyone who knows the key can forge tokens. For public APIs where tokens are validated by multiple parties, use RS256 or ES256 (asymmetric), so clients can validate with the public key without being able to forge new tokens.
• No rate limiting on authentication endpoints. A login or password-reset endpoint without rate limiting allows unlimited brute-force attempts. Apply progressive delays, lockout, or CAPTCHA after N failed attempts per IP or per account. Use a token-bucket or sliding-window rate limiter, not a simple counter.
• Granting blanket scopes or roles "for now." Giving every service or user admin-level access because it's easier to configure means a compromised credential gives the attacker the full blast radius. Apply least-privilege from the beginning: each service credential covers only the permissions that service legitimately needs.

Full reference

API key patterns

• Prefix keys for identification: sk_live_abc123 (secret), pk_live_xyz789 (public).
• Hash keys before storage (SHA-256). Show the full key only once at creation.
• Scope keys to specific permissions; never grant full access by default.
• Embed a key ID in the key itself so lookups don't require hashing every stored key.

CORS configuration

// Express.js example
app.use(cors({
  origin: ["https://app.example.com"],     // Never use "*" with credentials
  methods: ["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE"],
  allowedHeaders: ["Authorization", "Content-Type"],
  credentials: true,                        // Allow cookies
  maxAge: 86400,                            // Cache preflight 24h
}));

Never set Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * together with credentials.

Security review checklist

1. Auth tokens are transmitted only over HTTPS.
2. Passwords are hashed with bcrypt or argon2 — never MD5/SHA1.
3. JWT signatures are validated; alg: none is rejected.
4. Refresh tokens are rotated on use and revocable.
5. Session IDs are regenerated after authentication.
6. CORS origins are explicitly listed (no wildcards with credentials).
7. Rate limiting is applied to login and token endpoints.
8. Failed login attempts trigger progressive delays or lockout.

JWT validation in practice

Always specify allowed algorithms explicitly to prevent algorithm confusion attacks (an attacker switching RS256 to HS256 and signing with the public key):

import jwt
from jwt import PyJWKClient

jwks_client = PyJWKClient("https://auth.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json")

def validate_token(token: str) -> dict:
    signing_key = jwks_client.get_signing_key_from_jwt(token)
    return jwt.decode(
        token,
        signing_key.key,
        algorithms=["RS256"],       # Explicit allowlist
        issuer="https://auth.example.com",
        audience="https://api.example.com",
        options={
            "require": ["exp", "iss", "aud", "sub"],
            "verify_exp": True,
            "verify_iss": True,
            "verify_aud": True,
        },
    )

Common JWT vulnerabilities

• Algorithm confusion — fix by explicitly listing allowed algorithms; never trust the token's alg header.
• Missing signature validation — reject tokens with alg: none.
• Tokens stored in localStorage — readable by XSS; keep access tokens in memory and refresh tokens in httpOnly cookies.
• Long expirations — keep access tokens short-lived (5–15 min).
• Sensitive data in payload — base64 is encoding, not encryption.
• No revocation path — maintain a server-side denylist for critical invalidations and keep access-token lifetimes short.

Refresh-token rotation

The auth server issues a fresh refresh token on every use and invalidates the old one. If a previously-rotated refresh token is presented again, treat it as theft and invalidate the entire token family.

Anti-patterns

• Building your own crypto or password hashing.
• Storing JWT access tokens in localStorage on a SPA.
• Using HS256 for tokens consumed by clients you don't control.
• Granting blanket scopes or permissions because "it's easier".
• Returning different errors for "user not found" vs "wrong password" (enables enumeration).
• Using GET requests for state-changing operations (CSRF surface).