How do I install the Sec Threat Modeling skill?

Run npx skillmds@latest add quantumquirkxyz/sec-threat-modeling in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

Is Sec Threat Modeling safe to use?

This skill has not completed SkillMD's automated safety review yet. SkillMD never runs a skill's scripts for you; review the SKILL.md before installing.

Which AI agents work with Sec Threat Modeling?

This skill is tagged as working with Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex. SKILL.md is an open format, so most agents that read a skills directory can load it too.

Is Sec Threat Modeling free to use?

Yes. Installing skills from SkillMD is free, and the skill stays under its author's original license.

Who published Sec Threat Modeling?

quantumquirkxyz (@quantumquirkxyz) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Sec Threat Modeling by quantumquirkxyz

Name: Sec Threat Modeling
Author: quantumquirkxyz

File contents

Contract

Input: system architecture, data flows, users, deployment environment.
Output: threat model document + risk register.
Side effects: none.
Dependencies: none.
Stop condition: all assets mapped; risk register filled.
Risk: low.
Boundary: designs threat model; does not implement mitigations.

Threat Modeling

Build a threat model — assets, threats, vulnerabilities, mitigations — using STRIDE or ATT&CK.

Process

1. Define assets

What must be protected? Data (PII, credentials, business data), services (API, database), systems (servers, containers), users.

Completion criterion: asset list with value/criticality.

2. Map architecture

Data flow diagram: sources → processes → stores → sinks.
Trust boundaries: where do privileges change? (user → service → database → external API)
External dependencies: third-party APIs, SaaS, cloud providers.

Completion criterion: diagram saved; trust boundaries marked.

3. Identify threats

Use STRIDE per component:

Spoofing: can an attacker impersonate a user / service?
Tampering: can data be altered in transit / at rest?
Repudiation: can actions be denied? (lack of logging / audit)
Information Disclosure: can sensitive data leak (logs, errors, unencrypted storage)?
Denial of Service: can resources be exhausted?
Elevation of Privilege: can a low-privilege user gain admin?

Completion criterion: threat table with evidence and likelihood.

4. Assess vulnerabilities

How could each threat succeed? Weak authentication? Unvalidated input? Missing encryption? Overly permissive access control?

Completion criterion: vulnerability mapped per threat.

5. Design mitigations

For each threat-vulnerability pair: what control (preventive / detective / corrective) reduces likelihood or impact? (Encryption, authentication, validation, logging, rate limiting, backup, least privilege).

Completion criterion: mitigation table with responsible party.

6. Residual risk

After mitigations: is risk acceptable? If not, add more controls or accept with justification.

Completion criterion: residual risk stated; justification if accepted.

---name: sec-threat-modelingdescription: Design and document threat models for software / systems — assets, threats, vulnerabilities, mitigations — using STRIDE or ATT&CK frameworks.---## Contract- **Input:** system architecture, data flows, users, deployment environment.- **Output:** threat model document + risk register.- **Side effects:** none.- **Dependencies:** none.- **Stop condition:** all assets mapped; risk register filled.- **Risk:** low.- **Boundary:** designs threat model; does not implement mitigations.# Threat ModelingBuild a **threat model** — assets, threats, vulnerabilities, mitigations — using STRIDE or ATT&CK.## Process### 1. Define assetsWhat must be protected? Data (PII, credentials, business data), services (API, database), systems (servers, containers), users.**Completion criterion:** asset list with value/criticality.### 2. Map architecture- Data flow diagram: sources → processes → stores → sinks.- Trust boundaries: where do privileges change? (user → service → database → external API)- External dependencies: third-party APIs, SaaS, cloud providers.**Completion criterion:** diagram saved; trust boundaries marked.### 3. Identify threatsUse STRIDE per component:- **Spoofing:** can an attacker impersonate a user / service?- **Tampering:** can data be altered in transit / at rest?- **Repudiation:** can actions be denied? (lack of logging / audit)- **Information Disclosure:** can sensitive data leak (logs, errors, unencrypted storage)?- **Denial of Service:** can resources be exhausted?- **Elevation of Privilege:** can a low-privilege user gain admin?**Completion criterion:** threat table with evidence and likelihood.### 4. Assess vulnerabilitiesHow could each threat succeed? Weak authentication? Unvalidated input? Missing encryption? Overly permissive access control?**Completion criterion:** vulnerability mapped per threat.### 5. Design mitigationsFor each threat-vulnerability pair: what control (preventive / detective / corrective) reduces likelihood or impact? (Encryption, authentication, validation, logging, rate limiting, backup, least privilege).**Completion criterion:** mitigation table with responsible party.### 6. Residual riskAfter mitigations: is risk acceptable? If not, add more controls or accept with justification.**Completion criterion:** residual risk stated; justification if accepted.

Frequently asked questions

Sec Threat Modeling