MITRE ATT&CK T1003.004: LSA Secrets
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1003.004, LSA Secrets, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1003.004
- Technique name: LSA Secrets
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004
- Tactics: credential-access
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: Passcape LSA Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model)(Citation: Tilbury Windows Credentials) LSA secrets are stored in the registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)
Reg can be used to extract from the Registry. Mimikatz can be used to extract secrets from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Password Policies
- Privileged Account Management
- User Training
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- AADInternals (tool)
- APT29 (intrusion-set)
- APT33 (intrusion-set)
- CosmicDuke (malware)
- CrackMapExec (tool)
- Dragonfly (intrusion-set)
- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)
- IceApple (malware)
- Impacket (tool)
- Ke3chang (intrusion-set)
- LaZagne (tool)
- Leafminer (intrusion-set)
- Mimikatz (tool)
- MuddyWater (intrusion-set)
- OilRig (intrusion-set)
- Pupy (tool)
- Threat Group-3390 (intrusion-set)
- gsecdump (tool)
- menuPass (intrusion-set)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
1---2name: attack-ent-t1003-004-lsa-secrets3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1003.004 LSA Secrets in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1003.004, LSA Secrets, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: P…"4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1003-004-lsa-secrets7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1003.00410 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc11 attack_version: "1.1"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:48:29.945Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1003.004: LSA Secrets1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1003.004, LSA Secrets, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1003.00425- Technique name: LSA Secrets26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/00428- Tactics: credential-access29- Platforms: Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: Passcape LSA Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model)(Citation: Tilbury Windows Credentials) LSA secrets are stored in the registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets</code>. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)3738[Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) can be used to extract from the Registry. [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) can be used to extract secrets from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)3940## Agent workflow41421. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.432. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.443. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.454. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.465. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.476. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4849## Bundled resources5051- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.52- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.53- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.54- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.55- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.56- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.57- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.58- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.59- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6061To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6263## Detection guidance6465No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6667## Useful telemetry and data sources6869- Not specified in the STIX object.7071## Mitigations to consider7273- Password Policies74- Privileged Account Management75- User Training7677## Known threat context7879Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8081- AADInternals (tool)82- APT29 (intrusion-set)83- APT33 (intrusion-set)84- CosmicDuke (malware)85- CrackMapExec (tool)86- Dragonfly (intrusion-set)87- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)88- IceApple (malware)89- Impacket (tool)90- Ke3chang (intrusion-set)91- LaZagne (tool)92- Leafminer (intrusion-set)93- Mimikatz (tool)94- MuddyWater (intrusion-set)95- OilRig (intrusion-set)96- Pupy (tool)97- Threat Group-3390 (intrusion-set)98- gsecdump (tool)99- menuPass (intrusion-set)100101## Recommended output pattern102103When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:104105- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.106- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.107- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.108- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.109- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.110- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.111112## ATT&CK contributors113114- Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs