Attack Ent T1003 001 Lsass Memory

MITRE ATT&CK T1003.001: LSASS Memory

When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1003.001, LSASS Memory, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

Technique context

• ATT&CK domain: enterprise
• ATT&CK ID: T1003.001
• Technique name: LSASS Memory
• Type: sub-technique
• ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001
• Tactics: credential-access
• Platforms: Windows
• Required permissions: Not specified
• Effective permissions: Not specified
• Defenses bypassed: Not specified

ATT&CK description

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.

As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.

For example, on the target host use procdump:

• procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump

Locally, mimikatz can be run using:

• sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp
• sekurlsa::logonPasswords

Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used:

• rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)

Similar to Image File Execution Options Injection, the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of lsass.exe through Windows Error Reporting (WerFault.exe).(Citation: Deep Instinct LSASS)

Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)

The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:

• Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
• Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
• Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
• CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)

Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

Bundled resources

• references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
• references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
• references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
• templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
• templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
• templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
• templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
• scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
• assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

Useful telemetry and data sources

• Not specified in the STIX object.

Mitigations to consider

• Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
• Credential Access Protection
• Operating System Configuration
• Password Policies
• Privileged Account Management
• Privileged Process Integrity
• User Training

Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

• 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)
• 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)
• APT1 (intrusion-set)
• APT28 (intrusion-set)
• APT3 (intrusion-set)
• APT32 (intrusion-set)
• APT33 (intrusion-set)
• APT39 (intrusion-set)
• APT41 (intrusion-set)
• APT5 (intrusion-set)
• Agrius (intrusion-set)
• Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)
• BRONZE BUTLER (intrusion-set)
• Bad Rabbit (malware)
• Blue Mockingbird (intrusion-set)
• C0032 (campaign)
• Cleaver (intrusion-set)
• Cobalt Strike (malware)
• CozyCar (malware)
• Cutting Edge (campaign)

Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

• Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
• Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
• Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
• Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
• Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
• References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

ATT&CK contributors

• Edward Millington
• Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
• Olaf Hartong, Falcon Force
• Michael Forret, Quorum Cyber