Attack Ent T1070 Indicator Removal

MITRE ATT&CK T1070: Indicator Removal

When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1070, Indicator Removal, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.

Technique context

• ATT&CK domain: enterprise
• ATT&CK ID: T1070
• Technique name: Indicator Removal
• Type: technique
• ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070
• Tactics: stealth
• Platforms: Containers, ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
• Required permissions: Not specified
• Effective permissions: Not specified
• Defenses bypassed: Not specified

ATT&CK description

Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity. Rather than broadly removing evidence, adversaries may target specific artifacts that appear anomalous or are likely to draw scrutiny, while leaving sufficient data intact to maintain the appearance of normal system behavior.

Artifacts such as command histories, log entries, or file metadata may be altered in ways that align with expected user or system activity. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often platform-specific, allowing adversaries to tailor modifications that minimize suspicion.

These actions may not prevent detection entirely but can delay recognition of malicious activity or reduce the fidelity of alerts by making events appear benign or consistent with routine operations. Additionally, selectively removed or modified artifacts may still be recoverable through deeper forensic analysis, though their absence or alteration can complicate timeline reconstruction and attribution.

Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

Bundled resources

• references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
• references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
• references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
• templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
• templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
• templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
• templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
• scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
• assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

Useful telemetry and data sources

• Not specified in the STIX object.

Mitigations to consider

• Encrypt Sensitive Information
• Remote Data Storage
• Restrict File and Directory Permissions

Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

• APT42 (intrusion-set)
• APT5 (intrusion-set)
• BPFDoor (malware)
• Bankshot (malware)
• BlackEnergy (malware)
• CSPY Downloader (tool)
• Cutting Edge (campaign)
• DUSTTRAP (malware)
• DarkWatchman (malware)
• Donut (tool)
• EVILNUM (malware)
• Flagpro (malware)
• FunnyDream (malware)
• HermeticWiper (malware)
• IPsec Helper (malware)
• IronWind (malware)
• Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)
• Maze (malware)
• Metamorfo (malware)
• MultiLayer Wiper (malware)

Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

• Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
• Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
• Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
• Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
• Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
• References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

ATT&CK contributors

• Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman
• Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
• Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender