Attack Ent T1003 002 Security Account Manager

MITRE ATT&CK T1003.002: Security Account Manager

When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1003.002, Security Account Manager, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

Technique context

• ATT&CK domain: enterprise
• ATT&CK ID: T1003.002
• Technique name: Security Account Manager
• Type: sub-technique
• ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002
• Tactics: credential-access
• Platforms: Windows
• Required permissions: Not specified
• Effective permissions: Not specified
• Defenses bypassed: Not specified

ATT&CK description

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the net user command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:

• pwdumpx.exe
• gsecdump
• Mimikatz
• secretsdump.py

Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:

• reg save HKLM\sam sam
• reg save HKLM\system system

Creddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.(Citation: GitHub Creddump7)

Notes:

• RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator.
• RID 501 is the guest account.
• User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.

Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

Bundled resources

• references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
• references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
• references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
• templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
• templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
• templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
• templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
• scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
• assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

Useful telemetry and data sources

• Not specified in the STIX object.

Mitigations to consider

• Operating System Configuration
• Password Policies
• Privileged Account Management
• User Training

Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

• 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)
• APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign (campaign)
• APT29 (intrusion-set)
• APT41 (intrusion-set)
• APT5 (intrusion-set)
• Agrius (intrusion-set)
• C0017 (campaign)
• Cobalt Strike (malware)
• CosmicDuke (malware)
• CozyCar (malware)
• CrackMapExec (tool)
• Daggerfly (intrusion-set)
• Dragonfly (intrusion-set)
• Ember Bear (intrusion-set)
• FIN13 (intrusion-set)
• Fgdump (tool)
• FrostyGoop Incident (campaign)
• GALLIUM (intrusion-set)
• HOPLIGHT (malware)
• IceApple (malware)

Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

• Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
• Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
• Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
• Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
• Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
• References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

ATT&CK contributors

• Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
• Olaf Hartong, Falcon Force