MITRE ATT&CK T1033: System Owner/User Discovery
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1033, System Owner/User Discovery, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1033
- Technique name: System Owner/User Discovery
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033
- Tactics: discovery
- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including whoami. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. On macOS the dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as %USERNAME% and $USER, may also be used to access this information.
On network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as show users and show ssh can be used to display users currently logged into the device.(Citation: show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- APT19 (intrusion-set)
- APT3 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- APT37 (intrusion-set)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- APT39 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 (intrusion-set)
- Action RAT (malware)
- Agent Tesla (malware)
- Agent.btz (malware)
- Amadey (malware)
- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)
- Aria-body (malware)
- AsyncRAT (tool)
- AuTo Stealer (malware)
- Azorult (malware)
- BADHATCH (malware)
- BISCUIT (malware)
- BLUELIGHT (malware)
- BOOKWORM (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
1---2name: attack-ent-t1033-system-owner-user-discovery3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1033 System Owner/User Discovery in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1033, System Owner/User Discovery, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1033-system-owner-user-discovery7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T103310 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d31810411 attack_version: "1.6"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:48:20.366Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1033: System Owner/User Discovery1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1033, System Owner/User Discovery, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T103325- Technique name: System Owner/User Discovery26- Type: technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T103328- Tactics: discovery29- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.3738Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code>%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used to access this information.3940On network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show users` and `show ssh` can be used to display users currently logged into the device.(Citation: show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)4142## Agent workflow43441. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.452. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.463. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.474. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.485. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.496. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5051## Bundled resources5253- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.54- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.55- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.56- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.57- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.58- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.59- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.60- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.61- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6263To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6465## Detection guidance6667No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6869## Useful telemetry and data sources7071- Not specified in the STIX object.7273## Mitigations to consider7475- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.7677## Known threat context7879Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8081- APT19 (intrusion-set)82- APT3 (intrusion-set)83- APT32 (intrusion-set)84- APT37 (intrusion-set)85- APT38 (intrusion-set)86- APT39 (intrusion-set)87- APT41 (intrusion-set)88- Action RAT (malware)89- Agent Tesla (malware)90- Agent.btz (malware)91- Amadey (malware)92- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)93- Aria-body (malware)94- AsyncRAT (tool)95- AuTo Stealer (malware)96- Azorult (malware)97- BADHATCH (malware)98- BISCUIT (malware)99- BLUELIGHT (malware)100- BOOKWORM (malware)101102## Recommended output pattern103104When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:105106- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.107- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.108- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.109- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.110- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.111- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.112113## ATT&CK contributors114115- Austin Clark, @c2defense