MITRE ATT&CK T1027.002: Software Packing
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1027.002, Software Packing, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1027.002
- Technique name: Software Packing
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002
- Tactics: stealth
- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018)
Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.(Citation: Awesome Executable Packing)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)
- APT29 (intrusion-set)
- APT3 (intrusion-set)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- APT39 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 (intrusion-set)
- Anchor (malware)
- Aoqin Dragon (intrusion-set)
- AppleSeed (malware)
- Astaroth (malware)
- BLINDINGCAN (malware)
- Babuk (malware)
- Bazar (malware)
- Bisonal (malware)
- C0017 (campaign)
- COATHANGER (malware)
- CSPY Downloader (tool)
- China Chopper (malware)
- Clop (malware)
- CostaBricks (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
1---2name: attack-ent-t1027-002-software-packing3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1027.002 Software Packing in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1027.002, Software Packing, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1027-002-software-packing7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1027.00210 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-17537906906211 attack_version: "2.0"12 attack_modified: "2026-04-15T22:15:31.610Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1027.002: Software Packing1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1027.002, Software Packing, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1027.00225- Technique name: Software Packing26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/00228- Tactics: stealth29- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) 3738Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.(Citation: Awesome Executable Packing)3940## Agent workflow41421. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.432. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.443. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.454. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.465. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.476. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4849## Bundled resources5051- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.52- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.53- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.54- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.55- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.56- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.57- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.58- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.59- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6061To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6263## Detection guidance6465No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6667## Useful telemetry and data sources6869- Not specified in the STIX object.7071## Mitigations to consider7273- Antivirus/Antimalware7475## Known threat context7677Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7879- 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)80- APT29 (intrusion-set)81- APT3 (intrusion-set)82- APT38 (intrusion-set)83- APT39 (intrusion-set)84- APT41 (intrusion-set)85- Anchor (malware)86- Aoqin Dragon (intrusion-set)87- AppleSeed (malware)88- Astaroth (malware)89- BLINDINGCAN (malware)90- Babuk (malware)91- Bazar (malware)92- Bisonal (malware)93- C0017 (campaign)94- COATHANGER (malware)95- CSPY Downloader (tool)96- China Chopper (malware)97- Clop (malware)98- CostaBricks (malware)99100## Recommended output pattern101102When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:103104- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.105- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.106- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.107- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.108- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.109- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.110111## ATT&CK contributors112113- Filip Kafka, ESET