MITRE ATT&CK T1070.006: Timestomp
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1070.006, Timestomp, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1070.006
- Technique name: Timestomp
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006
- Tactics: stealth
- Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.
In Windows systems, both the $STANDARD_INFORMATION ($SI) and $FILE_NAME ($FN) attributes record times in a Master File Table (MFT) file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022) $SI (dates/time stamps) is displayed to the end user, including in the File System view, while $FN is dealt with by the kernel.(Citation: Magnet Forensics)
Modifying the $SI attribute is the most common method of timestomping because it can be modified at the user level using API calls. $FN timestomping, however, typically requires interacting with the system kernel or moving or renaming a file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022)
Adversaries modify timestamps on files so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. In order to evade detections that rely on identifying discrepancies between the $SI and $FN attributes, adversaries may also engage in “double timestomping” by modifying times on both attributes simultaneously.(Citation: Double Timestomping)
In Linux systems and on ESXi servers, threat actors may attempt to perform timestomping using commands such as touch -a -m -t <timestamp> <filename> (which sets access and modification times to a specific value) or touch -r <filename> <filename> (which sets access and modification times to match those of another file).(Citation: Inversecos Linux Timestomping)(Citation: Juniper Networks ESXi Backdoor 2022)
Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 3PARA RAT (malware)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT29 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- APT5 (intrusion-set)
- Attor (malware)
- BLINDINGCAN (malware)
- BOOKWORM (malware)
- BPFDoor (malware)
- Bankshot (malware)
- BitPaymer (malware)
- BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware (malware)
- C0032 (campaign)
- CHIMNEYSWEEP (malware)
- Chimera (intrusion-set)
- China Chopper (malware)
- Cobalt Strike (malware)
- Cutting Edge (campaign)
- Cyclops Blink (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Mike Hartley @mikehartley10
- Romain Dumont, ESET
1---2name: attack-ent-t1070-006-timestomp3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1070.006 Timestomp in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1070.006, Timestomp, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1070-006-timestomp7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1070.00610 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be965761111 attack_version: "2.0"12 attack_modified: "2026-04-15T20:30:57.770Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1070.006: Timestomp1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1070.006, Timestomp, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1070.00625- Technique name: Timestomp26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/00628- Tactics: stealth29- Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.3738In Windows systems, both the `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` (`$SI`) and `$FILE_NAME` (`$FN`) attributes record times in a Master File Table (MFT) file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022) `$SI` (dates/time stamps) is displayed to the end user, including in the File System view, while `$FN` is dealt with by the kernel.(Citation: Magnet Forensics)3940Modifying the `$SI` attribute is the most common method of timestomping because it can be modified at the user level using API calls. `$FN` timestomping, however, typically requires interacting with the system kernel or moving or renaming a file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022)4142Adversaries modify timestamps on files so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. In order to evade detections that rely on identifying discrepancies between the `$SI` and `$FN` attributes, adversaries may also engage in “double timestomping” by modifying times on both attributes simultaneously.(Citation: Double Timestomping)4344In Linux systems and on ESXi servers, threat actors may attempt to perform timestomping using commands such as `touch -a -m -t <timestamp> <filename>` (which sets access and modification times to a specific value) or `touch -r <filename> <filename>` (which sets access and modification times to match those of another file).(Citation: Inversecos Linux Timestomping)(Citation: Juniper Networks ESXi Backdoor 2022)4546Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)4748## Agent workflow49501. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.512. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.523. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.534. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.545. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.556. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5657## Bundled resources5859- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.60- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.61- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.62- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.63- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.64- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.65- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.66- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.67- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6869To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.7071## Detection guidance7273No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.7475## Useful telemetry and data sources7677- Not specified in the STIX object.7879## Mitigations to consider8081- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.8283## Known threat context8485Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8687- 3PARA RAT (malware)88- APT28 (intrusion-set)89- APT29 (intrusion-set)90- APT32 (intrusion-set)91- APT38 (intrusion-set)92- APT5 (intrusion-set)93- Attor (malware)94- BLINDINGCAN (malware)95- BOOKWORM (malware)96- BPFDoor (malware)97- Bankshot (malware)98- BitPaymer (malware)99- BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware (malware)100- C0032 (campaign)101- CHIMNEYSWEEP (malware)102- Chimera (intrusion-set)103- China Chopper (malware)104- Cobalt Strike (malware)105- Cutting Edge (campaign)106- Cyclops Blink (malware)107108## Recommended output pattern109110When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:111112- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.113- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.114- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.115- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.116- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.117- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.118119## ATT&CK contributors120121- Mike Hartley @mikehartley10122- Romain Dumont, ESET