MITRE ATT&CK T1091: Replication Through Removable Media
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1091, Replication Through Removable Media, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1091
- Technique name: Replication Through Removable Media
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091
- Tactics: initial-access, lateral-movement
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.
Mobile devices may also be used to infect PCs with malware if connected via USB.(Citation: Exploiting Smartphone USB ) This infection may be achieved using devices (Android, iOS, etc.) and, in some instances, USB charging cables.(Citation: Windows Malware Infecting Android)(Citation: iPhone Charging Cable Hack) For example, when a smartphone is connected to a system, it may appear to be mounted similar to a USB-connected disk drive. If malware that is compatible with the connected system is on the mobile device, the malware could infect the machine (especially if Autorun features are enabled).
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
- Disable or Remove Feature or Program
- Limit Hardware Installation
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- ANDROMEDA (malware)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- Agent.btz (malware)
- Aoqin Dragon (intrusion-set)
- CHOPSTICK (malware)
- Conficker (malware)
- Crimson (malware)
- Darkhotel (intrusion-set)
- DustySky (malware)
- FIN7 (intrusion-set)
- Flame (malware)
- Gamaredon Group (intrusion-set)
- H1N1 (malware)
- HIUPAN (malware)
- LuminousMoth (intrusion-set)
- Mustang Panda (intrusion-set)
- PlugX (malware)
- QakBot (malware)
- Ramsay (malware)
- Raspberry Robin (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy
1---2name: attack-ent-t1091-replication-through-removable-media3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1091 Replication Through Removable Media in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1091, Replication Through Removable Media, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and execu…"4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1091-replication-through-removable-media7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T109110 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a411 attack_version: "1.3"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:48:40.752Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1091: Replication Through Removable Media1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1091, Replication Through Removable Media, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T109125- Technique name: Replication Through Removable Media26- Type: technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T109128- Tactics: initial-access, lateral-movement29- Platforms: Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.3738Mobile devices may also be used to infect PCs with malware if connected via USB.(Citation: Exploiting Smartphone USB ) This infection may be achieved using devices (Android, iOS, etc.) and, in some instances, USB charging cables.(Citation: Windows Malware Infecting Android)(Citation: iPhone Charging Cable Hack) For example, when a smartphone is connected to a system, it may appear to be mounted similar to a USB-connected disk drive. If malware that is compatible with the connected system is on the mobile device, the malware could infect the machine (especially if Autorun features are enabled).3940## Agent workflow41421. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.432. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.443. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.454. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.465. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.476. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4849## Bundled resources5051- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.52- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.53- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.54- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.55- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.56- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.57- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.58- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.59- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6061To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6263## Detection guidance6465No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6667## Useful telemetry and data sources6869- Not specified in the STIX object.7071## Mitigations to consider7273- Behavior Prevention on Endpoint74- Disable or Remove Feature or Program75- Limit Hardware Installation7677## Known threat context7879Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8081- ANDROMEDA (malware)82- APT28 (intrusion-set)83- Agent.btz (malware)84- Aoqin Dragon (intrusion-set)85- CHOPSTICK (malware)86- Conficker (malware)87- Crimson (malware)88- Darkhotel (intrusion-set)89- DustySky (malware)90- FIN7 (intrusion-set)91- Flame (malware)92- Gamaredon Group (intrusion-set)93- H1N1 (malware)94- HIUPAN (malware)95- LuminousMoth (intrusion-set)96- Mustang Panda (intrusion-set)97- PlugX (malware)98- QakBot (malware)99- Ramsay (malware)100- Raspberry Robin (malware)101102## Recommended output pattern103104When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:105106- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.107- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.108- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.109- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.110- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.111- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.112113## ATT&CK contributors114115- Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy