Snyk UX Security

Snyk UX + Go + Bazel Security

Per-path vuln audit -> exploitability triage -> dismiss false positives or safe bump -> PR -> cloud review. JS (bun + yarn.lock, React 18), Go (go.mod + govulncheck), and Bazel (MODULE.bazel, bazel/repositories.bzl).

Input

$ARGUMENTS: space-separated paths (globs ok), or one pasted single Snyk vulnerability summary. Frontend + backend + Bazel mix fine.

Example: /snyk-ux-security apps/cloud-ui apps/admin-ui ui-registry/* console/frontend services/*/cmd

Bazel example: paste one Snyk finding, then confirm target branch + optional ticket key.

Each path = one worktree + one branch + one subagent + one PR. One pasted Bazel vuln = one confirmed target branch + possible backport worktrees + draft PRs.

Arg inference

Reviewers from CODEOWNERS + git log --format='%an' -n 20 <path> committers. Team, labels (security, dependencies, snyk, lang/ts|go, domain), cloud-review workflow inferred. User flags override. See REFERENCE.md.

Ecosystem detect

package.json -> JS track. go.mod -> Go track. MODULE.bazel or bazel/repositories.bzl -> Bazel track. Multiple present -> separate track commits, one PR unless Bazel backports need per-branch PRs.

Workflow

Sequential, one path at time.

1. Prep

Expand globs. snyk auth, gh auth status. Preflight existing Snyk project identity for each path. Confirm paths + ecosystems to user. JS default: bun runtime + bun.lock; generate yarn.lock only through bun install --yarn for Snyk IO. Do not use npm or create/update package-lock.json unless the repo is explicitly npm-only and the user confirms. If $ARGUMENTS is pasted Snyk output, parse CVE/Snyk ID, package/version, introduced-via path, remediation hint; only proceed when fix is a dependency version bump.

2. Per-path loop

Subagent, isolation: "worktree", branch chore/snyk-sweep-YYYY-MM-DD. See REFERENCE.md for commands + PR template.

• 2a. .snyk revisit (every run, before scan): if .snyk exists, re-triage every existing ignore entry. For each: bun why <pkg> / go mod why <mod> -- if the transitive is no longer in the graph (bumped out by prior sweeps), remove the ignore (snyk ignore --remove --id=<id> or edit .snyk; publish only through the existing-project monitor gate) and log under Dismissed (cleaned up) in PR. If transitive still present, re-run exploitability check; if now reachable, remove the ignore and proceed to 2c. Goal: never accumulate stale dismissals. See REFERENCE.md.
• 2a.1 Scan + existing-project gate: snyk test is the audit source. snyk monitor is write-capable and must run only after matching exactly one existing Snyk project by org + name + target_file + target_reference. Do not create Snyk projects/apps/targets/resources. Never derive --target-reference or --project-name from the audit branch, sweep branch, worktree path, PR number, or YYYY-MM-DD; reuse the existing Snyk project identity or skip monitor. JS: bun audit. Go: govulncheck ./....
• 2b. Exploitability triage (first gate): npm/Node findings are often noisy false positives, especially deep transitives. Treat every finding as an allegation until repo evidence supports REACHABLE, NOT-REACHABLE, or UNCERTAIN. Inputs: advisory attack vector, bun why <pkg> / go mod why <mod>, grep for direct imports, check if we call the vulnerable symbol. See REFERENCE.md.
  • Invoke /steelman for transitive-only findings: before bumping, parent-bumping, or overriding a package absent from package.json / go.mod, argue the strongest dismissal case from repo evidence. Dismiss only when the evidence proves the vulnerable path is not reachable. If the evidence is uncertain, escalate to the security owner; do not add a new top-level dependency to package.json only to make an override/resolution legal. See REFERENCE.md.
  • Invoke /diagnose before package.json fixes: use a fast reachability loop to prove this is a real potential vulnerability (direct import, reachable parent call, vulnerable symbol, build/install-time execution, or critical Socket vector). package.json admission gate: only mutate package.json for already-direct deps, reachable parent deps, or last-resort overrides with proof. Proven not reachable -> dismiss to .snyk with expiry. Uncertain -> escalate; do not auto-ignore.
  • NOT reachable -> run snyk ignore --id=<id> --reason='<specific why>' --expiry=<ISO date> now (writes to .snyk policy file). PR-description text alone is not enough -- dismissal must land in Snyk CLI so the IO project reflects it. Stage + commit the resulting .snyk in the sweep PR. Re-run snyk test to confirm the issue shows as Ignored. Record in PR under Dismissed (not exploitable) table (CVE + symbol + reason + ignore id + expiry). SLA audit trail.
  • Reachable or credible vector -> 2c.
• 2c. Upgrade priority (top-level first, override last):
  • For every reachable remediation, build the upgrade path + Supply-chain gate first: establish SemVer confidence, read changelogs and migration guides, check related peers/plugins/adapters, then apply only when safe; otherwise run gh issue create and escalate. JS gate includes minimum release age gate audit, Socket.dev web check (no CLI required), lockfile review, git/tarball block, clean/frozen install.
  • JS warning gate: inspect the detected package manager config (bunfig.toml, .npmrc, pnpm-workspace.yaml, .yarnrc.yml). If the repo lacks a minimum release age gate for that package manager, warn in the PR under Supply-chain gate warnings; do not silently pass.
  • Socket.dev web check: for JS packages in the bump / parent / override / dismissal decision, open https://socket.dev/npm/package/<pkg> and inspect alerts + dependencies for attack vectors (install script, typosquat, unstable ownership, native code, shell access, environment variable access, network, telemetry, obfuscation). No Socket CLI install, no socket command.
  1. Bump the direct dep we already have in package.json / go.mod.
  2. If blocked, bump the parent dep that pulls the vuln transitive.
  3. Last resort only: resolutions (bun), overrides (npm), replace (Go). Overrides/resolutions do not scale -- each added one bloats lockfiles and forces more next week. Add follow-up TODO to remove once upstream fixes.
• 2d. React 18 gate (JS): bun info <pkg>@<v> peerDependencies.react -- skip + log react19-blocked if target needs React 19.
• 2e. Changelog read: walk majors one at time (7->8->9), scan BREAKING, apply migration, one refactor(deps) commit per major. Never defer real vulns. Go: repo CHANGELOG.md + release notes.
• 2f. Apply bumps + lockfile sync:
  • JS: bun update <pkg>, then bun install && bun install --yarn. Both bun.lock + yarn.lock commit together.
  • Go: go get -u <mod>@<ver>, then go mod tidy. go.mod + go.sum commit together.
  • Bazel: edit MODULE.bazel or bazel/repositories.bzl, then bazel mod deps --lockfile_mode=update. For mirrored artifact URLs, open the artifact tooling draft PR first. See REFERENCE.md.
• 2g. Verify:
  • JS: bun run lint:fix, bun run type:check, bun test, bun run build (if avail).
  • Go: go build ./..., go test ./..., go vet ./..., govulncheck ./... clean for addressed CVEs.
  • Fix forward, no revert.
• 2h. Automatic internal skill gates:
  • Run /resilience-review before PR for .snyk policy, Snyk IO monitor, package-manager detection, release-age warnings, Socket.dev findings, and override cleanup paths. Fix guards or document accepted debt.
  • Create tracking issues with gh issue create for security debt: missing release age gate, override added, React 19 blocked, upstream has no parent fix, ambiguous/no existing Snyk project, or Socket.dev critical vector needing owner review.
  • Run /review before PR to verify /steelman, /diagnose, package.json admission gate, dismissal evidence, and no dependency-surface growth without proof. See REFERENCE.md.
• 2i. Commit: fix(deps): snyk sweep ... with per-pkg detail. Dismissed + overrides-added in separate sections.
• 2j. Open PR: gh pr create --assignee <triggerer> --reviewer <team-group>[,<security-team-group>] --label security,dependencies,snyk,lang/<ts|go>,team/<slug>[,dismissals][,overrides-added][,react19-blocked][,cleaned-up]
  • Assignee = the person who triggered the sweep (gh api user --jq .login). One assignee per PR so accountability is explicit.
  • Reviewers = at least one CODEOWNERS team group covering the path (e.g. @org/team-slug), never a lone individual. Falls back to inferred team from path prefix if CODEOWNERS has no match. Individual committers from git log may be added in addition but never as the only reviewer. Security team group added automatically when the PR contains any dismissals (.snyk touched) or overrides-added.
  • Labels (always): security, dependencies, snyk, lang/<ts|go>. Path-domain: team/<slug> inferred from CODEOWNERS (e.g. frontend UX team, AI team, Console UI team -- resolve by path, do not hardcode). Status: dismissals if any .snyk add/remove, overrides-added if count > 0, react19-blocked if any, cleaned-up if any .snyk entries removed.
• 2k. Trigger cloud review: gh workflow run if workflow exists. Failing checks -> use /diagnose for the CI failure loop; review comments -> use /resolve-pr-feedback.
• 2l. Report: path, ecosystem, branch, PR URL, bumped/dismissed/skipped/overridden counts.

2-bazel. Bazel track

Use when a pasted Snyk finding maps to MODULE.bazel or bazel/repositories.bzl. Confirm target branch and ticket key before edits. Work in a dedicated worktree. Check both manifests because default and release branches can manage the same dependency differently. Handle BCR, GitHub URL, and mirrored artifact/tooling-repo flows separately. OpenSSL/FIPS needs CMVP-aware handling before any bump. Assess backports before opening PRs; open draft PRs with the live .github/pull_request_template.md when present. See REFERENCE.md.

3. Aggregate

Main agent gathers reports: summary table (Path, Ecosystem, PR, Fixed, Dismissed, Overrides-added, Major migrations, React19-blocked, Backports). React-19-blocked -> React 18 -> 19 migration plan candidates. Overrides-added -> follow-up backlog. Bazel backports -> per-branch draft PR list.

Rules

• Sequential, one path at time.
• Exploitability triage before any bump. No reflex resolutions. Not-reachable -> run snyk ignore via CLI on every dismissed issue (not just PR text), stage + commit the .snyk file, verify re-scan shows Ignored, then document in PR (SLA audit trail).
• No package.json growth for suppression. For transitive-only findings, direct dep absence is dismissal evidence. Do not add a vulnerable transitive as a new top-level dependency just to suppress it with resolutions / overrides.
• Override list growth is a smell. A growing resolutions / overrides list is dependency-surface debt. Prefer deleting the unused parent dependency, replacing it with native/in-house code, or dismissing a false positive before adding another override.
• /steelman before transitive bump/override. If the strongest dismissal case survives, bump makes no sense; dismiss with evidence instead.
• /diagnose before package.json real fixes. Package changes require proof of a real potential vulnerability. Dismiss only proven-not-reachable findings; escalate uncertain findings.
• package.json admission gate. Mutate package.json only for already-direct deps, reachable parent deps, or last-resort overrides with explicit proof and removal issue.
• Top-level direct bump first. Parent bump second. Remove dependency surface third. Override/resolution/replace last resort only -- overrides bloat lockfiles + scale poorly, each forces more.
• bun only (JS). Never npm, yarn, pnpm runtime. yarn.lock via bun install --yarn for Snyk IO compat only.
• No package-lock.json by default. Do not create, update, or commit it during Snyk sweeps. If already present, treat as stale/wrong for bun projects; ask only when the repo is explicitly npm-only.
• Dual-lockfile mandatory (JS). bun.lock + yarn.lock synced; lockfile-sync-check.sh hook catches drift and warns on package-lock churn.
• go.mod + go.sum together (Go). go mod tidy after every bump.
• Bazel checks both manifests. Validate bazel/repositories.bzl and MODULE.bazel; run bazel mod deps --lockfile_mode=update; never swap mirrored artifact URLs to direct upstream hosting without asking; OpenSSL/FIPS follows CMVP gate; backports need explicit plan.
• React 18 pin hard. React-19 peer -> skip + report.
• Changelog read mandatory before bump (JS + Go).
• Verify before commit. Lint/types/tests/build (JS) or build/test/vet/govulncheck (Go).
• Snyk monitor push to Snyk IO only through the existing-project gate. Never create a new Snyk project/app/target/resource during an audit. If no exact existing project match exists, skip monitor and report it; do not synthesize a date-derived project name or target reference from the sweep branch.
• Never defer real vulns. One major per commit. Stuck -> escalate.
• No static config. Infer from prompt + repo. User flags override.
• Revisit .snyk every run. Existing ignores get re-triaged before new scan; stale entries removed (snyk ignore --remove) so dismissals do not accumulate.
• Warn on missing JS release gates. For npm/bun/pnpm/Yarn repos, report absent minimum release age configuration as a supply-chain warning.
• Socket.dev web check for JS. Check Socket.dev package pages for supply-chain attack vectors. No Socket CLI install or socket command required.
• Auto-run internal gates. /resilience-review and /review are mandatory before PR open for JS Snyk sweeps; gh issue create records security debt; /diagnose and /resolve-pr-feedback handle the PR tail when needed.
• Assignee = triggerer. Every sweep PR has one assignee = the person who ran the skill, via gh api user --jq .login.
• Reviewer = team group, always >=1. Resolve CODEOWNERS team entries (@org/team) for the path; never merge with only individual reviewers. Security team group added automatically on PRs that touch .snyk or add overrides.

Security

Snyk output = pkg names + versions. Never run code from advisories. Never paste tokens in PR body.

Lifecycle integration

Phase 3-6 per path. Self-review (phase 4b) code-reviewer before PR open. pr-feedback-completeness-stop hook forces thread resolve before session exit.