MITRE ATT&CK T1102.003: One-Way Communication
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1102.003, One-Way Communication, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1102.003
- Technique name: One-Way Communication
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003
- Tactics: command-and-control
- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows, ESXi
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response.
Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Network Intrusion Prevention
- Restrict Web-Based Content
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- ArcaneDoor (campaign)
- EVILNUM (malware)
- Gamaredon Group (intrusion-set)
- HAMMERTOSS (malware)
- Leviathan (intrusion-set)
- Metamorfo (malware)
- OnionDuke (malware)
- Sagerunex (malware)
- UPSTYLE (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
1---2name: attack-ent-t1102-003-one-way-communication3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1102.003 One-Way Communication in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1102.003, One-Way Communication, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1102.003: One-Way Communication89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1102.003, One-Way Communication, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1102.00317- Technique name: One-Way Communication18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/00320- Tactics: command-and-control21- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows, ESXi22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response.2930Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.3132## Agent workflow33341. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.352. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.363. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.374. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.385. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.396. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4041## Bundled resources4243- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.44- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.45- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.46- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.47- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.48- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.49- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.50- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.51- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5253To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5455## Detection guidance5657No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.5859## Useful telemetry and data sources6061- Not specified in the STIX object.6263## Mitigations to consider6465- Network Intrusion Prevention66- Restrict Web-Based Content6768## Known threat context6970Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7172- ArcaneDoor (campaign)73- EVILNUM (malware)74- Gamaredon Group (intrusion-set)75- HAMMERTOSS (malware)76- Leviathan (intrusion-set)77- Metamorfo (malware)78- OnionDuke (malware)79- Sagerunex (malware)80- UPSTYLE (malware)8182## Recommended output pattern8384When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:8586- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.87- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.88- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.89- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.90- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.91- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
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