randommonicle Constant-time secret compare
String equality short-circuits on the first differing byte, so token == expected leaks how
many leading bytes matched through response timing — an oracle an attacker can walk.
The rule
Hash both sides to fixed length, then compare constant-time:
import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
const h = (s) => createHash('sha256').update(s).digest();
const ok = timingSafeEqual(h(provided), h(expected));
Hashing first makes the buffers equal-length (timingSafeEqual throws on length mismatch — itself a leak) and keeps the comparison constant-time regardless of input size. Apply to bearer tokens, admin tokens, webhook signatures, and any password-equivalent. HMAC verification uses the same pattern on the computed and received MACs.
Why
It costs two lines and removes a whole attack class; equality comparison on secrets is the kind of defect that passes every functional test forever. Evidence: ICC CLAUDE.md known-issues (admin token compare, shipped fix).