APT29 — Adversary Emulation Playbook
Tier-3 Russian SVR espionage actor. Emulate stealth cloud-identity tradecraft, not
malware: APT29's modern signature is compromising identity (no-MFA password spray,
device-code/consent phishing), abusing OAuth applications and tokens for persistence, and
collecting mail/documents over residential proxies with a near-zero endpoint footprint.
Authorized red-team emulation only — every action runs under the engagement RoE.
When to emulate APT29
- Target is a cloud-first / hybrid-identity estate (Microsoft 365 + Entra ID, Okta, AWS IAM
Identity Center, Google Workspace) and the client wants their identity blast radius
tested the way a top-tier espionage actor would.
- Government, diplomatic, defense, think-tank, technology, or MSP targets (see the
industry → actor map in
../../references/apt-groups.md).
- The objective is quiet, long-dwell collection — not smash-and-grab.
ThreatProfile seed (plan/threat-profile.json)
{
"engagement_name": "<fill>",
"actor_name": "APT29-like (Cozy Bear / Midnight Blizzard)",
"actor_aliases": ["Cozy Bear", "Midnight Blizzard", "NOBELIUM", "The Dukes", "UNC2452"],
"group_id": "G0016",
"tier": "tier-3",
"sophistication": "nation-state",
"motivation": "espionage",
"initial_access": ["T1078.004", "T1110.003", "T1566.002", "T1195.002"],
"key_ttps": ["T1528", "T1550.001", "T1098.001", "T1098.003", "T1606.002", "T1114.002", "T1071.001", "T1090.003", "T1070.004"],
"tools": ["AADInternals", "ROADtools", "TokenTactics", "Sliver", "residential proxies"],
"infrastructure": ["Engagement-owned OAuth apps (consent abuse)", "Residential proxy egress", "Low-and-slow Graph/API calls"],
"recent_cti_delta": "2024-2026: malware-light cloud tradecraft — malicious OAuth app consent, device-code phishing, password spray against legacy/no-MFA tenants (Microsoft + HPE corporate breaches); SolarWinds-style CI/CD supply-chain remains in repertoire.",
"confidence": "probable"
}
Prune to RoE: if social engineering is out of scope, drop T1566.002; if only one cloud is
in scope, drop the others. A phase whose techniques are all pruned drops its kill-chain row.
Kill-chain emulation
Each row is a candidate OPPLAN objective. The orchestrator's OPPLAN-builder turns surviving
rows into an objective DAG; the executing agent loads the named skill.
| # |
Phase |
MITRE |
Emulated action |
Executing agent → skill |
| 1 |
Recon |
T1593 / T1589.002 |
Map tenant, federation, employees, exposed apps/OWA, email format |
recon → /skills/standard/recon/osint/SKILL.md, /skills/standard/recon/cloud-recon/SKILL.md |
| 2 |
Initial Access |
T1110.003 |
Slow password spray against legacy/no-MFA cloud auth |
exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/web/ato-methodology/SKILL.md |
| 3 |
Initial Access (alt) |
T1566.002 |
Device-code / consent phishing (Teams/email lure) |
phisher → /skills/standard/phisher/SKILL.md |
| 4 |
Initial Access (alt) |
T1195.002 |
CI/CD or dependency supply-chain foothold |
exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/supplychain/dep-confusion/SKILL.md |
| 5 |
Credential/Token |
T1528 / T1550.001 |
Steal & replay OAuth app access tokens (skip password+MFA) |
exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/web/oauth/SKILL.md |
| 6 |
Persistence (cloud) |
T1098.001 / T1098.003 |
Add app credentials + high Graph roles; consent malicious OAuth app |
cloud → /skills/standard/cloud/azure-managed-identity/SKILL.md, /skills/standard/cloud/aws-iam-passrole-chain/SKILL.md |
| 7 |
Lateral (identity) |
T1606.002 |
Golden SAML / federation-trust token forgery |
exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/web/saml/SKILL.md |
| 8 |
Collection |
T1114.002 |
Mailbox / document collection via Graph (canary mailbox) |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/credential-access/SKILL.md |
| 9 |
C2 |
T1071.001 / T1090.003 |
Sliver beacon over HTTPS via residential proxy |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/c2-sliver/SKILL.md |
| 10 |
Exfiltration |
T1567.002 |
Low-and-slow exfil of scoped collection set |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/reporting/SKILL.md |
Defense evasion (T1070.004 log/file cleanup, blending with admin activity) is cross-cutting —
the shared defense-evasion / opsec skills are auto-injected into every operational agent.
CONOPS kill_chain (copy into conops.json)
Collapse the table into the 5-phase ObjectivePhase model:
recon — tenant/identity/federation enumeration (rows 1).
initial-access — no-MFA password spray + consent phishing + optional supply-chain (2-4).
post-exploit — token theft, cloud role/cred persistence, Golden SAML, mailbox collection (5-8).
c2 — Sliver over HTTPS via residential proxy (9).
exfiltration — scoped, throttled collection exfil (10).
OPSEC & signature fidelity
- Low and slow. Spread the password spray over hours, one attempt per account; APT29 is
patient. No bursty auth.
- Egress from residential / reputable IP space, not a datacenter VPS, to defeat IOC-based
detection (mirror the real actor's residential-proxy obfuscation).
- Prefer tokens over passwords. Once an app token is held, stop touching passwords/MFA —
that is the whole point of the OAuth tradecraft.
- Blend with admin activity. Use Graph/PowerShell the way a tenant admin would; avoid
noisy endpoint tooling.
- Clean up consent grants and added credentials at engagement end (feeds
cleanup.json).
RoE / safety gates
- Identity takeover is high blast-radius. OAuth consent + added cloud roles can affect a
production tenant globally — require explicit, written cloud-tenant authorization. Prefer a
dedicated test tenant or a sandboxed app registration.
- Phishing requires social-engineering authorization and a lure-deconfliction pass
(
/skills/standard/phisher/lure-deconfliction/SKILL.md).
- Add an
EMERGENCY abort trigger to abort.json: "real (non-canary) user mailbox or
document collected, or consent granted on a non-engagement OAuth app."
Deconfliction
- Name every engagement OAuth app
redteam-<engagement-id>-* and record the app/client IDs
in deconfliction.json.
- Pin a known deconfliction egress IP range + a marker User-Agent string so the identity team
can separate the exercise from a real Midnight Blizzard sign-in.
- Pre-brief the identity/SOC team that no-MFA spray + consent grants are expected.
Fidelity notes (deviations)
- Emulate consent/token abuse with an engagement-owned app registration — never publish a
real malicious multi-tenant app.
- Use a canary mailbox/SharePoint site seeded with marked documents for the collection and
exfil phases; do not collect real PII or classified mail.
- Sliver replaces APT29's bespoke implants (WINELOADER, etc.); fidelity is the C2 channel
shape (HTTPS, jittered beacon, residential egress), not the binary.
1---2name: apt293description: "APT29 (Cozy Bear / Midnight Blizzard, SVR) adversary-emulation playbook — malware-light cloud-identity espionage: no-MFA password spray, OAuth consent/token abuse, Golden SAML, mailbox collection over residential proxies. Use when emulating APT29 against an M365/Entra/AWS-identity estate. Triggers on: 'emulate APT29', 'Cozy Bear', 'Midnight Blizzard', 'NOBELIUM', 'OAuth abuse', 'cloud identity espionage', 'Golden SAML'."4allowed-tools: Read Write Edit5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/purpleailab/apt297 skillogy:8 version: 19 subdomain: planning10 when_to_use: "emulate APT29, Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM, The Dukes, SVR, cloud identity espionage, OAuth consent abuse, token theft, Golden SAML, M365 Entra espionage, supply chain"11 tags: adversary-emulation, apt29, cozy-bear, cloud-identity, oauth, espionage12 mitre_attack: T1078.004, T1528, T1550.001, T1098.001, T1606.002, T1114.002, T1071.00113---1415# APT29 — Adversary Emulation Playbook1617> Tier-3 Russian SVR espionage actor. Emulate **stealth cloud-identity tradecraft**, not18> malware: APT29's modern signature is compromising identity (no-MFA password spray,19> device-code/consent phishing), abusing OAuth applications and tokens for persistence, and20> collecting mail/documents over residential proxies with a near-zero endpoint footprint.21> Authorized red-team emulation only — every action runs under the engagement RoE.2223## When to emulate APT292425- Target is a cloud-first / hybrid-identity estate (Microsoft 365 + Entra ID, Okta, AWS IAM26 Identity Center, Google Workspace) and the client wants their **identity blast radius**27 tested the way a top-tier espionage actor would.28- Government, diplomatic, defense, think-tank, technology, or MSP targets (see the29 industry → actor map in `../../references/apt-groups.md`).30- The objective is quiet, long-dwell collection — *not* smash-and-grab.3132## ThreatProfile seed (`plan/threat-profile.json`)3334```json35{36 "engagement_name": "<fill>",37 "actor_name": "APT29-like (Cozy Bear / Midnight Blizzard)",38 "actor_aliases": ["Cozy Bear", "Midnight Blizzard", "NOBELIUM", "The Dukes", "UNC2452"],39 "group_id": "G0016",40 "tier": "tier-3",41 "sophistication": "nation-state",42 "motivation": "espionage",43 "initial_access": ["T1078.004", "T1110.003", "T1566.002", "T1195.002"],44 "key_ttps": ["T1528", "T1550.001", "T1098.001", "T1098.003", "T1606.002", "T1114.002", "T1071.001", "T1090.003", "T1070.004"],45 "tools": ["AADInternals", "ROADtools", "TokenTactics", "Sliver", "residential proxies"],46 "infrastructure": ["Engagement-owned OAuth apps (consent abuse)", "Residential proxy egress", "Low-and-slow Graph/API calls"],47 "recent_cti_delta": "2024-2026: malware-light cloud tradecraft — malicious OAuth app consent, device-code phishing, password spray against legacy/no-MFA tenants (Microsoft + HPE corporate breaches); SolarWinds-style CI/CD supply-chain remains in repertoire.",48 "confidence": "probable"49}50```5152Prune to RoE: if social engineering is out of scope, drop `T1566.002`; if only one cloud is53in scope, drop the others. A phase whose techniques are all pruned drops its kill-chain row.5455## Kill-chain emulation5657Each row is a candidate OPPLAN objective. The orchestrator's OPPLAN-builder turns surviving58rows into an objective DAG; the **executing agent** loads the named skill.5960| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |61|---|-------|-------|-----------------|-------------------------|62| 1 | Recon | T1593 / T1589.002 | Map tenant, federation, employees, exposed apps/OWA, email format | recon → `/skills/standard/recon/osint/SKILL.md`, `/skills/standard/recon/cloud-recon/SKILL.md` |63| 2 | Initial Access | T1110.003 | Slow password spray against legacy/no-MFA cloud auth | exploit → `/skills/standard/exploit/web/ato-methodology/SKILL.md` |64| 3 | Initial Access (alt) | T1566.002 | Device-code / consent phishing (Teams/email lure) | phisher → `/skills/standard/phisher/SKILL.md` |65| 4 | Initial Access (alt) | T1195.002 | CI/CD or dependency supply-chain foothold | exploit → `/skills/standard/exploit/supplychain/dep-confusion/SKILL.md` |66| 5 | Credential/Token | T1528 / T1550.001 | Steal & replay OAuth app access tokens (skip password+MFA) | exploit → `/skills/standard/exploit/web/oauth/SKILL.md` |67| 6 | Persistence (cloud) | T1098.001 / T1098.003 | Add app credentials + high Graph roles; consent malicious OAuth app | cloud → `/skills/standard/cloud/azure-managed-identity/SKILL.md`, `/skills/standard/cloud/aws-iam-passrole-chain/SKILL.md` |68| 7 | Lateral (identity) | T1606.002 | Golden SAML / federation-trust token forgery | exploit → `/skills/standard/exploit/web/saml/SKILL.md` |69| 8 | Collection | T1114.002 | Mailbox / document collection via Graph (canary mailbox) | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/credential-access/SKILL.md` |70| 9 | C2 | T1071.001 / T1090.003 | Sliver beacon over HTTPS via residential proxy | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/c2-sliver/SKILL.md` |71| 10 | Exfiltration | T1567.002 | Low-and-slow exfil of scoped collection set | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/reporting/SKILL.md` |7273Defense evasion (T1070.004 log/file cleanup, blending with admin activity) is cross-cutting —74the shared `defense-evasion` / `opsec` skills are auto-injected into every operational agent.7576## CONOPS kill_chain (copy into `conops.json`)7778Collapse the table into the 5-phase `ObjectivePhase` model:79801. `recon` — tenant/identity/federation enumeration (rows 1).812. `initial-access` — no-MFA password spray + consent phishing + optional supply-chain (2-4).823. `post-exploit` — token theft, cloud role/cred persistence, Golden SAML, mailbox collection (5-8).834. `c2` — Sliver over HTTPS via residential proxy (9).845. `exfiltration` — scoped, throttled collection exfil (10).8586## OPSEC & signature fidelity8788- **Low and slow.** Spread the password spray over hours, one attempt per account; APT29 is89 patient. No bursty auth.90- **Egress from residential / reputable IP space**, not a datacenter VPS, to defeat IOC-based91 detection (mirror the real actor's residential-proxy obfuscation).92- **Prefer tokens over passwords.** Once an app token is held, stop touching passwords/MFA —93 that is the whole point of the OAuth tradecraft.94- **Blend with admin activity.** Use Graph/PowerShell the way a tenant admin would; avoid95 noisy endpoint tooling.96- **Clean up** consent grants and added credentials at engagement end (feeds `cleanup.json`).9798## RoE / safety gates99100- **Identity takeover is high blast-radius.** OAuth consent + added cloud roles can affect a101 production tenant globally — require explicit, written cloud-tenant authorization. Prefer a102 **dedicated test tenant** or a sandboxed app registration.103- **Phishing requires social-engineering authorization** and a lure-deconfliction pass104 (`/skills/standard/phisher/lure-deconfliction/SKILL.md`).105- Add an `EMERGENCY` abort trigger to `abort.json`: *"real (non-canary) user mailbox or106 document collected, or consent granted on a non-engagement OAuth app."*107108## Deconfliction109110- Name every engagement OAuth app `redteam-<engagement-id>-*` and record the app/client IDs111 in `deconfliction.json`.112- Pin a known deconfliction egress IP range + a marker User-Agent string so the identity team113 can separate the exercise from a real Midnight Blizzard sign-in.114- Pre-brief the identity/SOC team that no-MFA spray + consent grants are *expected*.115116## Fidelity notes (deviations)117118- Emulate consent/token abuse with an **engagement-owned** app registration — never publish a119 real malicious multi-tenant app.120- Use a **canary mailbox/SharePoint site** seeded with marked documents for the collection and121 exfil phases; do not collect real PII or classified mail.122- Sliver replaces APT29's bespoke implants (WINELOADER, etc.); fidelity is the C2 *channel123 shape* (HTTPS, jittered beacon, residential egress), not the binary.