Adversary Emulation — index & methodology
Adversary emulation reproduces a specific, named threat actor's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) — drawn from real, attributed intelligence — to test whether the target's people, process, and tooling detect and respond the way they should. It is distinct from generic penetration testing (opportunistic) and from simulation (abstract/random): emulation is threat-informed — every action traces to something a real group has been documented doing, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK.
Authorized use only. Emulate an actor's TTPs only within the engagement's Rules of Engagement and approved scope. Destructive techniques (Impact tactic: ransomware, wipers, ICS manipulation) are emulated as non-destructive proofs (e.g., a benign canary file, a dry-run) unless the RoE explicitly authorizes otherwise. The goal is to measure detection, not to cause damage.
When to use this
- The operator (or
roe.jsonthreat profile) names a specific actor to emulate, or names a sector/region whose dominant threat is a known group. - A purple-team / ATT&CK-evaluation engagement: run an actor's TTP chain while the
blue cell measures detection (see
kill-chain-analysisand theblue_cell). - You want a realistic, defensible attack plan instead of an ad-hoc one.
Methodology (5 steps)
- Select the actor. Map the engagement's industry/region/crown-jewels to a
relevant group (see the catalog below). When unsure, ask the operator via
ask_user_question. Record the choice in the OPPLAN. - Load the profile.
load_skill <slug>(e.g.load_skill apt29-cozy-bear). Each profile carries attribution, targeting, dated campaigns, the actor's TTPs mapped to ATT&CK technique IDs, signature tooling, emulation guidance (how to reproduce each TTP with Decepticon's own tools), and detection notes. - Scope to RoE. Intersect the actor's TTPs with the approved scope. Drop or down-scope anything out of bounds (e.g., replace a real wiper with a canary). Forbidden-destination / out-of-scope checks still apply at tool-call time.
- Emulate in kill-chain order. Walk Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Priv-Esc → Defense Evasion → Credential Access → Discovery → Lateral Movement → Collection → C2 → Exfiltration → (proof-of) Impact, using only the techniques this actor is known for. Cite the ATT&CK ID in each finding.
- Measure & report. Record which actions the blue cell detected/blocked vs.
missed (
kill-chain-analysis, MTTD), and produce a threat-informed report that ties each result to the emulated actor + ATT&CK technique. Feeds the final report.
This complements soundwave/threat-profile (which picks the actor at planning time)
and kill-chain-analysis (which scores detection across the chain).
Actor catalog
Profile (load_skill <slug>) |
Aliases | Attribution | Motivation | Notable for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
apt29-cozy-bear |
Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM, The Dukes | Russia (SVR) | Espionage | Stealthy cloud/identity intrusions; SolarWinds supply chain |
apt28-fancy-bear |
Forest Blizzard, Sofacy, STRONTIUM | Russia (GRU) | Espionage / influence | Credential phishing, election & defense targeting |
apt33-elfin |
Peach Sandstorm, HOLMIUM | Iran | Espionage (destructive links) | Aerospace & energy, Gulf-region targeting |
apt34-oilrig |
Helix Kitten, Hazel Sandstorm | Iran | Espionage | DNS-tunneling C2, Middle-East supply-chain access |
apt41-double-dragon |
Wicked Panda, BARIUM | China | Espionage and financial | Software supply-chain compromise; dual-use ops |
lazarus-group |
Hidden Cobra, Diamond Sleet | North Korea | Financial + destructive | Bank/crypto heists, WannaCry, supply chain |
fin7-carbanak |
Carbon Spider, Sangria Tempest | Financially motivated | Financial | POS/retail intrusions, Carbanak, ransomware affiliate |
sandworm-team |
Voodoo Bear, Seashell Blizzard | Russia (GRU) | Destructive / disruptive | NotPetya, Ukraine power-grid attacks, ICS |
volt-typhoon |
Vanguard Panda, Insidious Taurus | China | Pre-positioning | Living-off-the-land in US critical infrastructure |
scattered-spider |
UNC3944, Octo Tempest, Muddled Libra | Financially motivated | Financial / extortion | Help-desk social engineering, SIM-swap, MFA fatigue |
salt-typhoon |
Earth Estries, GhostEmperor, FamousSparrow | China | Espionage / pre-positioning | Edge-device exploitation, telecom targeting, DEMODEX rootkit |
turla |
Venomous Bear, Secret Blizzard, KRYPTON | Russia (FSB) | Espionage | Snake rootkit, satellite C2, hijacking other APTs' infra |
muddywater |
Mercury, Mango Sandstorm, Static Kitten | Iran (MOIS) | Espionage | PowerShell RATs, RMM tool abuse, Middle-East targeting |
apt36-transparent-tribe |
Transparent Tribe, Mythic Leopard, ProjectM | Pakistan | Espionage | CrimsonRAT, Android mobile malware, India-focused targeting |
apt37-reaper |
ScarCruft, Ricochet Chollima, InkySquid | North Korea | Espionage / surveillance | RoKRAT, zero-day browser exploits, defector surveillance |
mustang-panda |
Bronze President, Stately Taurus, RedDelta | China | Espionage | PlugX/DLL side-loading, USB propagation, SE Asia targeting |
dark-caracal |
— | Lebanon (GDGS) | Espionage / surveillance | Bandook RAT, multi-platform (Win/Mac/Android/Linux) |
patchwork |
Dropping Elephant, Chinastrats, Hangover | India | Espionage | BADNEWS RAT, copy-paste tradecraft, South Asia targeting |
pink-sandstorm |
Agrius, DEV-0227 | Iran | Destructive / espionage | Apostle wiper, destructive ops disguised as ransomware |
apt10-stone-panda |
Stone Panda, MenuPass, Red Apollo | China (MSS) | Espionage / IP theft | Cloud Hopper supply-chain, MSP targeting |
kimsuky |
Velvet Chollima, Emerald Sleet, THALLIUM | North Korea (RGB) | Espionage | BabyShark, credential phishing of think tanks/academia |
sidewinder |
Rattlesnake, T-APT-04, Razor Tiger | India | Espionage | LNK chains, .NET implants, Pakistan military targeting |
Profiles are grounded in MITRE ATT&CK group pages + public advisories; each lists its sources. ATT&CK technique IDs are the source of truth — verify against https://attack.mitre.org/groups/ if intel looks stale.