Technical methods and evidence
Use the relevant existing technique skills for implementation details. These notes explain technical prerequisites and evidentiary limits; they do not define an engagement stage order, dispatch policy, or report lifecycle. Tool availability and argument names come from the live schema. Authorization comes from the RoE.
Directory topology and effective rights
BloodHound collector exports describe topology and potential permissions; they do
not prove that a session, credential, or multi-hop path is usable. bh_ingest_zip
loads its own topology backend; confirmed engagement observations use kg_record.
Distinguish replication rights (GetChanges/GetChangesAll), group membership, nested
ACL inheritance, and effective access on the actual object. DCSync capability does
not require Domain Admin membership; replication testing still requires its specific
authorization. Kerberos SPN and preauthentication settings identify different ticket
exposure hypotheses; record encryption type and account policy rather than assuming
any captured hash is crackable.
Certificates, delegation and managed secrets
ADCS assessment compares template enrollment rights, subject/SAN control, EKUs, manager approval and CA settings; an ESC label alone is not a proven escalation. Use the existing ADCS and Kerberos technique skills for version-specific checks. Constrained, unconstrained and resource-based constrained delegation have different principal, SPN and ticket prerequisites. Distinguish ReadLAPSPassword and ReadGMSAPassword rights from actual retrievable and usable credentials. GPO edits, shadow credentials and computer-object writes are state changes, not read-only permission checks. Capture the effective principal, object, permission source and before/after state for any separately authorized validation.
