Dotnet Security Owasp

dotnet-security-owasp

OWASP Top 10 (2021) security guidance for .NET applications. Each category includes the vulnerability description, .NET-specific risk, mitigation code examples, and common pitfalls. This skill is the canonical owner of deprecated security pattern warnings (CAS, APTCA, .NET Remoting, DCOM, BinaryFormatter).

Scope

• OWASP Top 10 (2021) vulnerability categories with .NET-specific mitigations
• Injection, broken access control, XSS, SSRF prevention patterns
• Deprecated security API warnings (CAS, APTCA, BinaryFormatter, .NET Remoting)
• Security header configuration and CORS hardening
• Rate limiting and anti-forgery middleware patterns
• NuGet package audit and dependency vulnerability scanning

Out of scope

• Authentication/authorization implementation -- see [skill:dotnet-api-security]
• Blazor auth UI -- see [skill:dotnet-blazor-auth]
• Cryptographic algorithm selection -- see [skill:dotnet-cryptography]
• Configuration binding and Options pattern -- see [skill:dotnet-csharp-configuration]
• Secrets storage and management -- see [skill:dotnet-secrets-management]

Cross-references: [skill:dotnet-secrets-management] for secrets handling, [skill:dotnet-cryptography] for cryptographic best practices, [skill:dotnet-csharp-coding-standards] for secure coding conventions.

A01: Broken Access Control

Vulnerability: Users act outside their intended permissions -- accessing other users' data, elevating privileges, or bypassing access checks.

Risk in .NET: Missing [Authorize] attributes on controllers/endpoints, insecure direct object references (IDOR) where user IDs are taken from route parameters without ownership validation, and CORS misconfiguration allowing unintended origins.

Mitigation

// 1. Apply authorization globally, then opt out explicitly
builder.Services.AddAuthorizationBuilder()
    .SetFallbackPolicy(new AuthorizationPolicyBuilder()
        .RequireAuthenticatedUser()
        .Build());

var app = builder.Build();
app.MapControllers(); // All endpoints require auth by default

// 2. Resource-based authorization to prevent IDOR
public sealed class DocumentAuthorizationHandler
    : AuthorizationHandler<EditRequirement, Document>
{
    protected override Task HandleRequirementAsync(
        AuthorizationHandlerContext context,
        EditRequirement requirement,
        Document resource)
    {
        if (resource.OwnerId == context.User.FindFirstValue(ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier))
        {
            context.Succeed(requirement);
        }
        return Task.CompletedTask;
    }
}

// In the endpoint:
app.MapPut("/documents/{id}", async (
    int id,
    DocumentDto dto,
    IAuthorizationService authService,
    ClaimsPrincipal user,
    AppDbContext db) =>
{
    var document = await db.Documents.FindAsync(id);
    if (document is null) return Results.NotFound();

    var authResult = await authService.AuthorizeAsync(user, document, "Edit");
    if (!authResult.Succeeded) return Results.Forbid();

    document.Title = dto.Title;
    await db.SaveChangesAsync();
    return Results.NoContent();
});

```text

```csharp

// 3. Restrict CORS to known origins
builder.Services.AddCors(options =>
{
    options.AddPolicy("Strict", policy =>
    {
        policy.WithOrigins("https://app.example.com")
              .WithMethods("GET", "POST")
              .WithHeaders("Content-Type", "Authorization");
    });
});

```text

**Gotcha:** `AllowAnyOrigin()` combined with `AllowCredentials()` is rejected at runtime by ASP.NET Core, but `SetIsOriginAllowed(_ => true)` with `AllowCredentials()` silently allows all origins -- never use this pattern.

---

## A02: Cryptographic Failures

**Vulnerability:** Sensitive data exposed due to weak or missing encryption -- plaintext storage, deprecated algorithms, or improper key management.

**Risk in .NET:** Using MD5/SHA1 for hashing passwords, storing connection strings with plaintext passwords in `appsettings.json`, transmitting sensitive data over HTTP, or using `DES`/`RC2` for encryption.

### Mitigation

```csharp

// Enforce HTTPS and HSTS
builder.Services.AddHttpsRedirection(options =>
{
    options.HttpsPort = 443;
});

var app = builder.Build();
app.UseHsts(); // Strict-Transport-Security header
app.UseHttpsRedirection();

// Never store secrets in appsettings.json -- use user secrets or env vars
// See [skill:dotnet-secrets-management] for proper secrets handling

```json

```csharp

// Use Data Protection API for symmetric encryption of application data
public sealed class TokenProtector(IDataProtectionProvider provider)
{
    private readonly IDataProtector _protector =
        provider.CreateProtector("Tokens.V1");

    public string Protect(string plaintext) => _protector.Protect(plaintext);

    public string Unprotect(string ciphertext) => _protector.Unprotect(ciphertext);
}

```text

See [skill:dotnet-cryptography] for algorithm selection (AES-GCM, RSA, ECDSA) and key derivation.

---

## A03: Injection

**Vulnerability:** Untrusted data sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query -- SQL injection, command injection, LDAP injection, and cross-site scripting (XSS).

**Risk in .NET:** String concatenation in SQL queries, `Process.Start` with unsanitized input, rendering user input as raw HTML in Razor pages.

### Mitigation

```csharp

// SQL injection prevention: always use parameterized queries
// EF Core is parameterized by default via LINQ
var orders = await db.Orders
    .Where(o => o.CustomerId == customerId)
    .ToListAsync();

// When raw SQL is needed, use parameterized interpolation
var results = await db.Orders
    .FromSqlInterpolated($"SELECT * FROM Orders WHERE Status = {status}")
    .ToListAsync();

// NEVER concatenate user input into SQL:
// var bad = db.Orders.FromSqlRaw("SELECT * FROM Orders WHERE Status = '" + status + "'");

```text

```csharp

// XSS prevention: Razor encodes output by default.
// Use @Html.Raw() ONLY for trusted, pre-sanitized HTML.
// In Minimal APIs, return typed results -- not raw strings:
app.MapGet("/greeting", (string name) =>
    Results.Content($"<p>Hello, {HtmlEncoder.Default.Encode(name)}</p>",
        "text/html"));

// Command injection prevention: avoid Process.Start with user input.
// If unavoidable, validate against an allowlist:
public static bool IsAllowedTool(string toolName) =>
    toolName is "dotnet" or "git" or "nuget";

```bash

**Gotcha:** `FromSqlRaw` with string concatenation bypasses parameterization. Always use `FromSqlInterpolated` or pass `SqlParameter` objects to `FromSqlRaw`.

---

## A04: Insecure Design

**Vulnerability:** Flaws in design patterns that cannot be fixed by implementation alone -- missing rate limiting, lack of defense in depth, unrestricted resource consumption.

**Risk in .NET:** APIs without rate limiting, unbounded file uploads, missing anti-forgery tokens on state-changing operations.

### Mitigation

```csharp

// Rate limiting with built-in middleware (.NET 7+)
builder.Services.AddRateLimiter(options =>
{
    options.AddFixedWindowLimiter("api", limiterOptions =>
    {
        limiterOptions.PermitLimit = 100;
        limiterOptions.Window = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(1);
        limiterOptions.QueueLimit = 0;
    });
    options.RejectionStatusCode = StatusCodes.Status429TooManyRequests;
});

var app = builder.Build();
app.UseRateLimiter();

app.MapGet("/api/data", () => Results.Ok("data"))
    .RequireRateLimiting("api");

```text

```csharp

// Anti-forgery for Minimal APIs (.NET 8+)
builder.Services.AddAntiforgery();

var app = builder.Build();
app.UseAntiforgery();

// Form-bound endpoint: antiforgery validated automatically
app.MapPost("/orders", async ([FromForm] string productId, AppDbContext db) =>
{
    var order = new Order { ProductId = productId };
    db.Orders.Add(order);
    await db.SaveChangesAsync();
    return Results.Created($"/orders/{order.Id}", order);
});

// JSON endpoint: opt in explicitly with RequireAntiforgery()
app.MapPost("/api/orders", async (CreateOrderDto dto, AppDbContext db) =>
{
    var order = new Order { ProductId = dto.ProductId };
    db.Orders.Add(order);
    await db.SaveChangesAsync();
    return Results.Created($"/api/orders/{order.Id}", order);
}).RequireAntiforgery();

```text

**Gotcha:** `UseRateLimiter()` must be called after `UseRouting()` and before `MapControllers()`/`MapGet()` to apply correctly.

---

## A05: Security Misconfiguration

**Vulnerability:** Insecure default configurations, incomplete configurations, open cloud storage, unnecessary features enabled, verbose error messages.

**Risk in .NET:** Detailed exception pages in production (`UseDeveloperExceptionPage`), default Kestrel settings exposing server headers, debug endpoints left enabled, or missing security headers.

### Mitigation

```csharp

// Remove server identity headers (configure BEFORE Build)
builder.WebHost.ConfigureKestrel(options =>
{
    options.AddServerHeader = false;
});

var app = builder.Build();

if (app.Environment.IsDevelopment())
{
    app.UseDeveloperExceptionPage();
}
else
{
    // Generic error handler in production -- no stack traces
    app.UseExceptionHandler("/error");
    app.UseHsts();
}

// Add security headers via middleware
app.Use(async (context, next) =>
{
    context.Response.Headers.Append("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
    context.Response.Headers.Append("X-Frame-Options", "DENY");
    context.Response.Headers.Append("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin");
    context.Response.Headers.Append(
        "Content-Security-Policy",
        "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'");
    await next();
});

```text

```csharp

// Constrain request body size to prevent resource exhaustion (configure BEFORE Build)
builder.WebHost.ConfigureKestrel(options =>
{
    options.Limits.MaxRequestBodySize = 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10 MB
    options.Limits.MaxRequestHeadersTotalSize = 32 * 1024; // 32 KB
    options.Limits.RequestHeadersTimeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30);
});

// Then: var app = builder.Build();

```text

**Gotcha:** `UseDeveloperExceptionPage()` leaks source code paths and stack traces. Ensure it is gated behind `IsDevelopment()` and never enabled in production or staging.

---

## A06: Vulnerable and Outdated Components

**Vulnerability:** Using components with known vulnerabilities, unsupported frameworks, or unpatched dependencies.

**Risk in .NET:** Running on out-of-support .NET versions, NuGet packages with known CVEs, transitive dependency vulnerabilities not audited.

### Mitigation

```xml

<!-- Enable NuGet audit in Directory.Build.props or csproj -->
<PropertyGroup>
  <NuGetAudit>true</NuGetAudit>
  <NuGetAuditLevel>low</NuGetAuditLevel>
  <NuGetAuditMode>all</NuGetAuditMode> <!-- Audit direct + transitive -->
</PropertyGroup>

```text

```bash

# Audit NuGet packages for known vulnerabilities
dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive

# Keep packages up to date
dotnet outdated  # requires dotnet-outdated-tool

# Check .NET SDK/runtime support status
dotnet --info

```text

**Gotcha:** `NuGetAuditMode` defaults to `direct` -- transitive vulnerabilities are hidden unless you set `all`. Always use `all` in CI to catch deep dependency issues.

---

## A07: Identification and Authentication Failures

**Vulnerability:** Weak authentication mechanisms, credential stuffing, session fixation, missing multi-factor authentication.

**Risk in .NET:** Default Identity password policies that are too weak, session cookies without `Secure`/`SameSite` attributes, missing account lockout configuration.

### Mitigation

```csharp

// Configure strong Identity password and lockout policies

## Detailed Examples

See [references/detailed-examples.md](references/detailed-examples.md) for complete code samples and advanced patterns.