MITRE ATT&CK T1040: Network Sniffing
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1040, Network Sniffing, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1040
- Technique name: Network Sniffing
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040
- Tactics: credential-access, discovery
- Platforms: IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay, can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.
Network sniffing may reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Stealth activities. Adversaries may likely also utilize network sniffing during Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) to passively gain additional knowledge about the environment.
In cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)
On network devices, adversaries may perform network captures using Network Device CLI commands such as monitor capture.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: capture_embedded_packet_on_software)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Encrypt Sensitive Information
- Multi-factor Authentication
- Network Segmentation
- User Account Management
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT33 (intrusion-set)
- ArcaneDoor (campaign)
- CASTLETAP (malware)
- DarkVishnya (intrusion-set)
- Emotet (malware)
- Empire (tool)
- FoggyWeb (malware)
- Impacket (tool)
- J-magic (malware)
- JumbledPath (malware)
- Kimsuky (intrusion-set)
- Line Dancer (malware)
- MESSAGETAP (malware)
- NBTscan (tool)
- Penquin (malware)
- PoshC2 (tool)
- RedPenguin (campaign)
- Regin (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
- Tiago Faria, 3CORESec
- Austin Clark, @c2defense
- Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
- Eliraz Levi, Hunters
1---2name: attack-ent-t1040-network-sniffing3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1040 Network Sniffing in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1040, Network Sniffing, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1040-network-sniffing7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T104010 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f52911 attack_version: "1.7"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:48:36.910Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1040: Network Sniffing1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1040, Network Sniffing, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T104025- Technique name: Network Sniffing26- Type: technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T104028- Tactics: credential-access, discovery29- Platforms: IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.3738Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.3940Network sniffing may reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or [Stealth](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005) activities. Adversaries may likely also utilize network sniffing during [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) (AiTM) to passively gain additional knowledge about the environment.4142In cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)4344On network devices, adversaries may perform network captures using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `monitor capture`.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: capture_embedded_packet_on_software)4546## Agent workflow47481. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.492. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.503. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.514. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.525. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.536. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5455## Bundled resources5657- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.58- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.59- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.60- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.61- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.62- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.63- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.64- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.65- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6667To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6869## Detection guidance7071No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.7273## Useful telemetry and data sources7475- Not specified in the STIX object.7677## Mitigations to consider7879- Encrypt Sensitive Information80- Multi-factor Authentication81- Network Segmentation82- User Account Management8384## Known threat context8586Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8788- 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)89- APT28 (intrusion-set)90- APT33 (intrusion-set)91- ArcaneDoor (campaign)92- CASTLETAP (malware)93- DarkVishnya (intrusion-set)94- Emotet (malware)95- Empire (tool)96- FoggyWeb (malware)97- Impacket (tool)98- J-magic (malware)99- JumbledPath (malware)100- Kimsuky (intrusion-set)101- Line Dancer (malware)102- MESSAGETAP (malware)103- NBTscan (tool)104- Penquin (malware)105- PoshC2 (tool)106- RedPenguin (campaign)107- Regin (malware)108109## Recommended output pattern110111When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:112113- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.114- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.115- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.116- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.117- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.118- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.119120## ATT&CK contributors121122- Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix123- Tiago Faria, 3CORESec124- Austin Clark, @c2defense125- Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom126- Eliraz Levi, Hunters