MITRE ATT&CK T1055.009: Proc Memory
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1055.009, Proc Memory, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1055.009
- Technique name: Proc Memory
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009
- Tactics: privilege-escalation, stealth
- Platforms: Linux
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Proc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (/proc/[pid]) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within /proc/[pid]/maps can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)(Citation: DD Man)
Other techniques such as Dynamic Linker Hijacking may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to Process Hollowing, proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
- Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- KV Botnet Activity (campaign)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
1---2name: attack-ent-t1055-009-proc-memory3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1055.009 Proc Memory in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1055.009, Proc Memory, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1055.009: Proc Memory89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1055.009, Proc Memory, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1055.00917- Technique name: Proc Memory18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/00920- Tactics: privilege-escalation, stealth21- Platforms: Linux22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. 2930Proc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (<code>/proc/[pid]</code>) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within <code>/proc/[pid]/maps</code> can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)(Citation: DD Man) 3132Other techniques such as [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection) 3334Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.3536## Agent workflow37381. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.392. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.403. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.414. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.425. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.436. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4445## Bundled resources4647- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.48- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.49- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.50- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.51- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.52- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.53- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.54- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.55- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5657To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5859## Detection guidance6061No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6263## Useful telemetry and data sources6465- Not specified in the STIX object.6667## Mitigations to consider6869- Behavior Prevention on Endpoint70- Restrict File and Directory Permissions7172## Known threat context7374Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7576- KV Botnet Activity (campaign)7778## Recommended output pattern7980When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:8182- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.83- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.84- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.85- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.86- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.87- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
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