ICS / OT Operator Skill Catalog
Industrial engagements are not application security with longer rules of
engagement — they are a different discipline. A miswritten Modbus coil
on a real plant kills people. This catalog is read-mostly by default;
every write-scope skill carries an explicit safety gate.
Hard rules
- No writes without OPPLAN.safety_critical confirmation. The
middleware refuses writes when the active OPPLAN objective does not
carry
safety_critical_confirmed=true. Bypass requires operator
signature in /workspace/safety-attestation.txt.
- Read-only protocol discovery first. Identify what's on the wire
before any active probing. Many ICS protocols are unauthenticated;
a single malformed read can crash an old PLC.
- Out-of-band physical safety. The blue team includes plant ops.
A ConOps with
blue_team.plant_ops_phone is mandatory for engagements
on active production lines.
Playbooks
Inline technique reference — not separately loadable skills. The entries below
are summarized here for direct use; there is no separate SKILL.md to open for
each. Do NOT call the skill loader on them — apply the technique with your tools
using this summary and the protocol assessment guidance in this file.
| Technique |
Use for |
| modbus-discovery |
Read-only Modbus TCP/RTU enumeration, function code 3/4 polling |
| modbus-write |
GATED Write coils / registers; safety gate enforced |
| bacnet-discovery |
BACnet/IP Who-Is, object enumeration, device profile |
| s7comm |
Siemens S7 / S7Comm Plus enumeration via Snap7 / python-snap7 |
| dnp3 |
DNP3 outstation / master discovery; integrity poll |
| opcua |
OPC-UA browse, anonymous auth check, certificate analysis |
| hmi-web |
HMI web stacks (Wonderware, Iconics, Schneider) — known CVEs |
| engineering-software |
TIA Portal / Studio 5000 / Unity Pro project extraction |
Protocol assessment
- Passive observation: tap a SPAN port if available. Identify protocols
on the wire (
tshark -Y modbus || tshark -Y bacnet || ...).
- Network-layer discovery: nmap with
-sV --script modbus-discover,
bacnet-info, s7-info, dnp3-info (NSE scripts ship in Kali by
default; some are slow — set -T2 for production networks).
- Function-code-3 polling: read holding registers from every Modbus
device discovered. Log register maps to the knowledge graph as
:Service nodes with protocol=modbus.
- Identify the safety integrity level (SIL) of any device touched.
SIL 3+ devices NEVER get write probes without plant-ops sign-off.
- Engineering software attack path: if you can reach the engineering
workstation, extract the project archive (.s7p, .acd, .stp). The
project file is the crown jewel — it reveals the entire process model.
Detection gap
ICS networks rarely have host-based detection on PLCs/RTUs themselves —
the detection stack lives on the engineering workstation, the historian,
and any IT/OT gateway. Relevant Sigma detection patterns include:
- Function-code anomalies (write to coils outside normal ranges).
- Connection sources outside the documented MES/SCADA IP set.
- TIA Portal / Studio 5000 project download events.
Out of scope by default
Active glitching of PLC firmware; firmware upload to PLCs; safety
controller writes — all of these require an explicit RoE annex signed
by the asset owner. The default ICS RoE template in soundwave/ includes
this annex skeleton.
1---2name: ics-overview3description: >4 Use when the target is an industrial control system or operational technology5 network running Modbus, BACnet, S7Comm/S7Comm Plus, DNP3, OPC-UA, or any6 PLC/HMI/SCADA stack. Engagements MUST set RoE flag7 industrial_safety_critical=true; this catalog gates every write-scope8 operation behind explicit operator confirmation regardless of HITL middleware.9metadata:10 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/purpleailab/ics-overview11 skillogy:12 version: 113 subdomain: ics14 when_to_use: "ics ot industrial control modbus bacnet s7comm dnp3 opcua plc hmi scada safety-critical operational technology"15 tags: ics, ot, scada, plc, hmi, modbus, bacnet, s7, dnp3, opcua16 mitre_attack: T0800, T0801, T0859, T0830, T0814, T084617 safety_critical: true18---1920# ICS / OT Operator Skill Catalog2122Industrial engagements are not application security with longer rules of23engagement — they are a different discipline. A miswritten Modbus coil24on a real plant kills people. This catalog is **read-mostly by default**;25every write-scope skill carries an explicit safety gate.2627## Hard rules28291. **No writes without OPPLAN.safety_critical confirmation**. The30 middleware refuses writes when the active OPPLAN objective does not31 carry `safety_critical_confirmed=true`. Bypass requires operator32 signature in `/workspace/safety-attestation.txt`.332. **Read-only protocol discovery first**. Identify what's on the wire34 before any active probing. Many ICS protocols are unauthenticated;35 a single malformed read can crash an old PLC.363. **Out-of-band physical safety**. The blue team includes plant ops.37 A ConOps with `blue_team.plant_ops_phone` is mandatory for engagements38 on active production lines.3940## Playbooks4142> **Inline technique reference — not separately loadable skills.** The entries below43> are summarized here for direct use; there is no separate `SKILL.md` to open for44> each. Do NOT call the skill loader on them — apply the technique with your tools45> using this summary and the protocol assessment guidance in this file.464748| Technique | Use for |49|---|---|50| **modbus-discovery** | Read-only Modbus TCP/RTU enumeration, function code 3/4 polling |51| **modbus-write** | **GATED** Write coils / registers; safety gate enforced |52| **bacnet-discovery** | BACnet/IP Who-Is, object enumeration, device profile |53| **s7comm** | Siemens S7 / S7Comm Plus enumeration via Snap7 / python-snap7 |54| **dnp3** | DNP3 outstation / master discovery; integrity poll |55| **opcua** | OPC-UA browse, anonymous auth check, certificate analysis |56| **hmi-web** | HMI web stacks (Wonderware, Iconics, Schneider) — known CVEs |57| **engineering-software** | TIA Portal / Studio 5000 / Unity Pro project extraction |5859## Protocol assessment60611. **Passive observation**: tap a SPAN port if available. Identify protocols62 on the wire (`tshark -Y modbus || tshark -Y bacnet || ...`).632. **Network-layer discovery**: nmap with `-sV --script modbus-discover`,64 `bacnet-info`, `s7-info`, `dnp3-info` (NSE scripts ship in Kali by65 default; some are slow — set `-T2` for production networks).663. **Function-code-3 polling**: read holding registers from every Modbus67 device discovered. Log register maps to the knowledge graph as68 `:Service` nodes with `protocol=modbus`.694. **Identify the safety integrity level (SIL)** of any device touched.70 SIL 3+ devices NEVER get write probes without plant-ops sign-off.715. **Engineering software attack path**: if you can reach the engineering72 workstation, extract the project archive (.s7p, .acd, .stp). The73 project file is the crown jewel — it reveals the entire process model.7475## Detection gap7677ICS networks rarely have host-based detection on PLCs/RTUs themselves —78the detection stack lives on the engineering workstation, the historian,79and any IT/OT gateway. Relevant Sigma detection patterns include:8081- Function-code anomalies (write to coils outside normal ranges).82- Connection sources outside the documented MES/SCADA IP set.83- TIA Portal / Studio 5000 project download events.8485## Out of scope by default8687Active glitching of PLC firmware; firmware upload to PLCs; safety88controller writes — all of these require an explicit RoE annex signed89by the asset owner. The default ICS RoE template in `soundwave/` includes90this annex skeleton.