Astro Security

Astro Security

When to use

This skill is the Astro-specific layer on top of secure-coding. Astro mixes static-site generation, server-side rendering, and partial hydration in one codebase, which means the attack surface differs per page even within the same project. That mixed-mode reality is the single most underappreciated source of Astro security mistakes.

Triggers on:

• A question like "review our Astro app for security issues", "is this page SSG or SSR", "set:html on user input", "Astro API route auth", "Decap CMS hardening", "OAuth backend for Decap", "Astro middleware bypass".
• Presence of astro.config.mjs/.ts, src/pages/, src/middleware.ts, src/content/ directories, @astrojs/* adapters, or decap-cms/netlify-cms admin-UI files.
• A PR touching set:html, Astro.locals, middleware, content-collection schemas, MDX components, or adapter config.
• Astro version bumps, especially around security advisories (check the astro GitHub security tab).
• A handoff from security-review or api-security when Astro is in the stack.

When NOT (handoff)

• General TS/JS secure-coding (not Astro-specific) → secure-coding.
• OWASP API Top 10 as a conceptual framework → api-security. Here for the Astro-specific implementation of API routes.
• SAST tooling (eslint-plugin-security, Semgrep p/javascript) → sast-orchestrator.
• Dep vulns in package.json → cve-triage.
• Adapter-platform infrastructure (Cloudflare Workers KV access, Vercel project-config, Netlify env-vars) → platform-specific docs and iac-security where relevant.
• Secrets in .env, .env.local, or platform env-var stores → secrets-scanner.
• Decap CMS as a stand-alone topic outside Astro context (e.g. with Hugo, Gatsby, Eleventy) — this skill covers it because the Astro+Decap pairing is the most common production deployment.

Approach

Six phases. Phase 1 (render-mode classification) is the foundation — without it you cannot reason about which security rules apply to a given page.

1. Render-mode classification → attack-surface map

Astro has three output modes, set in astro.config.mjs:

• output: 'static' (default, SSG). Pages render at build time. No server-side runtime at request time. The attack surface is the build pipeline (supply chain, secrets in environment, [verify]-marked CVEs in dependencies) — not the running site. Once deployed, pages are plain HTML.
• output: 'server' (full SSR). Every page renders per request. Auth, sessions, env vars, server-side data fetches — all live.
• output: 'hybrid' (mixed). Default to SSG, opt-in to SSR per page via export const prerender = false. Or default to SSR with export const prerender = true for pre-rendered routes.

Reviewer rule: for every page or route, identify its render mode FIRST. The prerender flag, the absence/presence of an adapter, and any per-page exports decide which security rules apply. A page that "looks" dynamic in the source can still be SSG (so dynamic data is frozen at build time, possibly leaked to the static HTML); a page that "looks" static can be SSR (so input-validation and auth become live concerns).

Common mistake: assuming hybrid means "the safe parts are static". The pages that use Astro.request or read cookies must be SSR. If they slip into SSG by default, they may bake build-time-only data (env vars, request-context defaults) into the static output and leak it.

2. Output sanitization and XSS

Astro auto-escapes content rendered via {expression} in templates. XSS arises where you opt out.

• set:html directive — Astro's equivalent of React's dangerouslySetInnerHTML. Renders raw HTML.

  <div set:html={userContent} />        <!-- XSS if userContent is user input -->
  <Fragment set:html={trustedHtml} />   <!-- same risk, no wrapping element -->
  

  Default rule: never on user-controlled input. If you need rich-text input, sanitize via DOMPurify (server-side) or an isomorphic sanitizer before assignment.
• MDX in content collections — see phase 4. MDX includes JSX expressions and component instantiation; treating it as "just markdown" is wrong. MDX = code execution in the render context.
• client:* directives (client:load, client:visible, client:idle, client:only) ship JS to the browser. Review what is hydrated, especially client-side props that flow from server-side fetches — props are serialized into the page HTML and visible in the browser. Same trust-boundary discipline as the Next.js Server/Client Component boundary.
• Markdown rendering is safe by default: standard CommonMark / GFM is parsed and escaped. Custom remark/rehype plugins can reintroduce raw-HTML pass-through; review any rehype-raw-style plugin.
• <style> and <script> element exceptions: Astro's is:inline directive bypasses processing. Combined with templated content this can become an injection vector.

3. Server endpoints (API routes) and middleware

Two server-side primitives, both common attack-surface entry points.

API routes (src/pages/api/*.ts):

export async function POST({ request, locals }: APIContext) {
  const session = locals.session;             // set by middleware
  if (!session) return new Response("unauth", { status: 401 });

  const body = await request.json();
  const parsed = schema.safeParse(body);      // zod / valibot
  if (!parsed.success) return new Response("bad request", { status: 400 });

  // ... business logic with explicit ownership check
}

• Auth in the handler, not only in middleware (defense-in-depth).
• Input validation via zod/valibot. Trust nothing from request.json() or request.formData().
• IDOR fix: compare resource ownership against the authenticated identity. Same api-security API1 BOLA discipline.

Middleware (src/middleware.ts):

• Runs before every matching request, can mutate context.locals, redirect, or rewrite.
• Useful for: setting auth context, security headers, redirects.
• Not safe as the only auth gate. The Next.js CVE-2025-29927 class of middleware-bypass bug taught this lesson the hard way: middleware logic on the server can be skipped under specific request shapes if the framework has a bug. Pages and API routes must independently verify auth from Astro.locals.
• Matchers: Astro middleware matches all requests by default; scoping is via early-return inside the middleware. Make sure the path-check is correct and not bypassable via URL-encoding.

4. Content collections, MDX, and the author-trust model

Content collections (src/content/<collection>/*.{md,mdx,json,yaml}) are typed content, validated via a config.ts schema. Two security considerations:

• MDX = code execution at render. MDX files can include JSX expressions, import components, and run logic. An author who can write MDX into the content collection has effectively code-execution rights in the rendering context. This is fine for internal-team authors. It is not fine for user-generated content (blog comments, user profiles, community posts) — those must be plain Markdown or sanitized HTML.
• Schema validation does not sanitize content body. The z.object({...}) schema validates frontmatter; the body content is still arbitrary markdown/MDX. Schema is a type guard, not an XSS guard.

Author-trust model checklist:

• Who can commit to src/content/? In a Decap CMS setup (phase 6), this maps to "who has OAuth-authenticated edit access to the repo".
• Are MDX files limited to a content collection where only trusted authors write? If a user-facing collection allows MDX, that is a finding.
• Can imports inside MDX reach src/components/* or src/lib/*? If yes, the author-trust model extends to your entire src/ tree — not just the markdown directory.

5. Adapter-specific runtime + env vars + headers

Astro is adapter-agnostic, but each adapter has different security ergonomics.

• @astrojs/node — runs as a regular Node server. Standard Node security context: process env vars, filesystem access, network egress. No platform sandbox.
• @astrojs/cloudflare — Cloudflare Workers runtime. Env vars are bound, not from process.env. KV / R2 / D1 / Durable Objects are accessed via bindings on context.locals.runtime.env. Smaller request body limits (~100MB), constrained CPU time, no Node API.
• @astrojs/vercel — edge runtime or serverless functions. Edge runtime is V8-isolate (no Node API), serverless is Node. Edge-vs-serverless choice matters for which APIs you can use; security model differs slightly (edge has stricter cold-start isolation).
• @astrojs/netlify — Netlify Functions or Edge Functions, similar to Vercel split.

Env vars:

• PUBLIC_* prefix exposes the variable to the client bundle. Anything with PUBLIC_ is essentially public — treat it that way.
• Server-only env vars must NOT carry the PUBLIC_ prefix.
• astro:env (Astro 5+, opt-in) provides a typed schema for env access. Use it where available; it catches accidental client/server mismatches at build time.
• Audit: grep for PUBLIC_ in your code. Anything with KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, API, PASSWORD after PUBLIC_ is a finding.

Security headers:

• Astro 5+ has experimental CSP integration (experimental.csp). Where available, prefer it over hand-rolled middleware-set CSP.
• Without built-in CSP: set headers via the adapter's response handler or via middleware for SSR pages. Static pages get headers from the host (Cloudflare Pages, Vercel, Netlify all support per-route headers config).
• HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy — same baseline as any modern web app.
• CSP with unsafe-inline defeats most of the point. Use nonces or hashes; Astro's CSP integration supports nonce flow.

6. Decap CMS (formerly Netlify CMS)

Decap is the most common CMS pairing for Astro: git-based, content stored as files in the repo, edited via a JS admin UI. Specific security implications:

OAuth backend:

• Decap admin UI authenticates via OAuth against a git provider (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket).
• The OAuth flow needs a backend exchange (the OAuth client_secret can't sit in the browser). Common implementations: a self-hosted Cloudflare Worker / Netlify Function / Vercel Function that handles the /api/decap-auth/* exchange. Netlify Identity (the historical default) was deprecated.
• OAuth scope minimization: the registered OAuth app should request only the scopes Decap needs (repo for GitHub if private; public_repo if public; nothing more). Audit the OAuth app's scope on the provider side.
• Repo restriction: configure the OAuth app to be restricted to the specific repo. On GitHub: a GitHub App scoped to one repo is preferable over a classic OAuth app with broad access.

Token storage and XSS impact:

• Decap stores the OAuth access token in localStorage after login. This is by design (the SPA needs it for git-API calls).
• Consequence: XSS on the admin UI = token theft = full repo write access until token expires.
• Mitigation: strict CSP on the admin UI (/admin/), no unsafe-inline in the admin route, treat the admin UI as a trust boundary distinct from the public site. If your CSP on the public site needs to be relaxed for any reason, the admin UI's CSP must be tightened independently.
• Token lifetime: GitHub OAuth tokens don't expire by default. Consider rotating the OAuth app credentials periodically; revoke immediately if XSS is found.

Editorial workflow:

• publish_mode: editorial_workflow puts content edits into a draft branch, with PR review before merge.
• This is effectively a PR-as-content-gate — review of content goes through the same review path as code.
• Without editorial workflow, every save is a direct commit to main. For multi-author setups or anything customer-facing, editorial workflow is the right default.

Authorization model:

• Decap has no native role system. Authorization is entirely the git provider's repo permissions: who has commit access to the repo can edit. There is no "editor-only, can't touch settings" tier.
• Implication: an editor account is, from the git-provider perspective, a write-access account. Treat editors with the same vetting as developers.
• For finer-grained control, use GitHub branch protection + CODEOWNERS + required reviews on main. Editorial-workflow PRs go to feature branches; CODEOWNERS gates merging to main.

Media library:

• Uploaded media goes into the repo as files, committed via the OAuth-authenticated user.
• Large or binary uploads inflate the repo. Consider an external media backend (Cloudinary, ImageKit, custom S3) for production.
• File-type validation is done client-side in Decap; the git API will accept anything. Validate again in CI (e.g. a workflow that scans new files in the editorial-workflow branch).

Verification-loop

Layer 1: render mode identified per page (SSG / SSR / hybrid)?, all set:html reviewed for user-input source?, MDX scope contained to trusted authors?, API routes have auth + input validation?, middleware not the only auth gate?, env vars audited for accidental PUBLIC_ prefix?, Decap OAuth scope minimized + admin-UI CSP tightened?

Layer 2: Astro version up to date (check astro GitHub security advisories, [verify] markers on any specific CVE claims), adapter version current, Decap CMS version current, claims about OAuth scope behavior verified against the actual GitHub/GitLab OAuth app config (not assumed).

Output

Astro security review — <app>
Astro: <x.y.z> | Adapter: <node | cloudflare | vercel | netlify>
CMS: <Decap | other | none>

Render-mode map:
  output:                <static | server | hybrid>
  Per-page prerender exports: <list of explicit overrides>
  Pages with auth/sessions:   <should be SSR; verify>

Output sanitization:
  set:html occurrences:       <N, locations, source-of-input per occurrence>
  MDX collections:            <which, author scope>
  client:* directives:        <which, hydrated props review>

Server endpoints:
  src/pages/api/* count:      N
  Auth check per handler:     <yes for all | gaps on ...>
  Input validation:           <zod/valibot/... | none>

Middleware:
  src/middleware.ts present:  <yes/no>
  Auth in middleware only:    <FINDING if yes>
  Headers set in middleware:  <list>

Content collections:
  Collections defined:        <list, MDX-allowed yes/no per collection>
  Author-trust model:         <internal-team | broader>

Adapter + env vars:
  Adapter:                    <name + version>
  PUBLIC_* vars:               <list, review for accidental exposure>
  astro:env in use:            <yes/no>
  Security headers:            <CSP, HSTS, etc. — present, nonce-based>

Decap CMS (if applicable):
  OAuth backend:               <self-hosted worker | Netlify Identity (deprecated) | other>
  OAuth scope:                 <minimum repo scope | over-permissive — FINDING>
  GitHub App vs OAuth app:     <App | classic OAuth app — FINDING if classic on private repo>
  Editorial workflow:          <enabled | disabled>
  Admin UI CSP:                <strict | inherits public CSP — FINDING if same as public>
  Media backend:               <git-stored | external>

Version check:
  Astro security advisories:   <within N days | check>
  Decap CMS version:           <date of last update>
  cve-triage handoff:          <N deps with vulns>

Findings (severity-sorted, follow security-review format)
Verification-loop: ...

References

• Astro security overview — https://docs.astro.build/en/guides/security/. Official Astro security guidance.
• Astro CSP integration — https://docs.astro.build/en/reference/experimental-flags/csp/. Built-in CSP from Astro 5+.
• Astro middleware — https://docs.astro.build/en/guides/middleware/.
• Astro content collections — https://docs.astro.build/en/guides/content-collections/. MDX vs Markdown distinction.
• Astro endpoints — https://docs.astro.build/en/guides/endpoints/. Server endpoints (API routes) reference.
• Astro security advisories — https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories. Primary CVE source.
• Decap CMS docs — https://decapcms.org/docs/. Backend, OAuth, editorial workflow.
• Decap CMS GitHub — https://github.com/decaporg/decap-cms. Source + advisories.
• GitHub OAuth app vs GitHub App — https://docs.github.com/en/apps/oauth-apps/building-oauth-apps/differences-between-github-apps-and-oauth-apps. For Decap backend choice.
• OWASP Top 10 2021 — https://owasp.org/Top10/.
• CSP Reference — https://content-security-policy.com/. Per-directive guide.
• MDN Security Headers — https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers.

Categories

• appsec