MITRE ATT&CK T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1021.002, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1021.002
- Technique name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002
- Tactics: lateral-movement
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
SMB is a file, printer, and serial port sharing protocol for Windows machines on the same network or domain. Adversaries may use SMB to interact with file shares, allowing them to move laterally throughout a network. Linux and macOS implementations of SMB typically use Samba.
Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over SMB,(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs),(Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are Scheduled Task/Job, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels.(Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Filter Network Traffic
- Limit Access to Resource Over Network
- Password Policies
- Privileged Account Management
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign (campaign)
- APT3 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- APT39 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 (intrusion-set)
- Anchor (malware)
- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)
- BlackByte (intrusion-set)
- BlackByte Ransomware (malware)
- BlackEnergy (malware)
- Blue Mockingbird (intrusion-set)
- Brute Ratel C4 (tool)
- Chimera (intrusion-set)
- Cinnamon Tempest (intrusion-set)
- Cobalt Strike (malware)
- Conficker (malware)
- Conti (malware)
- Cutting Edge (campaign)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
1---2name: attack-ent-t1021-002-smb-windows-admin-shares3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1021.002, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB).4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1021.002, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1021.00217- Technique name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/00220- Tactics: lateral-movement21- Platforms: Windows22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.2930SMB is a file, printer, and serial port sharing protocol for Windows machines on the same network or domain. Adversaries may use SMB to interact with file shares, allowing them to move laterally throughout a network. Linux and macOS implementations of SMB typically use Samba.3132Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include `C$`, `ADMIN$`, and `IPC$`. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over SMB,(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs),(Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) and certain configuration and patch levels.(Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)3334## Agent workflow35361. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.372. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.383. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.394. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.405. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.416. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4243## Bundled resources4445- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.46- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.47- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.48- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.49- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.50- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.51- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.52- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.53- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5455To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5657## Detection guidance5859No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6061## Useful telemetry and data sources6263- Not specified in the STIX object.6465## Mitigations to consider6667- Filter Network Traffic68- Limit Access to Resource Over Network69- Password Policies70- Privileged Account Management7172## Known threat context7374Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7576- 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)77- APT28 (intrusion-set)78- APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign (campaign)79- APT3 (intrusion-set)80- APT32 (intrusion-set)81- APT39 (intrusion-set)82- APT41 (intrusion-set)83- Anchor (malware)84- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)85- BlackByte (intrusion-set)86- BlackByte Ransomware (malware)87- BlackEnergy (malware)88- Blue Mockingbird (intrusion-set)89- Brute Ratel C4 (tool)90- Chimera (intrusion-set)91- Cinnamon Tempest (intrusion-set)92- Cobalt Strike (malware)93- Conficker (malware)94- Conti (malware)95- Cutting Edge (campaign)9697## Recommended output pattern9899When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:100101- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.102- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.103- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.104- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.105- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.106- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.