Attack Ent T1070 006 Timestomp

MITRE ATT&CK T1070.006: Timestomp

When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1070.006, Timestomp, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

Technique context

• ATT&CK domain: enterprise
• ATT&CK ID: T1070.006
• Technique name: Timestomp
• Type: sub-technique
• ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006
• Tactics: stealth
• Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows
• Required permissions: Not specified
• Effective permissions: Not specified
• Defenses bypassed: Not specified

ATT&CK description

Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.

In Windows systems, both the $STANDARD_INFORMATION ($SI) and $FILE_NAME ($FN) attributes record times in a Master File Table (MFT) file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022) $SI (dates/time stamps) is displayed to the end user, including in the File System view, while $FN is dealt with by the kernel.(Citation: Magnet Forensics)

Modifying the $SI attribute is the most common method of timestomping because it can be modified at the user level using API calls. $FN timestomping, however, typically requires interacting with the system kernel or moving or renaming a file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022)

Adversaries modify timestamps on files so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. In order to evade detections that rely on identifying discrepancies between the $SI and $FN attributes, adversaries may also engage in “double timestomping” by modifying times on both attributes simultaneously.(Citation: Double Timestomping)

In Linux systems and on ESXi servers, threat actors may attempt to perform timestomping using commands such as touch -a -m -t <timestamp> <filename> (which sets access and modification times to a specific value) or touch -r <filename> <filename> (which sets access and modification times to match those of another file).(Citation: Inversecos Linux Timestomping)(Citation: Juniper Networks ESXi Backdoor 2022)

Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)

Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

Bundled resources

• references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
• references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
• references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
• templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
• templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
• templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
• templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
• scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
• assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

Useful telemetry and data sources

• Not specified in the STIX object.

Mitigations to consider

• No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.

Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

• 3PARA RAT (malware)
• APT28 (intrusion-set)
• APT29 (intrusion-set)
• APT32 (intrusion-set)
• APT38 (intrusion-set)
• APT5 (intrusion-set)
• Attor (malware)
• BLINDINGCAN (malware)
• BOOKWORM (malware)
• BPFDoor (malware)
• Bankshot (malware)
• BitPaymer (malware)
• BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware (malware)
• C0032 (campaign)
• CHIMNEYSWEEP (malware)
• Chimera (intrusion-set)
• China Chopper (malware)
• Cobalt Strike (malware)
• Cutting Edge (campaign)
• Cyclops Blink (malware)

Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

• Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
• Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
• Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
• Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
• Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
• References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

ATT&CK contributors

• Mike Hartley @mikehartley10
• Romain Dumont, ESET