LockBit / RaaS Affiliate — Adversary Emulation Playbook
Tier-2 ransomware-affiliate kill chain. Modeled on LockBit (most prolific RaaS of 2022-2023,
disrupted by Operation Cronos in Feb 2024) but written as the generic double-extortion
template — swap actor_name/group_id to retarget ALPHV/BlackCat, Akira, or Black Basta.
The flow: cheap initial access (broker/edge/RDP) → AD compromise to Domain Admin → disable
defenses + delete backups → bulk exfil → encrypt Windows + ESXi. Encryption and recovery
sabotage are canary/lab-only. Authorized red-team emulation only.
When to emulate a RaaS affiliate
- The client's top concern is ransomware resilience: time-to-Domain-Admin, EDR survival,
backup/shadow-copy protection, ESXi exposure, and exfil detection.
- Any sector — RaaS is opportunistic and cross-industry (see the industry → actor map in
../../references/apt-groups.md).
ThreatProfile seed (plan/threat-profile.json)
{
"engagement_name": "<fill>",
"actor_name": "LockBit-like (RaaS affiliate)",
"actor_aliases": ["LockBit 3.0 / Black", "RaaS affiliate", "(retarget: ALPHV / Akira / Black Basta)"],
"group_id": "",
"tier": "tier-2",
"sophistication": "high",
"motivation": "financial",
"initial_access": ["T1190", "T1133", "T1566", "T1078"],
"key_ttps": ["T1059.001", "T1003.001", "T1558.003", "T1484.001", "T1562.001", "T1490", "T1021.001", "T1567.002", "T1486"],
"tools": ["Initial-access-broker creds", "Sliver / Cobalt-style beacon", "NetExec", "Impacket / PsExec", "rclone (exfil)", "canary encryptor (lab)"],
"infrastructure": ["RDP/VPN edge foothold", "GPO-based deployment", "Engagement-owned exfil bucket"],
"recent_cti_delta": "LockBit: StealBit/MEGA exfil, Windows + VMware ESXi lockers, GPO-pushed deployment; affiliate model persists post-Operation-Cronos. Template applies to ALPHV/BlackCat (Rust, ESXi), Akira, Black Basta.",
"confidence": "probable"
}
Kill-chain emulation
| # |
Phase |
MITRE |
Emulated action |
Executing agent → skill |
| 1 |
Initial Access |
T1190 / T1133 / T1078 |
Broker creds / edge exploit / RDP-VPN logon |
exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/web/cve/SKILL.md, /skills/standard/exploit/web/ato-methodology/SKILL.md |
| 2 |
Initial Access (alt) |
T1566 |
Phishing loader |
phisher → /skills/standard/phisher/SKILL.md |
| 3 |
C2 |
T1071.001 |
Beacon for hands-on-keyboard ops |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/c2-sliver/SKILL.md |
| 4 |
Discovery / AD |
T1018 / T1083 |
Enumerate hosts, shares, AD attack paths |
ad → /skills/standard/ad/bloodhound-query/SKILL.md |
| 5 |
Credential Access |
T1003.001 / T1558.003 |
LSASS dump; Kerberoast |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/credential-access/SKILL.md; /skills/standard/ad/kerberoasting/SKILL.md |
| 6 |
Priv Esc to DA |
T1003.006 |
DCSync to domain dominance |
ad → /skills/standard/ad/dcsync/SKILL.md |
| 7 |
Defense Evasion (GATED) |
T1484.001 / T1562.001 / T1490 |
GPO disable Defender; delete shadow copies (lab) |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/privilege-escalation/SKILL.md (shared defense-evasion auto-loaded) |
| 8 |
Lateral |
T1021.001 / T1570 |
PsExec/GPO push across the estate |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/lateral-movement/SKILL.md; /skills/standard/ad/netexec/SKILL.md |
| 9 |
Exfiltration |
T1567.002 |
Bulk exfil (StealBit/rclone) of the canary data set |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/reporting/SKILL.md |
| 10 |
Impact (CANARY) |
T1486 |
Deploy canary encryptor (Windows + ESXi) via GPO/PsExec |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/reporting/SKILL.md |
CONOPS kill_chain (copy into conops.json)
recon — quick AD/host/share discovery (affiliates often buy access, so recon is light) (4).
initial-access — broker creds / edge exploit / RDP / phishing (1-2).
post-exploit — beacon, cred access, DA via DCSync, gated defense evasion + backup sabotage, lateral push (3-8).
c2 — Sliver (3).
exfiltration — bulk exfil then canary double-extortion encryption (9-10).
OPSEC & signature fidelity
- Fast and loud at the end. Affiliates exfil first (double extortion), then deploy
domain-wide in one push — mirror that sequencing so backup/EDR/segmentation are exercised.
- GPO/PsExec mass deployment is the fidelity-defining move; the test is whether one
Domain-Admin compromise really equals estate-wide encryption.
- Hit ESXi as well as Windows — RaaS crews target hypervisors for maximum impact.
RoE / safety gates
- Defense-evasion (Defender-disable via GPO), shadow-copy/backup deletion, mass deployment,
and encryption are destructive — lab/canary only, with explicit authorization. Add an
EMERGENCY abort: "production endpoint protection disabled, production backups/shadow copies
deleted, real data exfiltrated, or a production host encrypted."
- Exfil destination is an engagement-controlled bucket seeded with canary data only.
Deconfliction
- Record broker/edge foothold, beacon, GPO changes (and their rollback), exfil destination, and
the canary encryptor hash in
deconfliction.json + cleanup.json.
- Agree the defense-evasion + deployment window with the SOC; the deliverable is the
time-to-DA, backup-resilience, and exfil-detection findings — not a real outage.
Fidelity notes (deviations)
- No real LockBit/ALPHV locker. The impact step runs a canary encryptor against a
lab/canary host set; StealBit is replaced by rclone to an engagement bucket.
- This playbook is the reusable RaaS template: to emulate ALPHV/BlackCat (Rust, ESXi-first),
Akira, or Black Basta, change
actor_name/actor_aliases, leave group_id empty (MITRE
tracks these as software, not groups — see ../../references/apt-groups.md crosswalk), and
adjust the initial-access row to the crew's preferred vector.
1---2name: lockbit3description: "LockBit / generic RaaS-affiliate adversary-emulation playbook — broker/edge/RDP initial access, beacon, AD compromise to Domain Admin, defense evasion (Defender-disable via GPO, shadow-copy deletion), bulk exfil, then canary double-extortion encryption (Windows + ESXi). Reusable template for any ransomware affiliate (ALPHV, Akira, Black Basta). Triggers on: 'emulate LockBit', 'ransomware affiliate', 'RaaS', 'double extortion', 'StealBit', 'domain-wide ransomware', 'ESXi locker'."4allowed-tools: Read Write Edit5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/purpleailab/lockbit7 skillogy:8 version: 19 subdomain: planning10 when_to_use: "emulate LockBit, ransomware affiliate, RaaS, double extortion, StealBit, domain wide ransomware, ESXi locker, ALPHV, BlackCat, Akira, Black Basta, shadow copy deletion, GPO Defender disable, backup resilience test"11 tags: adversary-emulation, lockbit, ransomware, raas, double-extortion, ecrime12 mitre_attack: T1190, T1486, T1490, T1562.001, T1567.002, T1021.00113---1415# LockBit / RaaS Affiliate — Adversary Emulation Playbook1617> Tier-2 ransomware-affiliate kill chain. Modeled on LockBit (most prolific RaaS of 2022-2023,18> disrupted by Operation Cronos in Feb 2024) but written as the **generic double-extortion19> template** — swap `actor_name`/`group_id` to retarget ALPHV/BlackCat, Akira, or Black Basta.20> The flow: cheap initial access (broker/edge/RDP) → AD compromise to Domain Admin → disable21> defenses + delete backups → bulk exfil → encrypt Windows + ESXi. Encryption and recovery22> sabotage are **canary/lab-only**. Authorized red-team emulation only.2324## When to emulate a RaaS affiliate2526- The client's top concern is **ransomware resilience**: time-to-Domain-Admin, EDR survival,27 backup/shadow-copy protection, ESXi exposure, and exfil detection.28- Any sector — RaaS is opportunistic and cross-industry (see the industry → actor map in29 `../../references/apt-groups.md`).3031## ThreatProfile seed (`plan/threat-profile.json`)3233```json34{35 "engagement_name": "<fill>",36 "actor_name": "LockBit-like (RaaS affiliate)",37 "actor_aliases": ["LockBit 3.0 / Black", "RaaS affiliate", "(retarget: ALPHV / Akira / Black Basta)"],38 "group_id": "",39 "tier": "tier-2",40 "sophistication": "high",41 "motivation": "financial",42 "initial_access": ["T1190", "T1133", "T1566", "T1078"],43 "key_ttps": ["T1059.001", "T1003.001", "T1558.003", "T1484.001", "T1562.001", "T1490", "T1021.001", "T1567.002", "T1486"],44 "tools": ["Initial-access-broker creds", "Sliver / Cobalt-style beacon", "NetExec", "Impacket / PsExec", "rclone (exfil)", "canary encryptor (lab)"],45 "infrastructure": ["RDP/VPN edge foothold", "GPO-based deployment", "Engagement-owned exfil bucket"],46 "recent_cti_delta": "LockBit: StealBit/MEGA exfil, Windows + VMware ESXi lockers, GPO-pushed deployment; affiliate model persists post-Operation-Cronos. Template applies to ALPHV/BlackCat (Rust, ESXi), Akira, Black Basta.",47 "confidence": "probable"48}49```5051## Kill-chain emulation5253| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |54|---|-------|-------|-----------------|-------------------------|55| 1 | Initial Access | T1190 / T1133 / T1078 | Broker creds / edge exploit / RDP-VPN logon | exploit → `/skills/standard/exploit/web/cve/SKILL.md`, `/skills/standard/exploit/web/ato-methodology/SKILL.md` |56| 2 | Initial Access (alt) | T1566 | Phishing loader | phisher → `/skills/standard/phisher/SKILL.md` |57| 3 | C2 | T1071.001 | Beacon for hands-on-keyboard ops | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/c2-sliver/SKILL.md` |58| 4 | Discovery / AD | T1018 / T1083 | Enumerate hosts, shares, AD attack paths | ad → `/skills/standard/ad/bloodhound-query/SKILL.md` |59| 5 | Credential Access | T1003.001 / T1558.003 | LSASS dump; Kerberoast | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/credential-access/SKILL.md`; `/skills/standard/ad/kerberoasting/SKILL.md` |60| 6 | Priv Esc to DA | T1003.006 | DCSync to domain dominance | ad → `/skills/standard/ad/dcsync/SKILL.md` |61| 7 | Defense Evasion **(GATED)** | T1484.001 / T1562.001 / T1490 | GPO disable Defender; delete shadow copies (lab) | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/privilege-escalation/SKILL.md` (shared `defense-evasion` auto-loaded) |62| 8 | Lateral | T1021.001 / T1570 | PsExec/GPO push across the estate | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/lateral-movement/SKILL.md`; `/skills/standard/ad/netexec/SKILL.md` |63| 9 | Exfiltration | T1567.002 | Bulk exfil (StealBit/rclone) of the canary data set | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/reporting/SKILL.md` |64| 10 | Impact **(CANARY)** | T1486 | Deploy canary encryptor (Windows + ESXi) via GPO/PsExec | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/reporting/SKILL.md` |6566## CONOPS kill_chain (copy into `conops.json`)67681. `recon` — quick AD/host/share discovery (affiliates often buy access, so recon is light) (4).692. `initial-access` — broker creds / edge exploit / RDP / phishing (1-2).703. `post-exploit` — beacon, cred access, DA via DCSync, **gated** defense evasion + backup sabotage, lateral push (3-8).714. `c2` — Sliver (3).725. `exfiltration` — bulk exfil then **canary** double-extortion encryption (9-10).7374## OPSEC & signature fidelity7576- **Fast and loud at the end.** Affiliates exfil first (double extortion), then deploy77 domain-wide in one push — mirror that sequencing so backup/EDR/segmentation are exercised.78- **GPO/PsExec mass deployment** is the fidelity-defining move; the test is whether one79 Domain-Admin compromise really equals estate-wide encryption.80- Hit **ESXi** as well as Windows — RaaS crews target hypervisors for maximum impact.8182## RoE / safety gates8384- Defense-evasion (Defender-disable via GPO), **shadow-copy/backup deletion**, mass deployment,85 and encryption are **destructive** — lab/canary only, with explicit authorization. Add an86 `EMERGENCY` abort: *"production endpoint protection disabled, production backups/shadow copies87 deleted, real data exfiltrated, or a production host encrypted."*88- Exfil destination is an **engagement-controlled** bucket seeded with **canary** data only.8990## Deconfliction9192- Record broker/edge foothold, beacon, GPO changes (and their rollback), exfil destination, and93 the canary encryptor hash in `deconfliction.json` + `cleanup.json`.94- Agree the defense-evasion + deployment window with the SOC; the deliverable is the95 time-to-DA, backup-resilience, and exfil-detection findings — not a real outage.9697## Fidelity notes (deviations)9899- **No real LockBit/ALPHV locker.** The impact step runs a canary encryptor against a100 lab/canary host set; StealBit is replaced by rclone to an engagement bucket.101- This playbook is the reusable RaaS template: to emulate ALPHV/BlackCat (Rust, ESXi-first),102 Akira, or Black Basta, change `actor_name`/`actor_aliases`, leave `group_id` empty (MITRE103 tracks these as software, not groups — see `../../references/apt-groups.md` crosswalk), and104 adjust the initial-access row to the crew's preferred vector.