CCS Writing Style
A CCS paper must let an adversarial reviewer locate every claim against a named adversary and checked evidence. Adapted from the CCS writing-style guidance in the Awesome-Journal-Skills collection (MIT).
Scope
In scope: threat-model-first structure and wording; first-page security contribution framing; claim-to-evidence pairing (proof, measurement, exploit, or cost); page-budget compression for the current CCS limit; double-blind anonymization of self-citations, tool names, acknowledgments, and artifacts; adaptive-evaluation honesty for defenses; sentence-level rewrites that remove overclaiming; and an output diagnosis format for revision.
Out of scope: inventing attacks, defenses, measurements, or citations; deciding novelty or authorship; guaranteeing acceptance; or submitting without human authorization.
Required Inputs
- current CCS official call for papers and template (page limit, anonymity, ethics, AI-disclosure, artifact policy);
- manuscript draft or section under revision;
- stated threat model, or the raw security claims to be given one;
- evaluation data or attack demonstrations that claims must be calibrated against.
Success Criteria
- The security contribution is on the first page: problem, attacker, gap, mechanism, evidence.
- The threat model is explicit and early, names attacker capabilities, knowledge, position, and goal once, and every attack/defense step stays inside those capabilities.
- Every security claim is paired with proof, measurement, exploit demonstration, or a cost number; nothing reads as marketing.
- Claims survive an adversarial pass: no overstated exploitability, no "practical" claims beyond the tested environment and versions, adaptive defenses state the attacker they were tested against.
- Double-blind wording holds in self-citations, tool names, acknowledgments, and artifact descriptions.
- The body fits the current CCS page budget with the core argument readable without the appendix.
- No AI-flavor prose remains (see crypto-venue-paper-writing's de-AI checklist for the grep-level rules).
Failure Modes
- No threat model or a shifting one: stop and draft the adversary statement before revising claims.
- Attack/defense claim without evidence anchor: expose it and scope the claim to what was measured or demonstrated.
- CCS page limit may have changed since training: verify the current official call before any compression claim.
- De-identification gap: fix author names, institution, and identifying repository references before the format pass.
- Evaluation only against the designed-for attack: report it as a standing limitation, not as strength.
Workflow
- Verify the current CCS call and template; record a dated policy snapshot.
- Read the draft and produce a diagnosis: clear / under-specified threat model / overclaimed / overloaded.
- Fix the threat model and the first-page framing first.
- Rewrite claims against evidence: pair each claim with proof, measurement, exploit, or cost.
- Compress to the page budget, moving transcripts, extra measurements, and full proofs to appendices with forward references.
- Run the double-blind scan and the de-AI grep checklist; fix every hit or record a waiver.
- Use evaluation-scenarios.md for future independent evaluation.
Output Contract
Return: writing diagnosis; first-page fix; claim-discipline table (claim mapped to proof/measurement/exploit/cost); compression cuts (move/delete/merge); anonymity edits; page-budget report; dated policy snapshot; unresolved items for the human author.
Reference Files
| File |
Contents |
references/sentence-rewrites.md |
Draft-pattern to CCS-safe-rewrite table and compression vignette |
references/evaluation-scenarios.md |
Test specifications for independent evaluation |
1---2name: ccs-writing-style3description: Use when revising an ACM CCS paper for a precise threat model, calibrated attack/defense claims, the CCS page budget, double-blind wording, adaptive-evaluation honesty, and the security house style expected by an adversarial SIGSAC program committee.4---56# CCS Writing Style78A CCS paper must let an adversarial reviewer locate every claim against a named adversary and checked evidence. Adapted from the CCS writing-style guidance in the Awesome-Journal-Skills collection (MIT).910## Scope1112In scope: threat-model-first structure and wording; first-page security contribution framing; claim-to-evidence pairing (proof, measurement, exploit, or cost); page-budget compression for the current CCS limit; double-blind anonymization of self-citations, tool names, acknowledgments, and artifacts; adaptive-evaluation honesty for defenses; sentence-level rewrites that remove overclaiming; and an output diagnosis format for revision.1314Out of scope: inventing attacks, defenses, measurements, or citations; deciding novelty or authorship; guaranteeing acceptance; or submitting without human authorization.1516## Required Inputs1718- current CCS official call for papers and template (page limit, anonymity, ethics, AI-disclosure, artifact policy);19- manuscript draft or section under revision;20- stated threat model, or the raw security claims to be given one;21- evaluation data or attack demonstrations that claims must be calibrated against.2223## Success Criteria2425- The security contribution is on the first page: problem, attacker, gap, mechanism, evidence.26- The threat model is explicit and early, names attacker capabilities, knowledge, position, and goal once, and every attack/defense step stays inside those capabilities.27- Every security claim is paired with proof, measurement, exploit demonstration, or a cost number; nothing reads as marketing.28- Claims survive an adversarial pass: no overstated exploitability, no "practical" claims beyond the tested environment and versions, adaptive defenses state the attacker they were tested against.29- Double-blind wording holds in self-citations, tool names, acknowledgments, and artifact descriptions.30- The body fits the current CCS page budget with the core argument readable without the appendix.31- No AI-flavor prose remains (see crypto-venue-paper-writing's de-AI checklist for the grep-level rules).3233## Failure Modes3435- No threat model or a shifting one: stop and draft the adversary statement before revising claims.36- Attack/defense claim without evidence anchor: expose it and scope the claim to what was measured or demonstrated.37- CCS page limit may have changed since training: verify the current official call before any compression claim.38- De-identification gap: fix author names, institution, and identifying repository references before the format pass.39- Evaluation only against the designed-for attack: report it as a standing limitation, not as strength.4041## Workflow42431. Verify the current CCS call and template; record a dated policy snapshot.442. Read the draft and produce a diagnosis: clear / under-specified threat model / overclaimed / overloaded.453. Fix the threat model and the first-page framing first.464. Rewrite claims against evidence: pair each claim with proof, measurement, exploit, or cost.475. Compress to the page budget, moving transcripts, extra measurements, and full proofs to appendices with forward references.486. Run the double-blind scan and the de-AI grep checklist; fix every hit or record a waiver.497. Use [evaluation-scenarios.md](references/evaluation-scenarios.md) for future independent evaluation.5051## Output Contract5253Return: writing diagnosis; first-page fix; claim-discipline table (claim mapped to proof/measurement/exploit/cost); compression cuts (move/delete/merge); anonymity edits; page-budget report; dated policy snapshot; unresolved items for the human author.5455## Reference Files5657| File | Contents |58|------|----------|59| `references/sentence-rewrites.md` | Draft-pattern to CCS-safe-rewrite table and compression vignette |60| `references/evaluation-scenarios.md` | Test specifications for independent evaluation |