Rails Security

Rails Security

When to use

This skill is the Rails-specific layer on top of secure-coding. Convention over configuration covers a lot, but anyone going against the grain (string interpolation in .where, .html_safe on user input, CSRF off because "it was hard") gets vulnerabilities back.

Triggers on:

• A question like "review this Rails app", "Brakeman triage", "Devise hardening", "mass-assignment check", "is our CSP OK", "force SSL".
• Presence of Gemfile, config/application.rb, config/environments/production.rb, config/routes.rb, Devise setup under config/initializers/devise.rb, Pundit/CanCanCan policies.
• A PR that touches html_safe, raw, .where("... #{x} ..."), skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token, or skip_forgery_protection.
• A Brakeman report that needs triaging.
• A handoff from security-review where Rails is in the stack.

When NOT (handoff)

• General Ruby secure-coding → secure-coding.
• API design (Rails API-only mode overlaps with api-security) → that skill for OWASP API Top 10, here for Rails-specific implementation.
• SAST tool orchestration → sast-orchestrator. Brakeman is Rails-specific and belongs here.
• Dep vulns in gems → cve-triage (via bundle audit or OSV-scanner).
• Container/K8s deploy → container-hardening / k8s-security.
• Secrets in config/master.key or credentials.yml.enc on disk → secrets-scanner. This skill only covers the Rails credentials model.

Approach

Six phases. Brakeman does the heavy static-analysis lifting; this skill adds human context to what Brakeman outputs and catches what it misses.

1. Brakeman and dependency scanning

Brakeman (OSS, Rails-specific, since 2011). Static analysis that knows Rails idioms. Default tool for this skill.

bundle add brakeman --group=development
bundle exec brakeman --no-pager -o brakeman-report.json -f json

CI integration via the Brakeman action or plain bundle exec brakeman --exit-on-warn. Fail on new warnings via a baseline workflow (--compare against a previous run).

Triage Brakeman warnings with the same discipline as sast-orchestrator phase 5: baseline at introduction, suppress with rule ID plus reason (ignore.json), revisit periodically.

bundler-audit (OSS) for Gemfile.lock vulns; pass results on to cve-triage. Dependabot/Renovate for auto-updates.

2. Mass-assignment and strong_parameters

The classic Rails vulnerability. Pre-Rails-4 the whitelist was opt-in; since then it has been required via strong_parameters.

• Controller idiom: params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email). Only those fields are accepted by @user.update(user_params).
• Foot-gun: params.require(:user).permit! — the bang variant permits everything, effectively mass-assignment without a whitelist. Search for .permit! in every review.
• Nested attributes: permit(addresses_attributes: [:street, :city]) — explicit per level.
• Polymorphic / hash-type input: permit(preferences: {}) is an empty whitelist and accepts an entire hash without key checking. Limit to known keys.
• Admin flags never in permit: is_admin, role, stripe_customer_id — hardcode in the controller, do not allow via params.

3. SQL injection in ActiveRecord

ActiveRecord parameterizes via hash syntax and positional placeholders. Issues arise with string interpolation.

Safe (all parameterized):

User.where(name: name)
User.where("name = ?", name)
User.where("name = :n AND age > :a", n: name, a: 18)

Unsafe:

User.where("name = '#{name}'")          # string interpolation
User.where("name = '" + name + "'")     # concatenation
User.order(params[:sort])               # order-by user input = vulnerable
User.find_by_sql("SELECT ... #{query}") # raw SQL

Specific sub-patterns:

• order(params[:sort]) — allowlist of permitted column names. User.order(params[:sort].presence_in(%w[name created_at]) || :id).
• group(...), having(...), pluck(...) — accept string fragments; do not compose from user input.
• sanitize_sql_array/sanitize_sql_like for cases where you really do need raw SQL.
• find_by_sql, connection.execute — always parameterized; Brakeman catches this.

4. XSS and template escape

Rails escapes by default in ERB (<%= %>). XSS arises where you opt out.

• raw(user_input) — renders raw, no escaping.
• <%= user_input.html_safe %> — same effect, method on string.
• safe_concat, content_tag(..., user_input) with escape: false — variants.
• sanitize(user_html, tags: ..., attributes: ...) — Rails' built-in HTML sanitizer; acceptable for user-generated HTML provided the allowlist is tight. Refer to the Rails docs for the default allowlist.
• javascript_tag do ... end with user input in the body — JS-context XSS, not covered by HTML escape.
• Custom helpers that return html_safe are a common bug source. def my_helper(input); "<b>#{input}</b>".html_safe; end is broken if input is user input. Fix: content_tag(:b, input).

5. Auth: Devise, CSRF, sessions, CSP

• CSRF: protect_from_forgery with: :exception (default since Rails 5.2). skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token is a security-review trigger. API controllers extending ActionController::API do not need CSRF (stateless); mixed controllers (web + JSON) do.
• Devise hardening:
  • Modules: :database_authenticatable, :registerable, :recoverable, :rememberable, :validatable. Turn on :confirmable for email verification, :lockable for brute-force mitigation, :timeoutable for inactive sessions.
  • Password hashing: Devise uses bcrypt; stretches >= 12 for prod.
  • devise-two-factor for TOTP MFA.
  • Password reset flow: verify the token is time-bound (reset_password_within reasonably short) and enumeration-safe (same response for existing/non-existing email).
• Session config: config.session_store :cookie_store, key: '_app_session', secure: Rails.env.production?, httponly: true, same_site: :lax. expire_after reasonable (e.g. 2 hours of inactivity).
• Content Security Policy: since Rails 5.2 via config/initializers/content_security_policy.rb. Build the default policy without 'unsafe-inline' or 'unsafe-eval'; nonce-based if inline is needed.
• force_ssl: config.force_ssl = true in production.rb. Or at the reverse-proxy level, not both redundantly.

6. CVE patterns and verification-loop

Rails/Rack CVEs to know:

• CVE-2019-5418 ActionView file disclosure — Accept-header-based path traversal. Historical but canonical; every Rails version <5.2.2.1 / 4.2.11.1 is vulnerable. Reviewer reflex: is the Rails version recent enough?
• CVE-2022-32224 ActiveRecord YAML deserialization RCE — via serialize :column. Fixed in 5.2.8.1, 6.0.5.1, 6.1.6.1, 7.0.3.1. Search code for serialize :col without a type argument; that triggers the legacy YAML path.
• CVE-2023-22795 ActionDispatch ReDoS — header-parsing regex DoS.
• Rack 3.x security stream (2024) — multiple CVEs in Rack's request parser. [verify against https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories] for current status.
• Other: [verify against https://rubyonrails.org/security/] for Rails-specific, [verify against https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories] for Rack.

File uploads and Active Storage:

• has_one_attached :avatar — content type is stored via content_type on the blob, but the MIME check on upload is the controller's responsibility. Use validates :avatar, content_type: [...] via the active_storage_validations gem.
• Variants with the ImageMagick backend: a CVE-intensive library. Prefer vips as the backend.
• Private storage for non-public files (ActiveStorage::Current.url_options); do not share blob URLs directly without a signed URL plus expiry.

Verification-loop: Layer 1 scope (Gemfile versions, production.rb settings, routes + controller permits all walked through?), assumptions (protect_from_forgery active on all web controllers?). Layer 2 (CVE IDs verified against rubyonrails.org/security, Brakeman rule IDs are real, no invented Devise modules).

Output

Rails security review — <app>
Rails: <x.y.z> | Ruby: <x.y.z> | Gems with vuln: <N via cve-triage>

Brakeman:
  Warnings total:       N (baseline: M, new: K)
  High-confidence:      <list>
  Grouped by class

Code patterns:
  skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token: <list>
  .permit!, mass-assignment risks:                <list>
  String interpolation in .where/.order:          <list>
  html_safe/raw on user input:                    <list>

Devise:
  Modules present:      <confirmable, lockable, timeoutable?>
  MFA active:           <devise-two-factor | none>
  stretches:            <N>
  enumeration-safe:     <yes/no on reset flow>

Deploy settings:
  config.force_ssl:     <true | false>
  session-cookie flags: <secure, httponly, same_site>
  CSP:                  <default policy, no unsafe-inline?>

Active Storage (if applicable):
  MIME validation:      <present | missing>
  ImageMagick vs vips:  <backend>

Version check:
  Rails security releases:  <current | N months behind>
  Rack CVE scope:           <verified>

Findings (severity-sorted, follow security-review format)
Verification-loop: ...

References

• Rails Security Guide — https://guides.rubyonrails.org/security.html. Official security guide, maintained with core-team input.
• Rails Security Announcements — https://rubyonrails.org/security/. CVE feed.
• Brakeman — https://brakemanscanner.org/. Rails-specific SAST.
• bundler-audit — https://github.com/rubysec/bundler-audit. Gemfile.lock dep-CVE scan.
• Devise — https://github.com/heartcombo/devise and https://github.com/devise-security/devise-security for extra modules.
• Active Storage Validations — https://github.com/igorkasyanchuk/active_storage_validations. MIME/size checks that AS itself does not do.
• Rack Security Advisories — https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories. Rack touches every Rails app directly.
• OWASP Ruby on Rails Cheat Sheet — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Ruby_on_Rails_Cheat_Sheet.html.

Categories

• appsec