MITRE ATT&CK T1087.001: Local Account
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1087.001, Local Account, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1087.001
- Technique name: Local Account
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001
- Tactics: discovery
- Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the Net utility and id and groups on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: id man page)(Citation: groups man page) On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS, the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts. On ESXi servers, the esxcli system account list command can list local user accounts.(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Operating System Configuration
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- APT1 (intrusion-set)
- APT3 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 (intrusion-set)
- APT42 (intrusion-set)
- Agent Tesla (malware)
- Bankshot (malware)
- Bazar (malware)
- BitPaymer (malware)
- BloodHound (tool)
- Chimera (intrusion-set)
- Comnie (malware)
- DUSTTRAP (malware)
- Duqu (malware)
- Elise (malware)
- Empire (tool)
- Epic (malware)
- Fox Kitten (intrusion-set)
- GeminiDuke (malware)
- HyperStack (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Daniel Stepanic, Elastic
- Miriam Wiesner, @miriamxyra, Microsoft Security
1---2name: attack-ent-t1087-001-local-account3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1087.001 Local Account in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1087.001, Local Account, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1087.001: Local Account89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1087.001, Local Account, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1087.00117- Technique name: Local Account18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/00120- Tactics: discovery21- Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.2930Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code> on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: id man page)(Citation: groups man page) On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. On macOS, the <code>dscl . list /Users</code> command can be used to enumerate local accounts. On ESXi servers, the `esxcli system account list` command can list local user accounts.(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)3132## Agent workflow33341. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.352. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.363. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.374. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.385. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.396. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4041## Bundled resources4243- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.44- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.45- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.46- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.47- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.48- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.49- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.50- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.51- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5253To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5455## Detection guidance5657No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.5859## Useful telemetry and data sources6061- Not specified in the STIX object.6263## Mitigations to consider6465- Operating System Configuration6667## Known threat context6869Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7071- APT1 (intrusion-set)72- APT3 (intrusion-set)73- APT32 (intrusion-set)74- APT41 (intrusion-set)75- APT42 (intrusion-set)76- Agent Tesla (malware)77- Bankshot (malware)78- Bazar (malware)79- BitPaymer (malware)80- BloodHound (tool)81- Chimera (intrusion-set)82- Comnie (malware)83- DUSTTRAP (malware)84- Duqu (malware)85- Elise (malware)86- Empire (tool)87- Epic (malware)88- Fox Kitten (intrusion-set)89- GeminiDuke (malware)90- HyperStack (malware)9192## Recommended output pattern9394When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:9596- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.97- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.98- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.99- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.100- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.101- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.102103## ATT&CK contributors104105- Daniel Stepanic, Elastic106- Miriam Wiesner, @miriamxyra, Microsoft Security