Sandworm — Adversary Emulation Playbook
Tier-3 Russian GRU (Unit 74455) sabotage actor. Sandworm's signature is a patient,
living-off-the-land IT intrusion that crosses the IT/OT boundary and ends in physical or
data destruction (Ukraine grid via Industroyer; NotPetya pseudo-ransomware wiper).
This is the highest-risk emulation in the catalog. Every ICS-write and destructive step
is canary/lab-only and gated on explicit operator + OT-engineer authorization.
When to emulate Sandworm
- Target operates ICS/OT or critical infrastructure (energy, water, manufacturing,
transportation) and the client wants the IT→OT kill chain and destructive-impact resilience
tested — typically as a tabletop-plus or against a dedicated OT lab segment.
- The client's threat model includes destructive/disruptive nation-state actors (see the
industry → actor map in
../../references/apt-groups.md).
ThreatProfile seed (plan/threat-profile.json)
{
"engagement_name": "<fill>",
"actor_name": "Sandworm-like (APT44 / Seashell Blizzard)",
"actor_aliases": ["Voodoo Bear", "Telebots", "IRON VIKING", "Seashell Blizzard", "APT44"],
"group_id": "G0034",
"tier": "tier-3",
"sophistication": "nation-state",
"motivation": "disruption",
"initial_access": ["T1190", "T1566.001", "T1195.002", "T1133"],
"key_ttps": ["T1059.003", "T1003.001", "T1021.002", "T1570", "T1485", "T1561.002", "T1486", "T0831", "T0816", "T0855"],
"tools": ["NetExec", "Impacket", "Sliver", "pymodbus / python-snap7 (read-first)", "marked canary wiper (lab only)"],
"infrastructure": ["Compromised edge/VPN foothold", "Engineering-workstation jump host (IT->OT pivot)", "Sliver HTTPS C2"],
"recent_cti_delta": "2022 Industroyer2 against the Ukrainian power grid; sustained destructive operations vs Ukraine/NATO; LOTL with native Windows tools (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit) before detonation.",
"confidence": "probable"
}
Kill-chain emulation
| # |
Phase |
MITRE |
Emulated action |
Executing agent → skill |
| 1 |
Recon |
T1590 / T1595 |
Map external surface + IT/OT (Purdue) boundary; fingerprint ICS protocols |
recon → /skills/standard/recon/active-recon/SKILL.md; route ICS via /skills/standard/exploit/ics-ot/SKILL.md |
| 2 |
Initial Access |
T1190 |
Exploit edge/VPN/public-facing app |
exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/web/cve/SKILL.md |
| 3 |
Initial Access (alt) |
T1566.001 |
Spearphishing attachment to IT staff |
phisher → /skills/standard/phisher/SKILL.md |
| 4 |
Initial Access (alt) |
T1195.002 |
Trojanized software-update / supply chain (NotPetya pattern) |
exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/supplychain/dep-confusion/SKILL.md |
| 5 |
Credential Access |
T1003.001 |
LSASS dump on IT hosts (LOTL) |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/credential-access/SKILL.md |
| 6 |
Lateral (IT) |
T1021.002 / T1570 |
SMB admin-share spread + lateral tool transfer |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/lateral-movement/SKILL.md; /skills/standard/ad/netexec/SKILL.md |
| 7 |
IT→OT pivot |
T1021 |
Reach engineering workstation / OT jump host across the boundary |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/lateral-movement/SKILL.md |
| 8 |
ICS Impact (GATED) |
T0855 / T0831 / T0816 |
Read PLC state; authorized single benign write to a lab test point |
exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/ics-ot/modbus/SKILL.md (or s7comm / dnp3 / bacnet) |
| 9 |
Destructive (CANARY) |
T1485 / T1561.002 / T1486 |
Marked canary wipe / pseudo-ransom on a lab host only |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/reporting/SKILL.md (evidence) |
| 10 |
C2 |
T1071.001 |
Sliver HTTPS beacon for the IT-side foothold |
post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/c2-sliver/SKILL.md |
CONOPS kill_chain (copy into conops.json)
recon — external surface + Purdue/IT-OT mapping + ICS fingerprint (row 1).
initial-access — edge exploit / spearphish / supply chain (2-4).
post-exploit — LSASS, IT lateral, IT→OT pivot, gated ICS read/write, canary destruction (5-9).
c2 — Sliver HTTPS (10).
exfiltration — optional espionage subset (engineering docs, PLC logic) if in scope.
OPSEC & signature fidelity
- Quiet until detonation. Sandworm stages with native Windows tools (cmd, vssadmin,
wbadmin, bcdedit) and only becomes loud at the impact phase — mirror that: blend during
staging, then a single controlled, authorized impact event.
- Mirror the IT→OT pivot. The fidelity-defining behavior is crossing the boundary via an
engineering workstation, not the wiper binary.
- ICS reconnaissance is read-only and OPSEC-safe; the noise/risk is entirely in the write.
RoE / safety gates — READ BEFORE PLANNING
- ICS writes move physical actuators. Default to read-only enumeration. Any write/
control-class action requires explicit written OT-write authorization in the RoE and an
OT safety engineer on the contact plan, per
/skills/standard/exploit/ics-ot/SKILL.md
("SAFETY FIRST").
- Destruction is lab/canary only. Never run a real wiper or encryptor against production.
Use a marked canary file set on an isolated lab host.
abort.json MUST carry an EMERGENCY trigger (see /skills/standard/soundwave/abort-template/SKILL.md):
"Tier-3 destructive emulation against critical infrastructure — halt + operator-page +
1hr cooldown" — plus "any ICS write outside the named lab test point."
- Schedule a maintenance window with physical safety standby before any OT step.
Deconfliction
- Notify the OT/SOC team and name the exact ICS test device(s) and coil/register addresses in
deconfliction.json; nothing outside that list may be written.
- Tag the canary wiper artifact and Sliver implant with the engagement ID; record the lab
host inventory in
cleanup.json.
Fidelity notes (deviations)
- No real Industroyer/BlackEnergy/NotPetya samples. Emulate the sequence — IT foothold →
LOTL lateral → engineering-workstation pivot → ICS command — with pymodbus/python-snap7
(read-first) and Sliver.
- The "manipulation of control" step is a single authorized benign write to a lab test point
(e.g., toggle a non-safety-critical coil) with the OT engineer present, or fully
simulated when no lab is available.
- The destructive finale is a canary-only proof that the access would allow impact — the
deliverable distinguishes "impact demonstrated on canary" from "production impact" (never the latter).
1---2name: sandworm3description: "Sandworm (APT44 / Seashell Blizzard, GRU Unit 74455) adversary-emulation playbook — IT→OT intrusion ending in ICS manipulation or destructive impact, executed with living-off-the-land Windows tooling. SAFETY-CRITICAL: destructive and ICS-write steps are canary/lab-only and gated on explicit OT authorization. Use when emulating Sandworm against an ICS/OT or critical-infrastructure estate. Triggers on: 'emulate Sandworm', 'APT44', 'Seashell Blizzard', 'Voodoo Bear', 'ICS attack', 'OT destructive', 'Industroyer', 'NotPetya'."4allowed-tools: Read Write Edit5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/purpleailab/sandworm7 skillogy:8 version: 19 subdomain: planning10 when_to_use: "emulate Sandworm, APT44, Seashell Blizzard, Voodoo Bear, Telebots, GRU 74455, ICS OT attack, destructive wiper, Industroyer, NotPetya, critical infrastructure disruption, IT to OT pivot"11 tags: adversary-emulation, sandworm, apt44, ics-ot, destructive, critical-infrastructure12 mitre_attack: T1190, T1059.003, T1485, T1561.002, T0831, T081613---1415# Sandworm — Adversary Emulation Playbook1617> Tier-3 Russian GRU (Unit 74455) sabotage actor. Sandworm's signature is a patient,18> living-off-the-land IT intrusion that **crosses the IT/OT boundary and ends in physical or19> data destruction** (Ukraine grid via Industroyer; NotPetya pseudo-ransomware wiper).20> **This is the highest-risk emulation in the catalog.** Every ICS-write and destructive step21> is canary/lab-only and gated on explicit operator + OT-engineer authorization.2223## When to emulate Sandworm2425- Target operates **ICS/OT** or critical infrastructure (energy, water, manufacturing,26 transportation) and the client wants the IT→OT kill chain and destructive-impact resilience27 tested — typically as a tabletop-plus or against a dedicated OT lab segment.28- The client's threat model includes destructive/disruptive nation-state actors (see the29 industry → actor map in `../../references/apt-groups.md`).3031## ThreatProfile seed (`plan/threat-profile.json`)3233```json34{35 "engagement_name": "<fill>",36 "actor_name": "Sandworm-like (APT44 / Seashell Blizzard)",37 "actor_aliases": ["Voodoo Bear", "Telebots", "IRON VIKING", "Seashell Blizzard", "APT44"],38 "group_id": "G0034",39 "tier": "tier-3",40 "sophistication": "nation-state",41 "motivation": "disruption",42 "initial_access": ["T1190", "T1566.001", "T1195.002", "T1133"],43 "key_ttps": ["T1059.003", "T1003.001", "T1021.002", "T1570", "T1485", "T1561.002", "T1486", "T0831", "T0816", "T0855"],44 "tools": ["NetExec", "Impacket", "Sliver", "pymodbus / python-snap7 (read-first)", "marked canary wiper (lab only)"],45 "infrastructure": ["Compromised edge/VPN foothold", "Engineering-workstation jump host (IT->OT pivot)", "Sliver HTTPS C2"],46 "recent_cti_delta": "2022 Industroyer2 against the Ukrainian power grid; sustained destructive operations vs Ukraine/NATO; LOTL with native Windows tools (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit) before detonation.",47 "confidence": "probable"48}49```5051## Kill-chain emulation5253| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |54|---|-------|-------|-----------------|-------------------------|55| 1 | Recon | T1590 / T1595 | Map external surface + IT/OT (Purdue) boundary; fingerprint ICS protocols | recon → `/skills/standard/recon/active-recon/SKILL.md`; route ICS via `/skills/standard/exploit/ics-ot/SKILL.md` |56| 2 | Initial Access | T1190 | Exploit edge/VPN/public-facing app | exploit → `/skills/standard/exploit/web/cve/SKILL.md` |57| 3 | Initial Access (alt) | T1566.001 | Spearphishing attachment to IT staff | phisher → `/skills/standard/phisher/SKILL.md` |58| 4 | Initial Access (alt) | T1195.002 | Trojanized software-update / supply chain (NotPetya pattern) | exploit → `/skills/standard/exploit/supplychain/dep-confusion/SKILL.md` |59| 5 | Credential Access | T1003.001 | LSASS dump on IT hosts (LOTL) | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/credential-access/SKILL.md` |60| 6 | Lateral (IT) | T1021.002 / T1570 | SMB admin-share spread + lateral tool transfer | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/lateral-movement/SKILL.md`; `/skills/standard/ad/netexec/SKILL.md` |61| 7 | IT→OT pivot | T1021 | Reach engineering workstation / OT jump host across the boundary | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/lateral-movement/SKILL.md` |62| 8 | ICS Impact **(GATED)** | T0855 / T0831 / T0816 | Read PLC state; **authorized single benign write** to a lab test point | exploit → `/skills/standard/exploit/ics-ot/modbus/SKILL.md` (or `s7comm` / `dnp3` / `bacnet`) |63| 9 | Destructive **(CANARY)** | T1485 / T1561.002 / T1486 | Marked canary wipe / pseudo-ransom on a lab host only | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/reporting/SKILL.md` (evidence) |64| 10 | C2 | T1071.001 | Sliver HTTPS beacon for the IT-side foothold | post-exploit → `/skills/standard/post-exploit/c2-sliver/SKILL.md` |6566## CONOPS kill_chain (copy into `conops.json`)67681. `recon` — external surface + Purdue/IT-OT mapping + ICS fingerprint (row 1).692. `initial-access` — edge exploit / spearphish / supply chain (2-4).703. `post-exploit` — LSASS, IT lateral, IT→OT pivot, **gated** ICS read/write, **canary** destruction (5-9).714. `c2` — Sliver HTTPS (10).725. `exfiltration` — optional espionage subset (engineering docs, PLC logic) if in scope.7374## OPSEC & signature fidelity7576- **Quiet until detonation.** Sandworm stages with native Windows tools (cmd, vssadmin,77 wbadmin, bcdedit) and only becomes loud at the impact phase — mirror that: blend during78 staging, then a single controlled, authorized impact event.79- **Mirror the IT→OT pivot.** The fidelity-defining behavior is crossing the boundary via an80 engineering workstation, not the wiper binary.81- ICS reconnaissance is read-only and OPSEC-safe; the noise/risk is entirely in the write.8283## RoE / safety gates — READ BEFORE PLANNING8485- **ICS writes move physical actuators.** Default to **read-only** enumeration. Any write/86 control-class action requires explicit written OT-write authorization in the RoE and an87 **OT safety engineer on the contact plan**, per `/skills/standard/exploit/ics-ot/SKILL.md`88 ("SAFETY FIRST").89- **Destruction is lab/canary only.** Never run a real wiper or encryptor against production.90 Use a marked canary file set on an isolated lab host.91- `abort.json` MUST carry an `EMERGENCY` trigger (see `/skills/standard/soundwave/abort-template/SKILL.md`):92 *"Tier-3 destructive emulation against critical infrastructure — halt + operator-page +93 1hr cooldown"* — plus *"any ICS write outside the named lab test point."*94- Schedule a maintenance window with physical safety standby before any OT step.9596## Deconfliction9798- Notify the OT/SOC team and name the exact ICS test device(s) and coil/register addresses in99 `deconfliction.json`; nothing outside that list may be written.100- Tag the canary wiper artifact and Sliver implant with the engagement ID; record the lab101 host inventory in `cleanup.json`.102103## Fidelity notes (deviations)104105- **No real Industroyer/BlackEnergy/NotPetya samples.** Emulate the *sequence* — IT foothold →106 LOTL lateral → engineering-workstation pivot → ICS command — with pymodbus/python-snap7107 (read-first) and Sliver.108- The "manipulation of control" step is a single authorized benign write to a lab test point109 (e.g., toggle a non-safety-critical coil) **with the OT engineer present**, or fully110 simulated when no lab is available.111- The destructive finale is a canary-only proof that the access *would* allow impact — the112 deliverable distinguishes "impact demonstrated on canary" from "production impact" (never the latter).