MITRE ATT&CK T1070.004: File Deletion
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1070.004, File Deletion, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1070.004
- Technique name: File Deletion
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004
- Tactics: stealth
- Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) Examples of built-in Command and Scripting Interpreter functions include del on Windows, rm or unlink on Linux and macOS, and rm on ESXi.
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)
- ADVSTORESHELL (malware)
- APT18 (intrusion-set)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT29 (intrusion-set)
- APT3 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- APT39 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 DUST (campaign)
- APT5 (intrusion-set)
- AcidPour (malware)
- Anchor (malware)
- Apostle (malware)
- AppleJeus (malware)
- AppleSeed (malware)
- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)
- ArcaneDoor (campaign)
- Aria-body (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
1---2name: attack-ent-t1070-004-file-deletion3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1070.004 File Deletion in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1070.004, File Deletion, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1070-004-file-deletion7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1070.00410 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c11 attack_version: "2.0"12 attack_modified: "2026-04-15T20:28:46.342Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1070.004: File Deletion1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1070.004, File Deletion, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1070.00425- Technique name: File Deletion26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/00428- Tactics: stealth29- Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.3738There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) Examples of built-in [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) functions include <code>del</code> on Windows, <code>rm</code> or <code>unlink</code> on Linux and macOS, and `rm` on ESXi.3940## Agent workflow41421. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.432. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.443. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.454. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.465. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.476. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4849## Bundled resources5051- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.52- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.53- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.54- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.55- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.56- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.57- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.58- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.59- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6061To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6263## Detection guidance6465No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6667## Useful telemetry and data sources6869- Not specified in the STIX object.7071## Mitigations to consider7273- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.7475## Known threat context7677Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7879- 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)80- ADVSTORESHELL (malware)81- APT18 (intrusion-set)82- APT28 (intrusion-set)83- APT29 (intrusion-set)84- APT3 (intrusion-set)85- APT32 (intrusion-set)86- APT38 (intrusion-set)87- APT39 (intrusion-set)88- APT41 (intrusion-set)89- APT41 DUST (campaign)90- APT5 (intrusion-set)91- AcidPour (malware)92- Anchor (malware)93- Apostle (malware)94- AppleJeus (malware)95- AppleSeed (malware)96- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)97- ArcaneDoor (campaign)98- Aria-body (malware)99100## Recommended output pattern101102When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:103104- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.105- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.106- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.107- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.108- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.109- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.110111## ATT&CK contributors112113- Walker Johnson