Privacy Request Review
Judge whether a data subject request is in policy without erasing, exporting,
or sending anything. The skill consumes a request packet, metadata of an upstream-verified requestor assertion, and
policy bounds, decides eligibility deterministically, appends the verdict to
the subject request event stream through the store's events.append, and returns a bounded
handoff that a separate governed operator run may consume.
This is not a legal authority and does not replace counsel. It is an execution boundary for policy evidence: the receipt proves which inputs were inspected, which lawful basis was named, which scope was allowed or refused, and which durable verdict was appended.
Procedure
- Native
data.digestbinds the exact request packet and policy. - Deterministic judgment: the request type must be erasure or export, the
identity provider must be in
trusted_identity_providers, the proof must carry a validverified_atand a sha256 assertion digest bound to the same subject, a lawful basis must be named for the request type, and every requested data class and scope must sit inside bothscope_bounds.data_classesand the type-specific allowed list. Explicit requested scopes must also be within the requested data classes. These names are exact policy identifiers, not a wildcard or implicit subfield language. A mismatch refuses with named reasons; nothing is inferred. - The verdict, eligible or refused, is appended to the pinned store
stream with optimistic concurrency and an idempotency key, so repeated runs
cannot double-record. A verdict decides something about a person, so the
append waits on a person's approval of the exact event (
privacy_verdict), whatever the run'seffects. - An independent
events.readreads the exact original event position. Finalization requires a committed/replayed append at the expected version and matching source, event id, version and digest. A conflict cannot become a committed verdict. The final packet retains both native input digests. - An eligible result carries the exact subject/classes/scopes but no selected execution path. The operator must choose the owning product's erasure or secure subject-export capability. A refusal carries human review and no handoff. Do not invent a generic read/redact/send pipeline.
downstream_effect_performed is always false; the downstream operator owns the
actual erasure or export under its own authority and receipt.
Output
subject_request_verdict (runx/privacy-request-review.verdict.v1) carries request,
decision, escalation, legal, requestor, scope_bounds, handoff or
null, persistence with the committed stream version, and both input digests.
Inputs are request_packet, requestor_proof, policy, and the request's
place in this skill's own requests stream, which only it writes: its key,
expected_version and idempotency_key. persistence.key reports that key.
Trust and continuation
The host must obtain and verify identity through its actual identity provider before supplying assertion metadata. A timestamp, trusted provider name and digest-shaped string do not independently authenticate anyone. This review checks the supplied bindings against policy and records that conditional judgment; it performs no provider verification or legal determination.
Retain the original assertion/source provenance, policy, request and stable key with the result. Delivery must bind the actual verified requester and secure destination. Export the subject's entitled data: blindly applying PII redaction to that subject's own records can defeat the request. Apply third-party redaction or withholding only under the selected product's explicit policy.
A stale append returns a failure with no committed verdict. Inspect the current stream and preserve the original identity; do not silently retry a new write. Readback checks the original event position, so later unrelated events do not invalidate confirmation of an already committed verdict. A committed policy verdict is never authorization or proof of erasure, export or delivery.