How do I install the Hr Product MCP Governance skill?

Run npx skillmds@latest add safetymp/hr-product-mcp-governance in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

Is Hr Product MCP Governance safe to use?

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This skill is tagged as working with Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex. SKILL.md is an open format, so most agents that read a skills directory can load it too.

Is Hr Product MCP Governance free to use?

Yes. Installing skills from SkillMD is free, and the skill stays under its author's original license.

Who published Hr Product MCP Governance?

SafetyMP (@safetymp) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Hr Product MCP Governance by safetymp

Name: Hr Product MCP Governance
Author: SafetyMP

File contents

HR product MCP governance

Collaboration plane: Specialized skill — phase 6 only after human tradeoffs recorded. Distinct from Harness HITL (@hr-human-collaboration).

Use this skill when

Editing lib/copilot/ (catalog, transport, governance config)
Adding or changing tools in COPILOT_TOOL_CATALOG
Wiring MCP stdio/websocket transport (Phase 3)
Red-team or audit scenarios for cross-tenant tool calls

Do not use this skill when

Configuring Cursor workspace MCP plugins (Prisma, Figma, etc.) — use @protect-mcp-governance on the IDE plane
MLOps inference routing only (docs/ml/, services/ml-serving/) — use @hr-regulated-domain mlops L3
T1/T2 work with no copilot or threat-model surface

Instructions

Read hr-copilot-mcp.md and agent-mcp-threat-model.md.
Catalog: Zod inputSchema.parse before handlers; RBAC permission from descriptor; no direct Prisma in handlers — reuse lib/* with AuthContext.
Identity: tenant_id / subject_id only from JWT/session — never from model arguments.
Side effects: High-stakes mutations via lib/governance/ proposals + HITL — not raw tool execution.
Hybrid boundary: Cedar + shadow mode per transport-rollout.md; enforce only after shadow validation.
Tests: Extend tests/unit/copilot/mcp-tools.test.ts — unique names, read permissions, validation, unknown tool denial.
Update threat-model review checklist when adding tools.

Resources

references/tier-mapping.md
references/transport-rollout.md
hr-regulated-domain product-mcp L3
Global @protect-mcp-governance for Cedar/receipts at transport

Limitations

Engineering controls only — not legal advice
Transport may remain scaffold until Phase 3 exit criteria in implementation-sequence.md

---name: hr-product-mcp-governancedescription: Product-runtime HR copilot MCP: catalog, transport, tenant isolation, HITL, hybrid protect-mcp shadow→enforce. Use for lib/copilot, MCP tool additions, red-team scenarios. Not Cursor IDE MCP plugins.---# HR product MCP governance**Collaboration plane:** Specialized skill — phase 6 only after human tradeoffs recorded. Distinct from Harness HITL (`@hr-human-collaboration`).## Use this skill when- Editing [`lib/copilot/`](../../../lib/copilot/) (catalog, transport, governance config)- Adding or changing tools in `COPILOT_TOOL_CATALOG`- Wiring MCP stdio/websocket transport (Phase 3)- Red-team or audit scenarios for cross-tenant tool calls## Do not use this skill when- Configuring **Cursor workspace MCP plugins** (Prisma, Figma, etc.) — use `@protect-mcp-governance` on the IDE plane- MLOps inference routing only (`docs/ml/`, `services/ml-serving/`) — use `@hr-regulated-domain` mlops L3- T1/T2 work with no copilot or threat-model surface## Instructions1. Read [hr-copilot-mcp.md](../../../docs/architecture/hr-copilot-mcp.md) and [agent-mcp-threat-model.md](../../../docs/security/agent-mcp-threat-model.md).2. **Catalog:** Zod `inputSchema.parse` before handlers; RBAC `permission` from descriptor; no direct Prisma in handlers — reuse `lib/*` with `AuthContext`.3. **Identity:** `tenant_id` / `subject_id` only from JWT/session — never from model arguments.4. **Side effects:** High-stakes mutations via [`lib/governance/`](../../../lib/governance/) proposals + HITL — not raw tool execution.5. **Hybrid boundary:** Cedar + shadow mode per [transport-rollout.md](references/transport-rollout.md); enforce only after shadow validation.6. **Tests:** Extend [`tests/unit/copilot/mcp-tools.test.ts`](../../../tests/unit/copilot/mcp-tools.test.ts) — unique names, read permissions, validation, unknown tool denial.7. Update threat-model review checklist when adding tools.## Resources- [references/tier-mapping.md](references/tier-mapping.md)- [references/transport-rollout.md](references/transport-rollout.md)- [hr-regulated-domain product-mcp L3](../hr-regulated-domain/references/product-mcp.md)- Global `@protect-mcp-governance` for Cedar/receipts at transport## Limitations- Engineering controls only — not legal advice- Transport may remain scaffold until Phase 3 exit criteria in [`implementation-sequence.md`](../../../docs/ml/implementation-sequence.md)

Frequently asked questions

Hr Product MCP Governance