MITRE ATT&CK T1069.002: Domain Groups
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1069.002, Domain Groups, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1069.002
- Technique name: Domain Groups
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002
- Tactics: discovery
- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.
Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain-level groups.
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- AdFind (tool)
- BADHATCH (malware)
- BlackCat (malware)
- BloodHound (tool)
- Brute Ratel C4 (tool)
- C0015 (campaign)
- Cobalt Strike (malware)
- CrackMapExec (tool)
- Dragonfly (intrusion-set)
- Egregor (malware)
- FIN7 (intrusion-set)
- GRIFFON (malware)
- Gootloader (malware)
- Helminth (malware)
- INC Ransom (intrusion-set)
- Inception (intrusion-set)
- Ke3chang (intrusion-set)
- Kwampirs (malware)
- LAMEHUG (malware)
- LAPSUS$ (intrusion-set)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys
- Miriam Wiesner, @miriamxyra, Microsoft Security
1---2name: attack-ent-t1069-002-domain-groups3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1069.002 Domain Groups in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1069.002, Domain Groups, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1069-002-domain-groups7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1069.00210 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c11 attack_version: "1.2"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:48:33.946Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1069.002: Domain Groups1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1069.002, Domain Groups, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1069.00225- Technique name: Domain Groups26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/00228- Tactics: discovery29- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.3738Commands such as <code>net group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain-level groups.3940## Agent workflow41421. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.432. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.443. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.454. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.465. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.476. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4849## Bundled resources5051- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.52- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.53- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.54- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.55- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.56- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.57- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.58- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.59- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6061To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6263## Detection guidance6465No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6667## Useful telemetry and data sources6869- Not specified in the STIX object.7071## Mitigations to consider7273- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.7475## Known threat context7677Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7879- AdFind (tool)80- BADHATCH (malware)81- BlackCat (malware)82- BloodHound (tool)83- Brute Ratel C4 (tool)84- C0015 (campaign)85- Cobalt Strike (malware)86- CrackMapExec (tool)87- Dragonfly (intrusion-set)88- Egregor (malware)89- FIN7 (intrusion-set)90- GRIFFON (malware)91- Gootloader (malware)92- Helminth (malware)93- INC Ransom (intrusion-set)94- Inception (intrusion-set)95- Ke3chang (intrusion-set)96- Kwampirs (malware)97- LAMEHUG (malware)98- LAPSUS$ (intrusion-set)99100## Recommended output pattern101102When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:103104- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.105- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.106- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.107- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.108- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.109- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.110111## ATT&CK contributors112113- Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys114- Miriam Wiesner, @miriamxyra, Microsoft Security