Lookalike Domain

Lookalike Domain

The lure link's domain must look plausible and pass SPF/DKIM/DMARC or modern inboxes drop the mail and browsers flag the page. This skill stands up the domain that gophish-campaign and evilginx2-proxy sit behind.

Choose the name

• Combosquat / lookalike: acme-portal.example, login-acme.example, acme-sso.example (a real word the victim associates with the brand). Prefer this over raw typos.
• IDN homograph (Punycode): visually-similar Unicode characters (аcme.example with a Cyrillic а → xn--cme-8cd.example). Use only when the RoE allows and the mail path won't strip it.

python3 - <<'PY'
import idna
print(idna.encode("аcme.example").decode())   # punycode (xn--...)
PY

• NEVER pick a name confusable with a DIFFERENT customer's brand (plan/roe.json scope only).

DNS

A     @            <sandbox-ip>
A     login        <sandbox-ip>
MX    @            10 mail.<lookalike>.
TXT   @            "v=spf1 a mx ip4:<sandbox-ip> -all"
TXT   default._domainkey  "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<pubkey>"
TXT   _dmarc       "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@<lookalike>"

For evilginx2, delegate NS to the sandbox so it can answer ACME challenges itself.

TLS

acme.sh --issue --standalone -d login.acme-portal.example
# or let evilginx2 manage Let's Encrypt automatically

Verify before sending

dig +short login.acme-portal.example
# check SPF/DKIM/DMARC alignment with a test send to a controlled box
swaks --to test@controlled.example --from it@acme-portal.example --server localhost

Evidence

Record the domain, registration date, and DNS records in plan/phisher/infrastructure.md; this feeds the mandatory lure-deconfliction handshake payload (the blue team needs the lure domain + registration date). Create an Infrastructure node in the knowledge graph.

Failsafe

On stop, dns_failover_to_safe: repoint the domain to a static "authorized security test — contact your security team" page within 5 minutes.