Zero Trust Architect Skill
Drives Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) and SASE design, evaluation, and documentation.
Ryan's context: CCNA (2003–2006), CCNP R&S (full track), Applied Computer Science degree. Currently designing a SASE solution for employer. Transitioning into network solutions architecture.
Shared skills referenced:
Zero Trust Principles (NIST SP 800-207)
| Principle |
What it means in practice |
| Verify explicitly |
Authenticate and authorize every request — user, device, location, time |
| Use least privilege |
JIT/JEA access; never standing permissions to sensitive resources |
| Assume breach |
Segment everything; log all access; design for containment |
| Never trust the network |
LAN ≠ trusted; same policy on-prem, cloud, remote |
SASE Component Map
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SASE Cloud Fabric │
│ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ SWG │ │ CASB │ │ ZTNA │ │
│ │ (web policy) │ │ (SaaS DLP) │ │ (app access) │ │
│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ FWaaS │ │ DNS Sec │ │ DLP │ │
│ │ (L4-L7 FW) │ │ (DNS filter) │ │ (data egress)│ │
│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ │
│ │
│ SD-WAN Underlay / IPsec Tunnels │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
↑ ↑ ↑
Branch (CPE) Remote User Cloud App
SD-WAN edge Endpoint agent (SaaS/IaaS)
Component Definitions
| Component |
Role |
Key vendors |
| ZTNA |
Replaces VPN; identity-aware app access broker |
Zscaler ZPA, Palo Alto Prisma Access, Cloudflare Access, Cisco Duo NAS |
| SWG |
Inline web proxy; URL/SSL inspection; malware |
Zscaler ZIA, Netskope, Proxy SG |
| CASB |
SaaS visibility, inline DLP, shadow IT |
Netskope, McAfee MVISION, Zscaler CASB |
| FWaaS |
Cloud-hosted stateful L4-L7 firewall |
Palo Alto Prisma, Zscaler Cloud FW |
| SD-WAN |
Underlay abstraction; policy-based routing |
Fortinet, Cisco Viptela, VMware VeloCloud, Palo Alto Prisma SD-WAN |
| DNS Security |
Block C2, malware domains, DNS tunneling |
Cisco Umbrella, Cloudflare Gateway, Zscaler DNS |
| DLP |
Data-in-motion inspection; prevent exfil |
Netskope, Zscaler, Forcepoint |
SASE Deployment Models
Model 1: Single-Vendor SASE
All SSE + SD-WAN from one vendor (Palo Alto Prisma SASE, Fortinet SASE).
- Pro: single console, native integration, simplified licensing
- Con: vendor lock-in; best-of-breed gaps possible
- Choose when: org prioritises operational simplicity
Model 2: Dual-Vendor (SSE + SD-WAN)
Best-of-breed SSE (Zscaler/Netskope) + separate SD-WAN (Fortinet/Viptela).
- Pro: flexibility; independent scaling
- Con: integration complexity; two support relationships
- Choose when: existing SD-WAN investment exists; security maturity is high
Model 3: Hybrid Transition
Existing MPLS/VPN retained; SASE PoPs added in parallel for new workloads.
- Best for: phased migration with legacy branches that cannot immediately move
ZTA Policy Engine Design
Request (user + device + app + context)
↓
[Identity Check] ← IdP: Entra ID / Okta / Keycloak
↓
[Device Posture] ← MDM / EDR signal (compliant / managed / health score)
↓
[Risk Score] ← UEBA, time-of-day, geo, anomaly
↓
[Resource Policy] ← least-privilege; app segment; data classification
↓
[PEP Enforcement] ← ZTNA broker / inline proxy / microseg agent
↓
Allow / Deny / Step-up MFA / Quarantine
Policy Decision Point (PDP) vs Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
- PDP: decides (IdP + SIEM + posture signals) — often Okta/Entra conditional access or a PAM platform
- PEP: enforces at the network/app edge — ZTNA connector, SWG proxy, CASB inline
Microsegmentation Approaches
| Approach |
Granularity |
Best for |
| Network-based (VLAN/VRF) |
IP subnet |
Simple east-west; legacy |
| Firewall-based (micro-perimeter) |
App group |
Data centre |
| Host-based agent |
Process/app |
Cloud workloads; hybrid |
| Cloud-native NSG/SG |
VPC/subnet |
AWS/Azure/GCP workloads |
| Identity-aware proxy |
User + app |
ZTNA zero-trust app access |
CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model — Pillar Checklist
| Pillar |
Traditional |
Advanced |
Optimal |
| Identity |
MFA on some apps |
Phishing-resistant MFA everywhere |
Continuous re-auth; UEBA |
| Devices |
Corp-managed only |
MDM + posture check at access |
Automated remediation; EDR signal |
| Networks |
VLAN segmentation |
Encrypted in-enclave traffic |
Full microseg; all traffic TLS |
| Apps |
VPN to app subnet |
Per-app ZTNA |
Dynamic policy; app-layer ABAC |
| Data |
Basic DLP |
DLP + classification |
DSPM; automated policy enforcement |
Vendor Evaluation Scorecard
When evaluating SASE/SSE vendors, score on:
| Criterion |
Weight |
Notes |
| PoP coverage (latency to user base) |
High |
Must cover your key geographies |
| Single-pass architecture (no backhaul) |
High |
Traffic should not leave region unnecessarily |
| CASB inline + API mode |
Medium |
Inline for real-time; API for shadow IT |
| SSL/TLS inspection capacity |
High |
Without it, blind to 90% of threats |
| SD-WAN integration (native vs. API) |
Medium |
Native = lower latency & single policy |
| Licensing model (per-user vs. Mbps) |
High |
Per-user scales predictably |
| API & automation (Terraform provider) |
Medium |
GitOps-ready |
| Support for agentless access |
Medium |
Contractors, BYOD, OT devices |
Common Pitfalls
| Pitfall |
Mitigation |
| "VPN + ZT" as marketing, not architecture |
Validate PEP is in-path, not sidecar |
| Split tunnel VPN called "ZTNA" |
True ZTNA brokers per-app — no network access |
| Implicit trust within cloud VPC |
Apply NSGs + lateral movement controls |
| CASB API-only (reactive) |
Add inline CASB for real-time DLP |
| Policy complexity → no policy applied |
Start with coarse-grained; iterate |
| Ignoring OT/IoT in ZTA scope |
Certificate-based identity; agentless ZTNA |
ZERO_TRUST_KNOWLEDGE
Append discoveries here. Format: YYYY-MM-DD: <note>
1---2name: zero-trust-architect3description: Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) and SASE design — identity-first access, ZTNA, CASB, SWG, FWaaS, SSE/SASE frameworks, SD-WAN security integration, microsegmentation, policy engine design, and NIST SP 800-207 control mapping. Use when designing a ZTA, building a SASE deployment model, evaluating SD-WAN + security stack integration, or auditing implicit trust assumptions.4---56# Zero Trust Architect Skill78Drives Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) and SASE design, evaluation, and documentation.910**Ryan's context**: CCNA (2003–2006), CCNP R&S (full track), Applied Computer Science degree. Currently designing a SASE solution for employer. Transitioning into network solutions architecture.1112**Shared skills referenced:**13- Network architecture fundamentals → [`../network-architect/SKILL.md`](../network-architect/SKILL.md)14- Network security controls → [`../network-security/SKILL.md`](../network-security/SKILL.md)1516---1718## Zero Trust Principles (NIST SP 800-207)1920| Principle | What it means in practice |21|-----------|--------------------------|22| Verify explicitly | Authenticate and authorize every request — user, device, location, time |23| Use least privilege | JIT/JEA access; never standing permissions to sensitive resources |24| Assume breach | Segment everything; log all access; design for containment |25| Never trust the network | LAN ≠ trusted; same policy on-prem, cloud, remote |2627---2829## SASE Component Map3031```32┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐33│ SASE Cloud Fabric │34│ │35│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │36│ │ SWG │ │ CASB │ │ ZTNA │ │37│ │ (web policy) │ │ (SaaS DLP) │ │ (app access) │ │38│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ │39│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │40│ │ FWaaS │ │ DNS Sec │ │ DLP │ │41│ │ (L4-L7 FW) │ │ (DNS filter) │ │ (data egress)│ │42│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ │43│ │44│ SD-WAN Underlay / IPsec Tunnels │45└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘46 ↑ ↑ ↑47 Branch (CPE) Remote User Cloud App48 SD-WAN edge Endpoint agent (SaaS/IaaS)49```5051### Component Definitions5253| Component | Role | Key vendors |54|-----------|------|-------------|55| **ZTNA** | Replaces VPN; identity-aware app access broker | Zscaler ZPA, Palo Alto Prisma Access, Cloudflare Access, Cisco Duo NAS |56| **SWG** | Inline web proxy; URL/SSL inspection; malware | Zscaler ZIA, Netskope, Proxy SG |57| **CASB** | SaaS visibility, inline DLP, shadow IT | Netskope, McAfee MVISION, Zscaler CASB |58| **FWaaS** | Cloud-hosted stateful L4-L7 firewall | Palo Alto Prisma, Zscaler Cloud FW |59| **SD-WAN** | Underlay abstraction; policy-based routing | Fortinet, Cisco Viptela, VMware VeloCloud, Palo Alto Prisma SD-WAN |60| **DNS Security** | Block C2, malware domains, DNS tunneling | Cisco Umbrella, Cloudflare Gateway, Zscaler DNS |61| **DLP** | Data-in-motion inspection; prevent exfil | Netskope, Zscaler, Forcepoint |6263---6465## SASE Deployment Models6667### Model 1: Single-Vendor SASE68All SSE + SD-WAN from one vendor (Palo Alto Prisma SASE, Fortinet SASE).69- **Pro**: single console, native integration, simplified licensing70- **Con**: vendor lock-in; best-of-breed gaps possible71- **Choose when**: org prioritises operational simplicity7273### Model 2: Dual-Vendor (SSE + SD-WAN)74Best-of-breed SSE (Zscaler/Netskope) + separate SD-WAN (Fortinet/Viptela).75- **Pro**: flexibility; independent scaling76- **Con**: integration complexity; two support relationships77- **Choose when**: existing SD-WAN investment exists; security maturity is high7879### Model 3: Hybrid Transition80Existing MPLS/VPN retained; SASE PoPs added in parallel for new workloads.81- **Best for**: phased migration with legacy branches that cannot immediately move8283---8485## ZTA Policy Engine Design8687```88Request (user + device + app + context)89 ↓90[Identity Check] ← IdP: Entra ID / Okta / Keycloak91 ↓92[Device Posture] ← MDM / EDR signal (compliant / managed / health score)93 ↓94[Risk Score] ← UEBA, time-of-day, geo, anomaly95 ↓96[Resource Policy] ← least-privilege; app segment; data classification97 ↓98[PEP Enforcement] ← ZTNA broker / inline proxy / microseg agent99 ↓100Allow / Deny / Step-up MFA / Quarantine101```102103### Policy Decision Point (PDP) vs Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)104- **PDP**: decides (IdP + SIEM + posture signals) — often Okta/Entra conditional access or a PAM platform105- **PEP**: enforces at the network/app edge — ZTNA connector, SWG proxy, CASB inline106107---108109## Microsegmentation Approaches110111| Approach | Granularity | Best for |112|----------|-------------|----------|113| Network-based (VLAN/VRF) | IP subnet | Simple east-west; legacy |114| Firewall-based (micro-perimeter) | App group | Data centre |115| Host-based agent | Process/app | Cloud workloads; hybrid |116| Cloud-native NSG/SG | VPC/subnet | AWS/Azure/GCP workloads |117| Identity-aware proxy | User + app | ZTNA zero-trust app access |118119---120121## CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model — Pillar Checklist122123| Pillar | Traditional | Advanced | Optimal |124|--------|-------------|----------|---------|125| **Identity** | MFA on some apps | Phishing-resistant MFA everywhere | Continuous re-auth; UEBA |126| **Devices** | Corp-managed only | MDM + posture check at access | Automated remediation; EDR signal |127| **Networks** | VLAN segmentation | Encrypted in-enclave traffic | Full microseg; all traffic TLS |128| **Apps** | VPN to app subnet | Per-app ZTNA | Dynamic policy; app-layer ABAC |129| **Data** | Basic DLP | DLP + classification | DSPM; automated policy enforcement |130131---132133## Vendor Evaluation Scorecard134135When evaluating SASE/SSE vendors, score on:136137| Criterion | Weight | Notes |138|-----------|--------|-------|139| PoP coverage (latency to user base) | High | Must cover your key geographies |140| Single-pass architecture (no backhaul) | High | Traffic should not leave region unnecessarily |141| CASB inline + API mode | Medium | Inline for real-time; API for shadow IT |142| SSL/TLS inspection capacity | High | Without it, blind to 90% of threats |143| SD-WAN integration (native vs. API) | Medium | Native = lower latency & single policy |144| Licensing model (per-user vs. Mbps) | High | Per-user scales predictably |145| API & automation (Terraform provider) | Medium | GitOps-ready |146| Support for agentless access | Medium | Contractors, BYOD, OT devices |147148---149150## Common Pitfalls151152| Pitfall | Mitigation |153|---------|------------|154| "VPN + ZT" as marketing, not architecture | Validate PEP is in-path, not sidecar |155| Split tunnel VPN called "ZTNA" | True ZTNA brokers per-app — no network access |156| Implicit trust within cloud VPC | Apply NSGs + lateral movement controls |157| CASB API-only (reactive) | Add inline CASB for real-time DLP |158| Policy complexity → no policy applied | Start with coarse-grained; iterate |159| Ignoring OT/IoT in ZTA scope | Certificate-based identity; agentless ZTNA |160161---162163## ZERO_TRUST_KNOWLEDGE164165> Append discoveries here. Format: `YYYY-MM-DD: <note>`